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 Between 1790 and 1860, the governance of Baltimore and Philadelphia 
transformed to meet the demands of a capitalist economy predicated on moving people 
and goods ever more rapidly and indiscriminately. Far from being an era of diminished 
governmental oversight, however, the early republic saw a dramatic expansion in local 
and state regulation of urban economies and spaces, as newly minted municipal 
corporations endeavored to carve out spheres of economic and political influence and 
protect consumers and public welfare. They did so through market houses, licensing, 
product inspection, nuisance laws, and a bevy of other instruments. In response, men and 
women from across the social spectrum—from widows selling oranges to railroad 
corporations—shaped urban regulation and promoted their own visions of the market, 
enacting a civic economy. Through a study of thousands of petitions to city leaders, as 
well as city records and legislation, “Civic Economies” builds upon recent scholarship 
that has recovered a robust tradition of regulation in antebellum America. But it goes 
further to show how local variations, competing legal interpretations, and dynamics of 
class, gender, and race suffused regulatory institutions.  
 “Civic Economies” also probes the myriad forms and meanings of capitalism in 
antebellum America. Understanding capitalism in the context of human-scale spaces like 
the market house, sidewalk, and neighborhood, petitioners tended not to view regulation 
and capitalism as oppositional forces. Beginning in the 1820s, however, other 
conceptions of capitalism—emblematized by railroads, global trade, and abstract 
markets—exerted greater influence over urban governance. Increasingly, economic and 
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political elites used regulation to promote the free and efficient circulation of people, 
capital, and goods, rather than to ensure fair competition and just prices. Responsibility 
for market governance devolved from the state to urban capitalists operating through 
corporations and boards of trade. Municipal product inspection collapsed in the 1840s 
under the weight of free trade arguments, while private market houses proliferated at the 
expense of municipal market houses. Meanwhile, city leaders embarked on transforming 
urban space and governance in the image of nineteenth-century liberalism, promoting 
freedom of mobility and anchoring social inequalities in the built landscape—a pair of 
antebellum legacies that continues to shape American urbanism.  
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 1 
Introduction: Locating the Market, the State, and the Public in the Early Republic 
 
 On a summer morning in 1839, a Philadelphia official making his routine circuit 
through one of the city’s street markets happened upon a table of suspicious-looking 
butter. Weighing several lumps of butter on the market scale, his doubts were 
confirmed—they were several ounces lighter than indicated. The market clerk returned to 
the vender’s (or huckster’s) stall and, according to one Baltimore newspaper account, 
proceeded to confiscate “lump after lump” in full view of the shopping public. While 
scenes like this were routine in the antebellum public market, what allegedly happened 
next was not. The huckster, an African American woman described as “an old amazon,” 
did not appreciate the seizure or the clerk’s histrionics. Rather than submit to the 
indignity, she turned the tables and “pounced upon the clerk like a wild cat.” After a brief 
tussle, she had pinned him down, “and taking a lump of butter from him, greased his face, 
filling his mouth, ears, eyes, and nostrils.” To cap off her inversion of authority, “she then 
plunged her hands in her butter tub, and making the lumps into one mass, vociferated, 
‘Now weigh my butter, if you can, puppy—and touch it, if you dare.’” Lest the columnist 
allow comedy to obscure the vignette’s intended lesson, he opined that citizens should 
“mark” her “as a bold-faced swindler, who would cheat them, and flog them to boot.”1  
 The anecdote offers numerous avenues for interpreting society and economy in 
antebellum America. Set during arguably the deepest depression of the nineteenth century, 
the story pointed to the tribulations of men and women who eked out a precarious living 
along the edges of the antebellum economy. Selling from a makeshift stall outside the 
covered portion of the market house, the huckster’s economic marginalization was 
                                                
1 Sun (Baltimore), Aug. 5, 1839; Southern Patriot (Charleston, SC), Aug. 7, 1839. 
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spatially reinforced. Her toil likewise embodied the myriad challenges facing women of 
all backgrounds to sell articles of household production in an economy that devalued 
female labor. Perhaps most palpably, the story highlighted African Americans’ tenuous 
social and economic autonomy in the antebellum North, checked not only by law but also 
by a popular culture that mocked their aspirations and viewed their resistance as riotous. 
That the story was picked up by southern newspapers but did not circulate widely in local 
dailies suggests it was fabricated or embellished to promote a pro-slavery narrative about 
the dangers of abolition. Finally, there was the beleaguered market clerk, an emblem of 
municipal authority in a period of unsettling social and commercial transformation in 
cities like Philadelphia and Baltimore.2  
 The site where these various strands joined, the public market, provides an 
excellent if often overlooked vantage point for exploring the relationship between 
capitalism and governance in the early American republic. Citing the need for consumer 
protection and the potential for spatial and social disorder, eighteenth- and early-
nineteenth-century urban authorities established public markets to channel the urban food 
trade through a few, well-policed points of access. Public markets had been central 
features of the American landscape and linchpins of burgeoning urban economies since 
the seventeenth century. Nevertheless, their place in urban political economy expanded in 
                                                
2 For the precarious freedom of African Americans in Philadelphia and elsewhere in the antebellum North, 
see Gary B. Nash and Jean R. Soderlund, Freedom by Degrees: Emancipation in Philadelphia and Its 
Aftermath (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Erica Armstrong Dunbar, A Fragile Freedom: 
African-American Women and Emancipation in the Antebellum City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008); Samuel Otter, Philadelphia Stories: America’s Literature of Race and Freedom (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010); Shane White, “‘It Was a Proud Day’: African Americans, Festivals, and Parades in 
the North, 1741-1834,” Journal of American History 81, no. 1 (June 1994):13-50; Leslie M. Harris, In the 
Shadow of Slavery: African Americans in New York City, 1626-1863 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003); John Wood Sweet, Bodies Politic: Negotiating Race in the American North, 1730-1830 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003); Joanne Pope Melish, Disowning Slavery: Gradual 
Emancipation and “Race” in New England, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).  
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the early republic, as newly minted municipal corporations acquired greater regulatory 
authority from state legislatures.3 After 1790, city leaders viewed public markets—along 
with a range of other municipal services from waterworks to wharves—as speculative 
civic investments that quickened commercial activity in emerging neighborhoods, 
promoted the city’s reputation and extended its influence, and fostered property values.4 
Yet if public markets succeeded as forms of civic speculation, they proved ineffectual at 
containing and regulating commercial activity. A considerable portion of the country 
provisions that arrived in the city did not make it to market houses but were diverted and 
sold to urban consumers in any number of alternative or informal marketplaces: street 
corners, country roads, taverns, wharves, wagons, and shops of every shape and size 
                                                
3 On public markets in colonial and early national America, see Helen Tangires, Public Markets and Civic 
Culture in Nineteenth-Century America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Candice L. 
Harrison, “The Contest of Exchange: Space, Power, and Politics in Philadelphia’s Public Markets, 1770-
1859” (PhD diss., Emory University, 2008); Emma Hart, Building Charleston: Town and Society in the 
Eighteenth-Century British Atlantic World (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010); Barbara 
Clark Smith, “Markets, Streets, and Stores: Contested Terrain in Pre-industrial Boston,” in Autre Temps, 
Autre Espace/An Other Time, An Other Space, eds. Elise Marienstras and Barbara Karsky (Nancy, France: 
Presses universitaires de Nancy, 1986), 172-197; Gergely Baics, “Feeding Gotham: A Social History of 
Urban Provisioning, 1780-1860” (PhD diss., Northwestern University, 2009); Thomas David Beal, “Selling 
Gotham: The Retail Trade in New York City From the Public Market to Alexander T. Stewart’s Marble 
Palace, 1625-1860” (PhD diss., SUNY-Stony Brook, 1998); Jay R. Barshinger, “Provisions for Trade: The 
Market House in Southeastern Pennsylvania” (PhD diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1995); Karen J. 
Friedmann, “Victualling Colonial Boston,” Agricultural History 47, no. 3 (July 1973): 189-205; Gergely 
Baics, “Is Access to Food a Public Good? Meat Provisioning in Early New York City, 1790-1820,” Journal 
of Urban History 39 (July 2013): 643-668; Tracey Deutsch, “Putting Commerce in Its Place: Public 
Markets in U.S. History” (review of Tangires, Public Markets), American Quarterly 56, no. 2 (June 2004): 
481-488. 
4 On the development of municipal power and its relationship to other sources of state authority after the 
1790s, see Jon C. Teaford, The Municipal Revolution in America: Origins of Modern Urban Government, 
1650-1825 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975); Hendrik Hartog, Public Property and Private 
Power: The Corporation of the City of New York in American Law, 1730-1870 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1983), 69-175; Leonard P. Curry, The Corporate City: The American City as a Political Entity, 
1800-1850 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997); Eric H. Monkkonen, America Becomes Urban: The 
Development of U.S. Cities and Towns, 1780-1980 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Robin 
L. Einhorn, Property Rules: Political Economy in Chicago, 1833-1872 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991); Amy Bridges, A City in the Republic: Antebellum New York and the Origins of Machine 
Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987); Richardson Dilworth, ed., The City in American Political 
Development (New York: Routledge, 2009); Robert M. Ireland, “The Problem of Local, Private, and 
Special Legislation in the Nineteenth-Century United States,” American Journal of Legal History 46 
(2004): 271-299; Jon Teaford, “City Versus State: The Struggle for Legal Ascendancy,” American Journal 
of Legal History 17 (1973): 51-65. 
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throughout the city.5  
 To govern these alternative marketplaces, municipal and state authorities enacted 
a flurry of legislation between 1790 and 1860. Public markets anchored this vision of a 
well-regulated economy in the built landscape, but they were not the only or most far-
reaching elements of urban political economy. Legislation weighed factors like consumer 
protection and the city’s commercial reputation against the municipal corporation’s 
limited financial and administrative resources. Regulations drew largely from common 
law doctrine, but they were not ossified or regressive. Authorities molded older 
regulatory instruments, particularly market, licensing, inspection, and nuisance laws, to 
accommodate a range of new uses in the early republic. This echoes Morton Horwitz’s 
assertion that antebellum courts “self-consciously employed the common law as a 
creative instrument for directing men’s energies toward social change.”6 But whereas 
Horowitz viewed courts’ efforts as generally promoting private property and enterprise, 
this dissertation joins other works in recovering the prevalence of the public good in legal 
                                                
5 The literature on consumer culture in antebellum America is surprisingly thin, given the emphasis placed 
on consumerism in the periods bookending it. For a recent work that addresses this gap, see Wendy A. 
Woloson, “Wishful Thinking: Retail Premiums in Mid-Nineteenth-Century America,” Enterprise & Society 
13, no. 4 (2012): 790-831. The landscape is even sparser for antebellum consumer politics, though this is 
beginning to change. See for instance Ellen Hartigan-O’Connor, “‘Auctioneer of Offices’: Patronage, 
Value, and Trust in the Early Republic Marketplace,” Journal of the Early Republic 33, no. 3 (Fall 2013): 
466-467; Joanna Cohen, “‘The Right to Purchase Is as Free as the Right to Sell’: Defining Consumers as 
Citizens in the Auction-house Conflicts of the Early Republic,” Journal of the Early Republic 30, no. 1 
(Spring 2010): 25-62; Cohen, “‘Millions of Luxurious Citizens’: Consumption and Citizenship in the 
Urban Northeast, 1800-1865” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2009).  
6 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1977), 1. See also Kunal M. Parker, Common Law, History, and Democracy in America, 1790-1900: 
Legal Thought before Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Kermit L. Hall, “The 
Courts, 1790-1920,” in The Cambridge History of Law in America: Volume 2, eds. Michael Grossberg and 
Christopher Tomlins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 106-132; Tony A. Freyer, “Legal 
Innovation and Market Capitalism, 1790-1920,” in Grossberg and Tomlins, Cambridge History of Law, 
449-482; Donald J. Pisani, “Promotion and Regulation: Constitutionalism and the American Economy,” 
Journal of American History 74, no. 3 (Dec. 1987): 740-768; William E. Nelson, Americanization of the 
Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1975); Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American Republic 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
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and popular discourse. Exploding the myth that antebellum America was a laissez-faire 
society governed by a weak state, William Novak and other scholars of American 
political development have pointed to the “extraordinary breadth and variety” of local 
and state laws as evidence of “a strong regulatory tradition” that ensured public good 
trumped private interest.7 
 It is readily evident from a glance at city ordinances from the 1790s to 1850s that 
there indeed was an unflagging, even escalating, commitment to regulating the urban 
economy. But the annually published digests of ordinances and statutes obscure as much 
as they illuminate about the nature of regulation on the ground.8 Ordinances represented 
                                                
7 Pointing to the need to “rethink the early American state,” Novak, Richard John, and others view the 
groundswell of local and state laws as evidence of the legislature’s importance as a locus of antebellum 
state authority, countering Horwitz, among others, who considers the courtroom as the central site of 
antebellum law. This dissertation follows, in part, from Novak’s call to explore “the interconnections 
between formal legislatures and other lesser legislating bodies that allowed for a high degree of 
coordination, standardization, and integration in the early American state irrespective of court action or 
party politics.” William J. Novak, “A State of Legislatures,” Polity 40, no. 3 (July 2008): 343; Richard R. 
John, “Rethinking the Early American State,” ibid., 332-339. See also Brian Balogh, A Government Out of 
Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Mark R. Wilson, “Law and the American State, from the Revolution to the Civil 
War: Institutional Growth and Structural Change,” in Grossberg and Tomlins, Cambridge History of Law, 
1-35; Richard R. John, “Governmental Institutions as Agents of Change: Rethinking American Political 
Development in the Early Republic, 1787-1835,” Studies in American Political Development 11 (1997): 
347-380; William J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American State,” American Historical Review 113, 
no. 2 (2008): 752-772; Ira Katznelson, “On Rewriting the Epic of America,” in Shaped by War and Trade: 
International Influences on American Political Development, eds. Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003): 3-23; Jeffrey L. Pasley, Andrew W. Robertson, and David 
Waldstreicher, eds., Beyond the Founders: New Approaches to the Political History of the Early American 
Republic (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). For two classic works that portray the 
antebellum state as weak or decentralized, see James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in 
the Nineteenth-Century United States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1956); Louis Hartz, The 
Liberal Tradition in America (New York: Harcourt, 1955). For a work that situates these works in a 
broader context, see James T. Kloppenberg, “In Retrospect: Louis Hartz’s The Liberal Tradition in 
America,” Reviews in American History 29, no. 3 (2001): 460-476. For earlier, “Progressive school” works 
on the active role of the state in economic development, and which have influenced the more recent 
recovery of a “strong regulatory tradition,” see Oscar Handlin and Mary Flug Handlin, Commonwealth: A 
Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861, rev. edn. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: 
Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948). 
8 Laura Edwards has developed a similar argument regarding the proliferation of legal compilations in the 
1840s and 1850s, which attributed an appearance of uniformity and authority to the law: “The resulting 
volumes were not just compilations of facts. They forced existing laws into a unitary body, creating the 
impression of orderly progress over time.” Laura F. Edwards, The People and Their Peace: Legal Culture 
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just one step in a legal continuum, situated between petitions, which most often initiated 
the process of drawing up and voting on an ordinance, and enforcement in the streets and 
courts. Moreover, there was more room for maneuvering—for gray areas between licit 
and illicit—than the text of the ordinances suggested. The multiplicity of social practices 
and identities that constituted the antebellum city was not so easily categorized or policed 
by these ordinances, as Hendrik Hartog has shown. In his example, laws prohibiting pigs 
from roaming New York City streets ran up against the entrenched custom of treating 
streets as an urban commons, particularly in working-class neighborhoods at the edges of 
settlement. New York’s city council passed a steady stream of revised and new 
ordinances, with little effect. It was not until the cholera epidemic of 1849, thirty or forty 
years after they were first passed, that these laws were enforced with regularity.9 
Attempts to remove pigs and other purported nuisances from Philadelphia and Baltimore 
streets were similarly protracted and disputed, as petitions from the 1840s and 1850s 
show. 
 Petitions provide a unique window onto popular constructions of law and the 
economy. While “petitioning has a notably discontinuous history,” according to one 
scholar, the early republic witnessed a surge in petitioning as a form of political 
engagement. The most notable and dramatic use of petitioning occurred when female 
antislavery activists circulated memorials to Congress, collecting over three million 
signatures between 1831 and 1863 and prompting proslavery politicians to declare the 
                                                                                                                                            
and the Transformation of Inequality in the Post-Revolutionary South (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009), 39. 
9 Hendrik Hartog, “Pigs and Positivism,” Wisconsin Law Review (July/August 1985): 899-935. For a more 
recent work that places this contest in its political context, see Catherine McNeur, “The ‘Swinish 
Multitude’: Controversies Over Hogs in Antebellum New York City,” Journal of Urban History 37, no. 5 
(Sept. 2011): 639-660. See also Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories,” Stanford Law Review 36 
(Jan. 1984): 57-125. 
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infamous gag rule in the late 1830s. This well-known example formed only a part of the 
wider political culture of petitioning in the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century 
Atlantic world. Petitions provided men and, in particular, women a means to insert 
themselves in public debate and communicate not only with politicians but also with one 
another. Writing about the post-Revolutionary period, another historian has observed that 
“petitioners chose increasingly forthright language” in their appeals to legal bodies, 
“reveal[ing] their impatience at governmental delay or neglect,” especially in matters of 
economic significance. Edmund Morgan noted, more circumspectly, that petitioning was 
often a rote exercise, an act of “ventriloquism.” Still, it “nourished the fiction of the 
people’s capacity to speak for themselves.”10  
 At the extremely local level, however, petitions nourished far more than a fiction. 
Petitions not only gave ordinary people a vehicle for articulating their expectations of 
authorities but also captured their economic and political worldviews in their own 
language—whether formulaic or not. Petitioning constituted a civic dialogue about the 
appropriate uses of public space, the legitimate sphere of governmental activity, and the 
meanings of fair competition and free trade. The active process of petitioning—going 
from door to door or market stall to market stall for signatures, writing up counter-
                                                
10 Colin Leys, “Petitioning in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries,” Political Studies 3, no. 1 (1955): 
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into the politics of petitioning in the antislavery movement, see Susan Zaeske, Signatures of Citizenship: 
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petitions, and delivering the document to city leaders—constituted a vital, if overlooked, 
aspect of the political life of antebellum cities. They were thoroughly political documents, 
from the way in which the petitioners identified themselves at the outset (as property 
owners, longtime residents, widows, and so forth) to their signatures, which ranged from 
one or two to several thousand. More demonstrably, petitions shaped legislative agendas. 
City councils waded through hundreds of petitions annually, a large portion of which 
requested or proposed specific regulatory action. Some simply asked to be allowed to 
place an awning over the sidewalk in front of their storefront. Others called for 
modifications in how coal was measured at public weigh houses or where bacon venders 
were allowed to sell. Still others used their petitions to pivot from a critique of specific 
policies to a more thorough analysis of social and economic inequalities produced or 
reinforced by the law. Authorities read and deliberated about all of them.  
 Alongside the replies and reports of countless city officials, the several thousand 
antebellum petitions preserved in Baltimore’s exceptional municipal archives exhibit the 
workings of a vernacular political economy—the civic economy. The civic economy 
resembles William Novak’s conception of the public economy as “the rules by which the 
people would acquire and exchange food and goods,” which were based on “fair dealing, 
fair price, [and] honest labor.”11 But the civic economy pushes this model further to 
consider how men and women, acting out of self-interest or self-preservation, 
manipulated the rules of exchange. Some did so simply by disregarding the rules, but 
                                                
11 William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law & Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America (Chapel 
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most worked through the law to enact their own understanding of a well-regulated 
marketplace. Politics and power suffused the civic economy, often in the guise of the 
public good—an increasingly malleable concept in a period where the social and spatial 
boundaries of the public were fluid, disputed, and vigorously patrolled.12 Likewise, the 
civic economy acknowledges the various motivations of authorities charged with the 
responsibility of mediating the people’s competing claims to the urban marketplace and 
its regulation. Beyond its implications for the study of the state in antebellum America, 
focusing on the civic economy yields new insights into the kaleidoscopic urban 
marketplace. 
 Above all, the civic economy embodied antebellum Americans’ ambivalence 
towards capitalism. This ambivalence has been well documented, parsed, and debated.13 
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As a recent volume puts it, “it was far from obvious” to antebellum observers “that a 
system of profitmaking based on the perpetual movement of goods and persons could 
possibly serve as the foundation of public order and stable government.”14 It is notable 
that none of the documented petitions employed the term “capitalism,” and only a few 
referred to more commonly used concepts like free trade in the 1840s and 1850s. Read 
one way, this elision lends credence to the “market revolution” thesis, which contends 
there was a viral strain of anti-capitalism that persisted until at least the Civil War. In this 
interpretation, “democracy was born in tension with capitalism,” which increasingly 
came to exert a hegemonic force over all aspects of life between 1815 and 1860. 
Moreover, the language of the petitions would seem to indicate the continuing force of 
moral economy in American society. Appeals to custom, tradition, and just prices, calls 
to root out conspiratorial middlemen, and claims to the street and market house as urban 
commons all were routine in antebellum petitions.15  
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 This dissertation offers another interpretation of petitioners’ economic vocabulary. 
It views petitions as part of a broader civic contest over what capitalism meant in practice. 
Without discounting the influence of the urban middle classes and elite—whose 
paternalism and property interests powerfully shaped the contours of this contest—this 
dissertation employs its unique body of sources to show how poorer urban residents 
articulated more democratic visions of capitalism. Through the civic economy, thousands 
of urban residents sought to justify and carve out space for an informal marketplace of 
goods. As Seth Rockman and others have shown, plebeian economic activities often 
straddled cultural and legal distinctions between licit and illicit, facilitating an insecure 
but potentially profitable economic landscape for men and women with ambition and 
resourcefulness, if not resources. To counter abstract forces beyond their control and the 
vagaries of daily life, poor men and women collaborated in shopping networks, pooled 
resources, bartered, negotiated, and exercised creativity in ways that blurred neat 
categories of legitimate and illegitimate consumption. These men and women loosened 
the boundaries of legitimate commerce and provide a compelling illustration that 
antebellum capitalism did not operate under its own power but rather was fashioned by 
numerous visible hands. Formal and informal markets not only shaped but more often 
collapsed into one another.16  
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 A focus on the civic economy also highlights the importance of space to 
antebellum understandings of capitalism. Historians’ attempts to interpret this spatial 
logic typically begin and end with the antebellum achievement of “annihilating space and 
time” via the railroad. And it will be seen that the railroad, along with other revolutions in 
transportation and communication, did play a transformative role in the civic economy. In 
particular, the desire to make the city “a mere place of transit” reframed the imperatives 
of urban governance to facilitate the unimpeded movement of people, goods, and capital. 
Cities competed with one another to capture the greatest market share, which urban 
boosters quantified not only in terms of bushels and dollars but also in terms of 
geographic reach and the speed with which certain commodities traveled from rural 
producers to the city.17  
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 For most operating in the civic economy, however, there were more immediate 
and prosaic ways of interpreting the geographies of capitalism. Petitions often dealt with 
how to allocate space in the urban marketplace: who could access market stalls, how far 
into the sidewalk shopkeepers could advertise their products, which streets were suitable 
for omnibuses, and so forth. The market was as much a space as a process, and as such it 
required the careful orchestration of how people and things moved through it. Authorities 
and residents alike framed most urban problems and solutions as matters of circulation 
and mobility. They inherited conceptual frameworks from eighteenth-century city fathers, 
who saw government, according to Michel Foucault, as “a matter of organizing 
circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad 
circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad.”18  The fact that 
much of what was circulating was food only heightened the perceived need for 
supervision. As late as 1856, Philadelphia officials declared responsibility for regulating 
“the sale of that most important object of trade—the food of the million.” With the urban 
food supply becoming progressively mediated, however, questions of public health 
played an ever more central role in the civic economy. As food traveled greater distance, 
a revised understanding of the market’s scale emerged to accommodate this spatial and 
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 This dissertation “locates” the market, the state, and the public in two of 
antebellum America’s three largest cities, Baltimore and Philadelphia. There are several 
advantages to focusing on these two cities beyond their rich and complementary source 
materials. First, they illustrate the localized nature of regulation. Scholarship on 
regulation typically takes one of two forms. One generalizes from a specific locale—
usually New York, which, though influential, was no more representative of antebellum 
cities than any other (and in fact was highly unusual given its Dutch roots).20 The other 
draws upon a number of state or city case studies, which offers the benefit of a more 
comprehensive study but does so at the expense of local particularities and richer context. 
By examining two locations in depth, this dissertation endeavors to scale between the 
local and the general. The recent work of Laura Edwards on localized legal cultures in 
antebellum North and South Carolina provides a compelling illustration of the benefits in 
studying two places side-by-side, in conversation if not in direct comparison. Just as this 
approach enables Edwards to paint a detailed portrait of the struggles to enact a more 
centralized, top-down legal culture in the Carolinas, juxtaposing Baltimore and 
Philadelphia reveals more complex historical trajectories of regulation and capitalism 
than a study of either city in isolation would offer.21   
 Second, the two cities provide a clear illustration of the role of urban rivalry in 
shaping the civic economy. As the two principal cities of the Mid-Atlantic, inhabiting the 
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same Susquehanna watershed, they took pains to compare not only their export and 
population statistics but also the cleanliness of their public markets, the brightness of 
their apples, and even the vocal range of their street criers. Authorities in both cities 
employed regulation not only to preserve order but also to create economic advantage.22 
Yet they also learned how to govern from each other. Following the incorporation of 
Philadelphia in 1789 and Baltimore in 1797, city officials frequently communicated, 
requesting assistance in locating runaways or counterfeiters, sharing insight about the 
benefits and drawbacks of certain municipal reforms, and exchanging gratis copies of 
published city ordinances. To be sure, there were decided differences in the social and 
economic life of the two cities, none more palpable than the fact that antebellum 
Baltimore was home to several thousand slaves while Philadelphia had none. 
Nevertheless, as two cities that experienced many of the same effects of rapid 
urbanization and commercialization between 1790 and 1860, their civic economies 
possessed more commonalities than differences. Moreover, the presence of these 
commonalities serves to make the differences all the more illuminative of the range of 
possibilities within the broader process of capitalist transformation. 
 
 “Civic Economies” takes an out-and-back journey through the urban marketplace. 
It begins in Chapter One with the public market and charts the various ways in which 
Philadelphia and Baltimore literally and figuratively drew nourishment from the 
institution. As nodes around which city neighborhoods grew in population and in 
business activity, public markets influenced the pace and character of urban development. 
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Recognizing this, residents waged petition battles over the exact placement of new 
market houses and the management of existing ones. City lawmakers also understood the 
significance of these spaces for providing fresh and fairly priced food for the people, as 
well as for increasing property value. Consequently, they exerted great time, effort, and 
cost in regulating public markets. A well-ordered system of market houses not only made 
for a healthy civic body but also enabled the city to draw more farmers and products to 
the city. Situated at either end of a fertile agricultural region, Baltimore and Philadelphia 
(as well as other cities, from New York to Norfolk) competed for the best produce and 
lowest prices, prompting city promoters to view public markets in the same light as other 
agents of urban imperialism, including the railroad. Yet by the 1830s, some critics 
viewed public markets as out of sync with the imperatives of capitalism—particularly in 
the municipal market system’s emphasis on managing and containing the circulation of 
people and produce—as well as the evolving urban landscape.  
 Chapter Two moves outward from the public market to consider licensing, which 
served as a gatekeeping mechanism for the broader urban marketplace. Characterized by 
some scholars as little more than a means of raising revenue and by others as a form of 
social control, licensing occupied a prominent place in antebellum debates over the role 
of the state in regulating society and trade. This chapter places the political agitation over 
liquor licensing into a broader context of disputes over what privileges a license entailed, 
how licenses were distinct from taxes, and whether a license conferred legitimacy or not. 
Retailers of nearly every description were required to take out a license in the antebellum 
period, particularly in Maryland, which passed the most robust license laws in the nation 
in the 1820s. For some, taking out a license simply meant paying an annual fee to cover 
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the presumed public costs of their regulation. For those in trades deemed dangerous to 
public morals or health (intentionally elastic designations), it required paying costly fees 
and proving good character in court. While auctioneers and shopkeepers saw licenses as a 
tax or economic regulation, poorer tradespeople often experienced them as moral 
regulations that limited geographic and social mobility. If licensing became a more 
passive and liberal instrument of governance for “respectable” trades by the 1830s and 
1840s, the opposite was true for trades viewed as operating in the shadows, such as 
pawnbroking and tavernkeeping.  
 Licensing represented one of the most malleable regulatory instruments at the 
disposal of city and state authorities, but product inspection was the most ambitious, as 
Chapter Three shows. Between the 1790s and 1820s, Philadelphia and Baltimore 
authorities crafted legislation that established stringent product standards in order to 
promote their cities’ reputations in an expanding global economy. Their efforts were 
encapsulated in the municipal brand, the mark that official inspectors placed (or did not 
place) on the barrels of flour, corn, beef, fish, potash, and other commodities that coursed 
through the ports. The inspection system sought to give local and state authorities control 
over the entire commodity chain, from harvest to hearth. The effects of inspection were 
not borne equally throughout the chain, and artisans, farmers, and laborers frequently 
bemoaned the various costs they incurred. Indeed, many obstacles remained to 
standardizing commodities and their producers, not least of which was the fact that the 
inspection system required space and time, two increasingly scarce entities in the urban 
marketplace. With the rise of new means of transportation, merchants who long had 
supported efforts to promote the municipal brand soon called for the elimination of 
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impediments to the rapid and indiscriminate circulation of commodities through the city, 
citing the imperatives of free trade and competitive advantage. Local and state inspection 
systems collapsed swiftly in the late 1840s and early 1850s, as city leaders established 
free trade zones that encouraged transshipment. Meanwhile, merchants began to institute 
their own standards to lend order to the global flow of commerce, replacing the municipal 
brand with the merchant’s brand. 
 Returning from the wharf to the neighborhood, Chapter Four explores the poor 
men and women who insinuated themselves into the daily operations of the urban 
economy. Articulating between city and countryside, as well as between different 
neighborhoods in the city, hucksters performed crucial functions in supplying urban 
consumers with basic provisions. Their mobility, which enabled them to mediate between 
rural producers and urban consumers, provoked heated debate over whether these men 
and women were vital ligaments in a rapidly expanding commercial society or parasites 
that paid no rent and preyed on the public. Authorities found themselves alternately 
unwilling and unable to prevent huckstering, whether out of a sense of patriarchal 
benevolence or recognition of the limitations of public markets. As a result, what few 
ordinances were passed restricting hucksters seldom were enforced—and when they were, 
as in the purported butter tale that opened this introduction, they frequently met with 
vigorous defenses of huckster autonomy. That did not mean huckstering went 
unregulated, only that social authorities did the policing. For an emerging middle class, 
hucksters were targets for broader anxieties about the dominance of intermediaries in the 
national market economy and the disordering of urban space. Hucksters’ mixed social 
composition influenced middle- and upper-class perceptions of their activities as uncouth, 
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promiscuous, and utterly unproductive. Yet the huckster vision of capitalism—where 
convenience was a commodity and the entire city was an unbounded bazaar—powerfully 
shaped the retail geography that emerged in the 1850s. 
 Chapter Five concludes with the destruction of a public market—Philadelphia’s 
170-year-old High Street Market, to be precise—and the uneven rise of the liberal city 
and its emphasis on free circulation. By the 1850s, municipal authorities faced what they 
viewed as a problem of scale: how to govern an increasingly populous, diverse, and 
sprawling city. It appeared to social and political leaders that well-established 
mechanisms for ensuring public order were failing, evidenced by a surge in popular 
violence, immorality, and illicit commerce. One proposed solution, which has been 
widely studied, was the growth and professionalization of urban policing. The 
proliferation of uniformed policemen, however, was but one facet of a larger project to 
remake the city as a modern, self-governing, and above all orderly system of circulation. 
The concept of public convenience eclipsed the public good as the driving force behind 
efforts to facilitate the free movement of people and goods through the city. Taking on 
new financial burdens and imposing new taxes, municipal authorities expanded urban 
services from water and sewerage to street lighting and firefighting. Philadelphia 
lawmakers attempted to do the same with the city’s public market system, but their 
efforts stalled. In place of the municipal market system emerged a private food economy 
that prioritized convenience and freedom of movement over consumer protection. Public 
markets remained features of the urban landscape in both cities, but their influences as 
spaces of economy and governance waned while their role as civic centers persisted. 
 By 1860, then, the civic economy had evolved dramatically, if not in a unilinear 
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fashion. The rise of the liberal city did not eliminate more vernacular understandings of 
urban political economy, which was characterized by a human-scale understanding of 
capitalism and markets—with a focus on market houses, street corners, and 
neighborhoods. But as the conflicts over inspection and High Street Market, in particular, 
illustrate, there was another form of capitalism that subsumed these vernacular, localized 
constructions. Industrial-scale capitalism—with its emphasis on global networks, rapid 
and cheap transportation, and high degree of capitalization—exerted increasing influence 






Chapter 1: Marketing Place and Space 
 
  The market represented many things to many people in antebellum America. “The 
name market is a very common one found in nearly all the principal cities and towns—I 
may say—in the Universe,” nineteenth-century butcher-historian Thomas De Voe wrote. 
There were money markets, cattle markets, cotton markets, and produce markets. 
Moreover, each city was its own market, holding sway over the products and producers 
of its hinterlands. As transportation and communications revolutions obliterated previous 
constraints of time and space, newspapers breathlessly recorded commodity prices and 
trends under headlines of “The Baltimore Market” or “Philadelphia’s Market.” The 
above-mentioned revolutions likewise facilitated the development of a more abstract 
understanding of the market as a process, divorced from the market as a place. Despite 
the proliferation of “markets,” however, most nineteenth-century Americans understood 
the market as a physical space, or as De Voe put it, “a mart, where merchants meet who 
traffic in all kinds of provisions”—a public market.1  
 The early-nineteenth-century public market was not simply a physical vessel for 
an assortment of economic and social transactions. It anchored a vernacular 
understanding of urban political economy that was both durable and fraught. The market 
house was the physical embodiment of the civic economy, a crucible of exchange and 
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cooperation as well as deception and discord.2 As the interface between city and 
countryside, the market house underscored the interdependence of urban and rural 
consumers and producers. But the market house also reproduced the political and social 
tensions arising from the increased commercialization of agricultural production. This 
was evident whenever city and state lawmakers came to an impasse over market 
regulations, butchers and farmers challenged one another’s claims to market stalls, 
farmers sold their produce to faraway merchants, and customers complained to venders 
about rising prices and declining quality. As hubs of both retail and wholesale trade, 
public markets also operated within different registers of exchange—they were intensely 
local institutions, but they were also spaces of regional and global commerce. This, too, 
produced disagreement over which types of commercial activity should be prioritized or 
even permitted in the public market—that which sustained the immediate neighborhood 
or that which promoted the city or region’s economic position vis-à-vis its competitors. 
 To manage the public market and its myriad uses and meanings, the municipal 
corporation devoted considerable effort in crafting legislation, maintaining the physical 
infrastructures of the market system, and mediating the public’s conflicting claims to the 
space. 
As an instrument of governance, the public market provided a coherent object of 
regulation, concentrating a number of potentially problematic activities in a well-defined 
space. Or that was the idea, at least. Indeed, the notion of a spatially and temporally 
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bounded marketplace—captured in the phrase, “within the limits of the market”—was 
problematic in a commercial society predicated on the rapid circulation of people and 
commodities. Moreover, in defining the market as a space of governmental intervention, 
the municipal corporation weighed the public market’s many utilities—ensuring 
consumer protection, catalyzing residential growth, drawing agricultural trade away from 
competing cities, and fostering civic identification—against the financial exigencies of 
running a city. After 1820, the pressure to make the public market more profitable to the 
municipal corporation frequently ran crosswise to the visions that consumers, venders, 
and farmers held for the market as a space of economic democracy. Nevertheless, despite 
mounting pressures from within and without, the public market proved a highly dynamic 
and adaptable institution, capable of withstanding and mediating the various claims made 
on it. Thus the public market served as the principal axis of the well-regulated economy, 
sustained the physical growth of the city and its neighborhoods, and manifested the 
public’s evolving and competing understandings of economic democracy—in short, it 
embodied the civic economy.  
 
I. Locating the market in space, place, and time 
 While only one hundred miles, less than a day’s journey by water, separated 
Philadelphia and Baltimore, circumstances led to distinctive public market traditions. 
With its emphasis on regularity and order, William Penn’s 1681 plan for Philadelphia 
only begrudgingly made room for a public marketplace. Evincing ambivalence about the 
role of commerce in the colony, Penn did not assign a place to market houses in the 




authority to build and regulate marketplaces. Colonists preempted this mandate—or, as a 
writer in 1853 put it, “Trade proved stronger than Penn’s purpose.”3 By 1682, shortly 
after settlement, farmers, residents, artisans, merchants, and local Indians had established 
their own trading spaces and routines. In 1693, three distinct spaces were being used to 
conduct trade, at which time the provincial council declared “that the place for the 
markett be in the High-street, wher the second street Crosses it, and in no other place.”4 
Situated along an east-west axis of governmental structures, from the courthouse to the 
jail, High Street Market, one observer averred, stood “in the most convenient and public 
part of the settlement (Fig. 1.1).”5  
 In 1751, as Philadelphia’s population surpassed 25,000, Baltimore remained a 
loosely assembled town of a few hundred souls, subservient to the political and 
commercial interests of Annapolis and the state’s slaveholding elite. Taking stock of their 
fledgling settlement’s potential as a port, fourteen of Baltimore’s leading men recognized 
the latent value of a market house for current residents, neighboring communities dotting 
the Patapsco basin, and settlers yet to come. For “the further Encouragement and 
Improvement of Baltimore Town,” these town fathers “Promis[ed] and Oblige[d]” 
themselves to furnish the funds necessary “for Purchasing a Lott or Lotts, whereon to 
Build a Market House, Town House, and other Necessary Buildings for the Benefit of 
said Town, and conveniency of such Persons as bring their Butcher’s meat, and other 
commodities to sell at Market in the said Town.” Inhabitants took out subscriptions, and 
                                                
3 North American, May 28, 1853; John W. Reps, The Making of Urban America: A History of City 
Planning in the United States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), 160-174. 
4 Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1852), 1:28-33, 388, 392; John Fanning 
Watson, Annals of Philadelphia, and Pennsylvania, in the Olden Time… (Philadelphia, 1884), 3:183-85; 
James Mease, The Picture of Philadelphia: Being an Account of its Origins, Increase and Improvements… 
(Philadelphia, 1811), 116-117. 
5 De Voe, “Public Markets of Philadelphia”; Thompson Westcott to Thomas De Voe, Dec. 17, 1862, 




Centre, or Marsh, Market was completed a decade later.6 Indeed, for most seventeenth- 
and eighteenth-century Americans, to effectively build a town required establishing a 
conveniently located and well-regulated space of trade. “If there is no market,” Fernand 
Braudel posited, “a town is inconceivable,” for urban development was “rooted in and 
nourished by the people and land surrounding it.”7 Even Boston, where retailers railed 
against commercial restrictions, sustained a system of public markets.8 For Baltimore’s 
early leaders, the mere presence of a market space distinguished the up-and-coming town 
from the humble village. 
 While English patterns most influenced the architecture and governance of public 
markets in colonial and early national America, both free and unfree residents adapted the 
market spaces of American towns to fulfill their expectations of what a market should be. 
French and Spanish public square traditions influenced New Orleans’ marketplaces in 
space and practice, Dutch traders transplanted their market culture to New York’s 
markets, and the eighteenth-century influx of German settlers contributed to the culinary, 
linguistic, and architectural qualities of mid-Atlantic market houses. Finally, African 
slaves and free blacks abounded in coastal market towns, shaping the distinctive 
foodways, negotiating practices, and social systems—“market cultures”—that emerged in 
Atlantic-oriented cities.9 Situated at the confluence of these distinct traditions, market 
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houses occupied a prominent place in the built, cultural, and economic landscapes of the 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American city.10 
 Public markets enhanced a town’s prospects and solidified its stature within a web 
of exchange increasing in size and complexity. As the two cities’ preeminent market 
houses, Centre and High Street markets stood poised at the confluence of local and 
international streams of trade. From the start, Centre and High Street markets catered to a 
cosmopolitan as well as local clientele. This was evident in their placement, abutting the 
waterfront on one end and, on the other, the main road leading to the countryside. The 
dense commercial networks in which public markets were embedded guided the 
decisions of all market-goers, who had increased access to information about 
commodities and prices thanks to the proliferation of newspapers in the eighteenth 
century. Public markets’ adaptability in serving retailers and buyers, big and small, 
enabled port cities to earn sustained access to an “empire of goods” and laid the base for 
a more complex urban service economy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries.11 
 The commercial effects of public markets were not restricted to market day. Long 
before central retail districts were the urban norm, businesses of all forms congregated in 
the streets and storefronts adjacent to public markets. Hucksters and peddlers scoured the 
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streets leading to and from the market, sizing up articles and haggling over prices with 
farmers and customers. Prostitutes and brothels found ample patronage among the 
itinerant strangers, from wealthy merchants to sailors, who collected in the neighborhood 
of the marketplace. Boarding houses, hotels, and taverns serviced farmers and other 
travelers. In more sparsely settled neighborhoods, tavern yards operated as impromptu 
marketplaces.12 Those with capital to invest in real estate benefited even more from 
proximity to public markets. Wholesaling depots capitalized on convenient access to 
provisions, while shopkeepers and auctioneers took advantage of increased pedestrian 
traffic. When Baltimore flour merchants Thomas McElderry and Cumberland Dugan 
simultaneously erected a row of houses with commercial and warehouse space on piers at 
the foot of Centre Market in 1796, they banked on the continuing symbiosis of the local 
provisions economy and the broader maritime economy (Fig. 1.2).  
 The architectural sophistication and ambition of McElderry and Dugan’s 
speculative rowhouses was not mirrored in the market’s more humble façade. Prior to the 
trend of constructing ornate, mixed-use market halls, beginning with Boston’s Quincy 
Market in 1824, market houses were rough and ready structures. The dominant type of 
market building in early America, the freestanding, open-air shed, had been standard in 
England and continental Europe for centuries. Sheds lent themselves to being built down 
the center of wide streets, which were already publicly owned and facilitated the 
movement of shoppers, venders, and wagons through and past the markets. An English 
visitor to Philadelphia wryly noted that “the great market of Philadelphia” made “no 
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pretension to architectural beauty.”13 Disapproving of overelaborate market halls like 
Quincy Market, another commentator celebrated the functionality of the simple shed: 
“The convenience of a market-house is, to have it long, narrow, and open, on all sides, so 
that the articles may be spread abroad, and the people may have both room and light.”14 
Many others shared her predilection for plainness, not least of all for its cheap costs. 
 Perhaps the most well known example of the shed style, the High Street 
shambles—an early-modern term for market stalls that was gradually becoming 
synonymous with disorder by the nineteenth century—served as an important point of 
reference for Americans in the early republic. One visitor to Baltimore considered Fells 
Point Market, built in 1784, as being “built on the model of the one in Philadelphia.”15 
Shed-style construction owed its popularity to quick and inexpensive assembly, ease of 
cleaning, and ready adaptability to a site’s topographical features. The latter characteristic 
was particularly necessary in light of the poor and undeveloped land on which market 
sheds typically were erected. Reserving better plots for residential and commercial 
dwellings, Baltimore’s city commissioners situated Centre Market on less hospitable 
ground, guaranteeing its alternate denomination as Marsh Market.16 From the beginning, 
however, High Street Market occupied some of the most valuable real estate in 
Philadelphia, given the street’s grand width (100 feet) compared to other east-west 
boulevards in the city (75 feet or less). 
 High Street Market’s simple form—two rows of stalls facing inward under a 
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gable roof with little adornment—masked a far more complex spatial and social order. 
Artists like William Birch used the structure’s considerable length to experiment with 
scale and perspective (Fig. 1.3). Standing nearly a half-mile long, bisected by streets at 
every block, and lined by two- and three-story brick houses and shops, the vertically 
diminutive nature of the shambles was accenuated by its stark contrast with the evolving 
built landscape enveloping it. While Birch’s late-eighteenth-century prints elided the 
working-class men and women who labored and socialized in the marketplace, many 
other observers reveled in High Street Market’s heterogeneity. In Charles Brockden 
Brown’s Arthur Mervyn, High Street at night exposed the wide-eyed farm boy to the 
dangers of deception in the anonymous commercial city.17 On market day, when “the 
People swarm … thicker than Flies to a Hogshead from which Sugar has been started,” 
visitors heard venders and customers conversing in more than a half-dozen languages, 
from German farmers to African sailors.18 A persistent reminder of the city’s growth and 
morphology, the market houses in High Street were erected, expanded, demolished, and 
rebuilt at rapid intervals (Fig. 1.4).  
 Whether constructed in streets or on vacant lots, public markets were well suited 
to the cramped quarters of Baltimore and Philadelphia, whose growing populations 
(26,514 and 41,220, respectively) each occupied a single square mile in 1800.19 Creeping 
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down High Street block by block, Philadelphia’s market shambles were a barometer of 
the city’s growing population. This was ensured by a 1786 state act empowering city 
wardens to extend the market westward “as necessity or occasion shall require,” for 
“custom and long usage have fixed High street, as the most eligible and central place for 
the market-house to be continued.”20 Centre Market served all of Baltimore until 1784, 
when construction began on three additional markets (Hanover, Fells Point, and 
Lexington) that were also near the water, but less prone to frequent floods from the 
nearby Jones Falls. City commissioners had been unable to agree on a single site, one 
historian notes, so instead “each [market] became the kingpin of a local economic system, 
speculative building, and a residential neighborhood.”21  
 Public markets undergirded the emergence of a significant aspect of antebellum 
urban form, what Robin Einhorn has termed “segmentation”—competition between 
neighborhoods for municipal services and political power.22 As cities overspread their 
original limits, outlying residents called on authorities to establish markets in their 
neighborhoods. The result was a renewed commitment to market construction in the early 
nineteenth century, along with more extensive municipal influence in underdeveloped 
areas, as informal trading routines were relocated to better regulated market spaces. 
Growth in neighborhoods along Philadelphia’s southern border hastened the creation of 
South Second Street Market in 1745 and Wharton Market in 1813. Development in 
northern and eastern districts brought the Norwich Market in 1783, North Second Street 
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Market in 1800, Broad Street Market in 1814, and Kensington Market in 1819 (Fig. 
1.5).23 In Baltimore, population growth came later but more swiftly, spurred by the city’s 
access to the grain trade of the Susquehanna valley. By the mid-1840s, eight full-service 
markets radiated outward from the urban core, including Belair (1819), Richmond (1834), 
Hollins (1839), and Federal Hill (1845) (Fig. 1.6). While most of these newer market 
houses were smaller and oriented toward their immediate neighborhoods, some, like 
Belair Market, grew in patronage, size, and influence—so much so that, by the 1840s, 
Belair’s boosters claimed it stood alongside Centre and Lexington in the city’s market 
house hierarchy.  
 For residents of Federal Hill, at Baltimore’s southern extremity, or Spring Garden, 
northwest of Philadelphia, a nearby market house provided two primary benefits. First, it 
limited dependence on hucksters and private meat shops, thus promoting access to fresher 
and ostensibly cheaper food. Urban consumers in the early nineteenth century lived 
closer to their sources of food than was later the case, as most fruit and vegetables grew 
in gardens or truck farms only a few miles away, meat was butchered on site, and local 
fishermen supplied fish and oysters. Nevertheless, lack of refrigeration and the 
particularities of distribution mitigated these benefits.24 Meat and produce spoiled easily 
in the market’s open-air stalls, particularly during the summer and in spite of farmers’ 
efforts to transport their goods at night, when it was cooler.25 If a farmer or vender was 
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unable to sell items on market day, hucksters bought up the unsold articles in bulk. In 
Philadelphia’s markets, one writer bemoaned, week-old fish “in a state of putrefaction” 
was worked up by hucksters—“no novices in the art of making stale fish appear as 
fresh”—and sold to “the unsuspecting servant.”26 While the presence of a market house 
did not prevent the adulteration or spoilage of food, it encouraged farmers to come 
directly to city residents and bypass intermediaries. It also provided market clerks a 
chance to inspect visually food exposed for sale, a far more difficult proposition with 
hucksters, who were moving targets.  
 Second, the presence of a market house attracted further commercial and 
residential development, which in turn raised property value in the urban periphery. 
Those holding undeveloped tracts of land understood as much. As Baltimore’s city 
council noted in defense of its 1816 annexation plan, these outlying properties “derive[d] 
all their high value from their proximity to the commercial parts, to the markets, to the 
navigation &c.”27 Even though market spaces introduced a number of undesirable 
features to a neighborhood—offal, rotting produce, street congestion, an infusion of 
lower-class street venders—property owners clamored for the construction or expansion 
of market houses. City councils routinely were flooded with such requests. When 
Baltimore lawmakers passed an ordinance prohibiting the custom of farmers selling fresh 
produce in city streets in 1800, the city’s western inhabitants protested the lack of market 
accommodations. They drew the city’s attention to “the great distance we are from the 
Principal Market of this City and the Remoteness of the Hanover Market which renders 
our situation very disagreeable.” Because of “the rapid growth of that part of the city,” 
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they concluded, “we are led to think we are Intitled to your attention.” The state evidently 
agreed, as it authorized the construction of a new market house, “which will be attended 
with great convenience to the inhabitants thereof.”28 In 1845, wishing to have Hanover 
Market extended, neighbors of the market, halfway between Baltimore’s two principal 
markets, argued its location was “admirably adapted to the wants and convenience of the 
great and growing population of that part of the city.” The council chose instead to 
support the erection of a new market house a half-mile south in Federal Hill, where 
“improvements [were] going on with much spirit.”29 Calls to establish more convenient 
markets thus were routine throughout the period, but they should not distract from the 
municipal corporation’s primary calculus for erecting markets: enhancing the value and 
viability of property in growing neighborhoods. 
 Public markets were more than engines of economic development. As monuments 
to the progress or “spirit” of a city, public markets were a major source of civic 
identification and urban rivalry in the early republic. On tours of America, male and 
female travelers drew conclusions about towns and their inhabitants from the state of 
their markets. Indeed, markets were on the itineraries of many visitors, offering visual, 
aural, and olfactory clues to the present and future success of a city through their 
architectural qualities, food, and the manners of traders and customers. When Anne 
Royall, a Washingtonian, complained of “the constant buz of the multitude” in 
Baltimore’s narrow streets in 1824, she leavened her comments by praising the 
abundance and variety of goods in the city’s markets. It might have been “the most 
illiterate, proud and ignorant city, excepting Richmond, in the Union,” but the sheer 
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abundance of its marketplaces underscored its promise: “Nothing pleased me more than 
the markets … never had I before seen anything equal to [them].”30 Comparisons 
between cities were commonplace. For New York jurist James Kent in 1793, Baltimore’s 
Centre Market was “built of Brick & is as long as the Fly Market at NY,” contributing to 
the “new, elegant & prosperous” look of the city.31 Philadelphians bragged about the 
order and epicurean bounty of their markets and cast aspersions on New York’s Fly 
Market, implying its name was all too appropriate.32 
 Public markets were not merely passive emblems of this civic culture but in fact 
helped shape the contours of political life in the city. “The market’s central location, 
unostentatious design, and multiple functions,” historian Helen Tangires writes, “made it 
a frequent site for public celebrations” in the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century city.33 
As extensions of street culture, public markets were spaces in which to celebrate national 
independence, mourn the death of figures like George Washington, receive visits from 
foreign dignitaries or celebrities, and attend political rallies. As the most conspicuous and 
politically active figures associated with public markets, butchers infused the market’s 
civic culture with artisanal rhetoric and imagery. Nowhere was this more on display than 
with “fat-beef” exhibitions, when butchers and farmers paraded enormous steers from 
market house to slaughterhouse and back. In perhaps the most celebrated instance, 
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White’s Great Cattle Show, a procession of two hundred butchers led eighty-seven heads 
of cattle over six miles through the streets of Philadelphia in March 1821 (Fig. 1.7). 
Against a backdrop bearing the mottos, “Pennsylvania against the World” and “We Feed 
the Hungry,” Philadelphians jointly exercised their civic and consumer identities, buying 
up the beef in fourteen hours.34  
 Boosters pointed to such scenes as manifesting the commercial influence of their 
cities and the vitality of its citizens and leaders. Newspaper editors took to quantifying 
the reputation of their marketplaces. On Christmas Eve in 1829, the Baltimore Gazette 
and Daily Advertiser expressed delight over the “animating sight” of Centre Market, 
citing the clerk’s count of 451 wagons, 559 carts, and 45 market boats.35 Such numbers, 
another writer noted, demonstrated the city’s command “not only [of] an excellent, but 
[of] a long continued market of the various fruits of the earth.”36 Seeking “to afford our 
readers some idea of the abundance with which Philadelphia is blessed,” the Inquirer 
reported there had been, in Second Street on the previous Saturday, “119 wagons offering 
6,264 lbs. butter, 758 dozen eggs, 572 pairs of chicken, 45 turkeys, 106 geese, 67 pair of 
ducks … [and] beef, veal, fruit, grain and vegetables to an immense amount.”37 These 
calculations, provided without context or direct comparison, aimed not only to 
overwhelm the reader but also to demonstrate, in the discourse of the day, the natural 
advantages that cities like Baltimore and Philadelphia claimed to possess over their ever-
expanding hinterlands.  
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 Given their proximity, Baltimore and Philadelphia were especially prone to 
comparison of physical as well as economic features. During an 1803 visit, a medical 
student from Philadelphia remarked that Baltimore’s markets were “upon the best 
construction” he had seen, with “fine shelter on each side for those who sell vegetables, 
poultry, &c.”38 Others were more explicit in their appraisals. One morning in 1818, 
another visitor to the city “took a survey of the market, which is strikingly inferior to that 
of [Philadelphia] in points of plenty & goodness, but in price far superior.”39 A Baltimore 
editor adopted a different approach to celebrating the fecundity of his city’s markets, 
favorably comparing the beauty of Baltimore’s female hucksters to those in 
Philadelphia’s markets.40  
 The public markets of the two cities were seen as jousting not only for plaudits 
but also for products. Mid-Atlantic farmers, increasingly sensitive to variables like 
commodity prices, road conditions, market rents and licenses, and general ease of trade, 
profited from their access to two major market cities and many more secondary market 
towns, from York to Frederick. Previously localized, rural production rapidly but 
unevenly reoriented to the demands of urban consumers. Such was the case with 
Philadelphia’s “butter belt.” The growth of the city stimulated butter making on 
hinterland farms, leading both to the disappearance of livestock from urban households 
and to the increasing reliance of rural households on urban manufactured goods.41 
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Despite its proximity to the butter belt, however, Philadelphia did not maintain a 
monopoly. In 1840, the Sun cheerfully reported of a farmer who brought seventy pounds 
of butter to Lexington Market. While the farmer lived only fifteen miles from 
Philadelphia, “he found the Baltimore market reached with equal ease and facility by 
means of the Railroad.” The columnist encouraged Baltimoreans to offer “to the farmers 
of Chester county the right hand of fellowship.”42  
 Unsuccessful attempts to attract farmers were attributed to insufficiencies in the 
city’s market system and its inability to grease the wheels of commerce. The most 
frequent grievances claimed that market houses were too small, too distant, or too 
crowded, compelling rural producers to travel elsewhere with their goods. Even with 
well-appointed market houses, however, the availability of articles fluctuated. In 1833, 
14,544 kegs of butter were inspected in Baltimore market houses, dropping off to an 
average of 8,000 over the next three years, and rebounding in 1837 with 15,542.43 With 
only a single butter and lard inspector to attend all the city’s marketplaces, one petition 
noted, many farmers were left waiting hours. In comparison with the high costs farmers 
had to pay for inspection, “our rival city of Philadelphia” charged only four cents per keg. 
“Is it not an object under our present relative situation to equalize,” another petition asked, 
“the expenses attending the produce brought to our market?”44 But the problems did not 
end with butter. One vexed Baltimorean found that the peck of peaches he bought at the 
market had entered into a “decaying state” by the time he got it home, leading him to 
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wonder if “the Philadelphia market, as some have suggested, get[s] the cream, while the 
refuse is brought here.”45 While some grumbled about hucksters withholding fresh 
produce from the market or farmers’ faulty storage techniques, the responsibility for 
ensuring the cream made it to market unquestionably fell to municipal officials.  
 
II. Governing the marketplace 
 Endowed by law with “full power and authority to take possession, care and 
charge of the markets” in Baltimore, Robert Lawson was the face of a regulatory system 
that designated the public market as a physically bounded space, the perimeter of which 
was to be closely patrolled.46 In reality, the market was profoundly porous, and it was 
becoming more so over the course of the first half of the nineteenth century. This was 
necessitated by its very design and use, with numerous points of access, no windows or 
doors (at least until the mid-century development of enclosed market halls), many formal 
and informal utilities, and a heterogeneous population that resisted easy surveillance (Fig. 
1.8). The deliberate openness of market houses and arrangement of stalls long had served 
as a bulwark against fraudulent transactions and unsanitary conditions. This owed as 
much to the informal self-policing practiced by venders and consumers as it did to formal 
legislation. Nevertheless, understanding that their ability to render commerce an object of 
governance rested on placing physical and temporal limits to exchange, lawmakers 
established a latticework of regulations and empowered men like Lawson to enforce it. 
 As the head clerk of Centre Market for nearly a decade in the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century, Lawson developed a keen understanding of the space and its 
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inhabitants. Twice a week, he paced back and forth between the parallel rows of stalls on 
market morning, inspecting with his eyes and nose the medley of meats and produce 
spread out on tables, benches, and butcher blocks.47 When he came across potentially 
unwholesome or otherwise manipulated provisions, he confiscated the offending articles 
and levied a small fine, half of which he kept to supplement his income. He made enough 
of a scene that nearby venders and shoppers might take note, setting an example of the 
offender and extracting an additional penalty in the form of the vender’s reputation with 
customers. A former city constable (and failed candidate for county sheriff) who later 
translated his experience as clerk into a third career as butcher, Lawson was accustomed 
to both the hard and soft applications of the law.48 
 Of particular interest were the men and women whom he took to be hucksters. 
These individuals traded in fruit, vegetables, butter, tea, coffee, sugar, and other 
comestibles purchased from farmers in city streets and along country roads. Lawson 
suspected their provisions had been purchased within ten miles of the city, in defiance of 
municipal prohibitions against forestalling, the buying and reselling of foodstuffs for 
profit. Forestallers were triply predatory to Lawson: they bilked farmers of potential 
earnings, they drove up the prices of “necessaries” (preying on the poor in particular), 
and they sold food that was often overripe, unwholesome, or fraudulently packed. 
Moreover, their comparatively rough behavior undermined the respectability and order of 
the space in Lawson’s charge. Female shoppers regularly complained to him of being on 
the receiving end of “a torrent of foul abuse and billingsgate language” from hucksters, 
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particularly if they had the temerity to criticize the price or quality of the articles for sale. 
Lawson and other clerks often encountered verbal or physical abuse by hucksters 
defending their craft.  
 In most instances, he found himself unable “to arrest & destroy [the] evil practice” 
of forestalling. The mobile class of hucksters formed networks that spread far beyond the 
city, and only the baldest scofflaws purchased goods and announced their intention to 
resell them in his presence. There was also no visual distinction between articles legally 
and illegally exposed for sale at huckster stands. Underscoring the degree to which the 
marketplace was informally policed by buyers and sellers, exclusive of the clerk’s 
presence, witnesses seldom came forward to assist in Lawson’s attempts to prosecute 
hucksters for forestalling. While some may have been indifferent to the hucksters’ 
impositions, others more rightly feared being blacklisted by the close-knit fraternity of 
traders.  
 Unable to dislodge such an entrenched custom, Lawson had other responsibilities 
to attend to. Checking on the less occupied northern end of the market space across 
Baltimore Street, he encountered the smell of urine, mingling with the stench of horse 
manure and wastewater dumped into Jones Falls by the fishmongers. Lawson stole 
moments during the morning to catch up with renters who owed payments on their stalls, 
checking licenses to make sure they were up to date, and compiling lists of the men and 
women who rented space in the market for his monthly report to the city register. When 
early afternoon arrived, customers dispersed, cartmen and personal servants retrieved the 
purchases of Baltimore’s wealthier families and merchants, farmers sold hucksters their 




Lawson or his assistant then hosed off the brick pavement to rid it of blood, fruit and 
vegetable waste, and dirt. Centre Market remained a site of social and commercial 
activity during non-market hours, but for the most part Lawson’s work was done after a 
fifteen-hour day that started hours before daybreak and lasted into the afternoon and, on 
Saturdays, well after sunset. Lawson and other clerks were expected “to have and keep 
the market clean” every day of the week, “the Sabbath morning not excluded.”49 
 Municipal market ordinances gave the semblance that Lawson and his fellow 
officials were unerring and synchronized appendages of the state. “Precise regulations 
have been laid down,” noted an 1824 guidebook of Philadelphia, “for the government of 
the markets, and respecting weights and measures, and the introduction of game, &c. at 
improper seasons, or in an unsuitable condition, the enforcement of which is attended to 
by the clerks of the market.”50 Laws governing the market sought to shore up boundaries 
through an interlocking system of inspection and licensing; through laws prohibiting 
monopolization and price manipulation; through the limiting of market hours and days; 
and through defining, to the inch, the physical parameters of the market.51 The “full 
power and authority to enact and pass all ordinances necessary” for the establishment and 
regulation of markets was among the first powers laid out in city charters of incorporation. 
So too were the powers to inspect commodities, affix the assize of bread, and keep 
standards and measures.52 When market rules and regulations passed by state legislatures 
were found to be “inadequate to suppress and prevent many inconveniences and abuses 
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which have crept into the several markets” of Baltimore, the city council passed 
ordinances that designated the forms of commercial activity that could occur “within the 
limits of the market.”53 Thus began a cycle of nearly constant revision of market 
regulations in an effort to create legible boundaries around the marketplace.54  
 This cycle of lawmaking sought to balance the numerous demands made on 
public markets by buyers, sellers, and the municipal corporation itself. In response to an 
unending stream of petitions from residents, city councils proposed, passed, amended, 
and revoked hundreds of market ordinances during the antebellum period. As early as the 
1820s, Baltimore’s councilmembers had grown weary of the never-ending cycle of 
petitions requesting alterations, whether modest or wholesale, in market regulations. For 
all the time previous councils had spent “legislating on the markets,” one committee 
bemoaned, it was disconcerting that “so much complaint should still exist.”55 Their 
weariness manifested in frequent errors: transposing words (“unsound fish” became 
“unsound flesh”), passing new laws without explicitly negating old ones, assigning 
incorrect rents to market stalls, neglecting to establish penalties for violations, or putting 
the wrong seal on the document—all of which invalidated the enacted law.56 
 Their Philadelphia counterparts likely felt fatigued, as well. Between 1789 and 
1889, more than 150 ordinances were passed regulating city market houses, excluding 
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auxiliary matters like lighting and paving. Structures of local governance evolved to meet 
the growing demands of market regulation. By 1822, the select and common councils 
formed a permanent joint committee on markets, separate from committees on policing 
and city property, where market matters previously were debated. In 1854, Philadelphia’s 
newly consolidated municipal government established a semi-independent department of 
markets, the sole responsibility of which was to oversee all matters related to supplying 
the city with food.57 By the Civil War, annually published digests of ordinances for 
Baltimore and Philadelphia swelled into multivolume tomes, with markets among the 
most legislated subjects.  
 Given the tenacity of the notion that the antebellum period marked the apotheosis 
of liberalism and limited state economic intervention (with the major exception of 
internal improvements), it is worth considering why local authorities expended great time 
and effort in designating and patrolling the “limits of the market.” One possible way of 
looking at these exertions is to view them as the articulation of state and local 
government’s enduring investment in the regulation of economy for the public good. 
Countering generations of scholarship that viewed the period of 1790 to 1860 as the 
heyday of American laissez faire, William Novak views the vast quantity of local 
economic regulations as the continuation (indeed elaboration) of a strong conception of 
police powers inherited from common law and other earlier sources. For Novak, the 
expanding corpus of economic regulations in the decades leading up to the Civil War 
represented an attempt to secure “fair dealing, fair price, [and] honest labor.” This vision 
of a well-regulated economy was physically expressed by the public market, an 
institution that signaled the local and state government’s authority to function as “central 
                                                




creators of the notion of economy as a special sphere of social activity, a sphere distinctly 
cognizable as an object of governance.”58  
 For Lawson and fellow market clerks, however, the raft of market regulations was 
more an unfunded mandate than a potent articulation of government management of the 
economy. Clerks regularly bemoaned the discrepancy between their income and the vital 
work they did. Lawson’s predecessor as Centre Market’s clerk, Andrew Carson, 
complained in 1801 of working “under circumstances more troblesom and less Lucrative 
than his Predicessor” due to “extra Services” he was required to perform. Some clerks 
also rented and operated market stalls to supplement their income.59 Not only did clerks 
see themselves as chronically underpaid but also as figures of derision. “In enforcing the 
duties imposed upon them by virtue of the office they hold,” several clerks petitioned in 
1826, “they are liable to be abused by certain persons frequenting the Markets.” 
Confrontations quickly escalated in the agonistic environment of the marketplace, as 
suspected “infringers” of market ordinances released a stream of profanities insulting the 
clerk. Because of his inability to adequately punish the act of disobedience, the clerk’s 
authority was marred in the eyes of the “crowd” of onlookers.60 City leaders enhanced 
surveillance by appointing watchmen and constables to assist market clerks, but this too 
proved problematic in light of how diminutive and overburdened the city’s police force 
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was before its professionalization and expansion in the late 1850s.61 At the very least, 
then, market laws should not be read as a straightforward indication of the municipal 
corporation’s investment in regulating the economy. 
 Another possible explanation for the proliferation of market ordinances, which 
does not necessary dispel Novak’s larger point, is that municipal governments sought to 
compensate for their tenuous authority in matters of economy and society. In an 1825 
report in which it decried ongoing complaints about market ordinances, Baltimore’s city 
council reckoned that, sooner or later, “the Corporation will have to assert her right to the 
controul of the Markets[,] or prepare to erect a sufficient number of Market Houses for 
the whole Trading community, or abandon the management of them altogether.” The 
council believed it was incapable of doing the second, and “the interests of our fellow 
Citizens and public good alike [forbade]” the latter. This left only the first option, for the 
corporation “to assert her right to the controul of the Markets.” But several factors 
hampered this. It would seem, the council wrote, “as if almost every provision which was 
necessary for regulating the markets has already been made.” Yet “no matter how well 
defined and harmonious the provisions of our laws may be, so long as they are enforced 
by one officer and neglected by another, discontent & dissatisfaction will be the 
consequence.” Noting that the past decade had seen an unprecedented number of 
petitions regarding the city’s markets, the councilmen surmised, “We may legislate 
Session after Session, until legislation becomes a serious evil, if the officers of the 
Corporation continue to exercise their discretion and take upon themselves, the 
prerogative of deciding on the propriety of the Laws instead of enforcing them.” 
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Signaling the degree to which these quandaries vexed city leaders, both council branches 
took the unusual step of ordering fifty copies of the report printed.62  
 Indeed, in a theme that will be returned to several times in the chapters that follow, 
public markets provided the municipal corporation routine reminders of its limitations in 
governing the rapidly expanding antebellum city. This was driven home in an emerging 
middle-class discourse that identified the public market with social and spatial disorder. 
As Simon Newman has illustrated, public spaces in Philadelphia, particularly 
marketplaces, were understood as “provid[ing] venues for socialization, drinking, 
prostitution, and begging” in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century. When 
residents near South Second Street Market successfully protested the holding of market 
day on Sunday in 1806, they did so “not from religious reasons only.” Instead, it was in 
response to the laboring classes, who received their weekly wages on Saturday and went 
on sprees of “riot and debauchery” in the marketplace later that evening.63 Residents near 
Centre Market complained in 1811 that it had become “the resort of idle and dissolute 
persons.”64 Baltimore’s Centre Market, Thomas Griffith wrote to Mayor Small in 1830, 
“has become a positive nuisance … just as much so, as it would be, to have a common 
Fair in the centre of a City, twice a week, or 104 times a year.” Not only did 
“Countrymen come, with the product of their hard labor, to stand in the streets, wet or dry, 
from night until morning to the annoyance of adjacent Stores & passengers,” but the 
market itself seemed to breed disorder: “The Crowds assembled at that Market, induce 
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many to keep Tippling-Shops, and no Police whatever would prevent Stealing, Fighting 
and many other crimes and vices, contaminating and demoralising those who frequent 
it.”65  
 Despite the city’s attempts to restrict trade “within the limits of the market,” 
transactions spilled out of the space, transforming surrounding streets and neighborhoods 
into ad hoc country fairs like the ones Griffith decried. Areas near the markets were prone 
to gridlock on market day, as shoppers, venders, farmers, cartmen, hack drivers, horses, 
wagons, and cattle vied for position in cramped and chaotic quarters. Market wagons 
lined the streets extending as far as three miles from the market houses. Yet while public 
markets represented a glorified ideal space where city and country met, the rural 
character of these spaces did not always mesh with urban tastes. If middle-class urban 
dwellers increasingly sought to bring an agrarian vision to bear on urban form in the mid 
nineteenth century through parks and cemeteries, the sights and smells of cows, horses, 
goats, and pigs provided an excess of country sensibilities—this was not the rus in urbe 
they had in mind.66 For residents of Fells Point, this was evident when rogue pigs—the 
ubiquitous “swinish multitude”—destroyed a fence erected around the marketplace to 
beautify the space, or whenever winds shifted and carried the odor of animals across 
more populated areas of the city.67  
 A third and more forceful explanation for the proliferation of market ordinances is 
the self-interest of the many parties who had an investment (financial or otherwise) in the 
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government of the public market. While formulaic on the surface, their arguments for 
regulation reveal the interrelationship of self-interest and the public good in antebellum 
political discourse. In referencing the “interests of our fellow Citizens and public good,” 
the 1825 council report reinforced Novak’s claim for the pervasiveness of the language of 
public welfare in nineteenth-century America. So did petitions, which more than laws and 
court decisions illuminated the worldview of urban residents, as the majority appealed to 
some iteration of the common good. But in adhering to certain scripts that petitioners felt 
strengthened their case in front of city leaders, petitions also betrayed the contested 
nature of the public welfare in the antebellum city.  
This suggests an important amendment to Novak’s thesis: while most antebellum 
residents and authorities viewed the public market as a legitimate and vital exercise of 
governmental authority, they viewed regulation itself in a new light. They proceeded not 
from an adherence to traditional moral economy but rather from a more innovative 
conception of economic democracy. For consumers, this entailed equal and unfettered 
access to cheap and bountiful goods. For sellers, it was predicated on open competition 
with other retailers and restrictions on monopolies, public or private. Thus all buyers and 
sellers in the urban marketplace conceived themselves individually as the “public” and 
expected the municipal corporation to act on their behalf. 
 Consider the various ends to which the concept of the public was applied in the 
long-running civic debate over how best to regulate public markets. The institution was 
designed to serve as a source of healthy and cheap provisions, a commercial outlet for 
farmers and retailers, a place where itinerant venders could safely and efficiently sell 




corporation. As a result, the governance of public markets was shaped and prodded by 
competing communities within the broader public: household consumers of all classes 
who marketed a few days every week; shopkeepers and merchants looking to benefit 
from increased traffic; property owners and lessees concerned with the value of their 
investments; non-residents who grew and manufactured products for the market; poor 
men and women street venders who relied on the market to carve out a modicum of 
economic independence; a panoply of city employees from clerks to inspectors who 
depended on the market house for their salaries and fees; and municipal leaders who 
viewed public markets as a dependable (if not extravagant) source of income.  
 
III. Competing visions of economic democracy 
 Reflecting the largest community interest, petitions of city residents principally 
dealt with access and convenience. As noted above, owners and occupiers of property 
were instrumental in convincing municipal authorities to erect new market houses as well 
as in dictating their placement. When neighbors of Belair Market declared that the 
“public good requires the building of a house on the space between Gay and Ensor Sts.,” 
they only made explicit what other petitioners assumed about the validity of their own 
claims.68 Twin concerns of convenience and property value spurred requests for new or 
extended market houses. Residents wrote of the various advantages that would accrue not 
only to themselves, but also to farmers, butchers, venders, and artisans, who would 
promptly rent all the stalls and thus refill public coffers. Others framed market house 
extensions explicitly as more speculative investments, from which both public and 
private assets would “derive a very large interest” as the city filled in around the spaces. 
                                                




In 1835, residents west of Lexington Market pleaded with the city to purchase additional 
land for future expansion before it became too expensive. Two years later, mayor Samuel 
Smith joined in, reminding an indecisive city council “of the absolute necessity of 
purchasing the lot now vacant for the extension of the Lexington Market.”69 When 
officials sought to erect a market house in Federal Hill in 1839, landowners asked for 
$10,000, which the joint committee on markets opined was too much, putting off 
construction for another six years—a better time for municipal finances than during the 
Panic of 1837, perhaps, but at greater cost as well.70 
 Few, however, consented to the taking of their property for municipal 
improvement. When residents of northern Baltimore caught wind of a petition to the state 
legislature offering their land for the proposed Richmond Market, they stridently denied 
having any “knowledge, consent, or approbation” of its contents.71 City leaders viewed 
markets as they did other public improvements, especially highways, which permitted the 
use of eminent domain. Generally cognizant that the latter mechanism was, according to 
historian Morton Horwitz, “the one truly explosive legal ‘time bomb’ in all antebellum 
law,” Baltimore’s city council typically was content to travel a path of lesser resistance.72 
Thus it relied heavily on the time-honored tradition of gratuitous bequests from wealthy 
landowners like the Howards, on whose land Richmond Market was eventually built in 
1834.73 When built as speculative endeavors to accelerate the growth of outlying 
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neighborhoods, as Richmond Market was, officials were anxious when years passed and 
stalls went unrented.  
 Rent was the abiding issue for the market’s suppliers and established occupants—
farmers, butchers, and victuallers—who viewed certain economic privileges as vested in 
their status as renters of city property. Stall rentals constituted the most significant 
investment of market venders, but it was not the only cost. When market houses first 
opened, city authorities held public auctions, publicizing them well ahead of time in order 
to draw the most bidders. Winning bids, which could approach one thousand dollars for 
the best-located or most spacious stalls, secured victuallers virtually permanent leases and 
the right to pay rent on a yearly or quarterly basis. Stalls, like experience and know-how, 
thus passed from generation to generation. Whereas different stalls may have been 
purchased for different amounts, annual rents were tiered according to stall size. By 
themselves, rents posed a relatively slight burden for most. In 1802, Philadelphia’s 
Catherine Heimer paid $2.50 per quarter for stall “No. 3 in Secd Shambles.”74 When 
Jersey farmers protested the raising of rents to $16 annually following the enlargement of 
the same market in 1809, refusing to pay, the select and common councils relented and 
directed stalls be let for “the highest and best rents that can be reasonably obtained.”75 In 
1847, Baltimore’s venders paid only from $5 to $32 annually, the most expensive stalls 
reserved for Centre Market and the cheapest for the newly opened Cross Street Market.76 
In return for the payment of rent, venders received a license as a form of receipt. Other 
expenses included inspection fees (normally a few cents per keg of butter or side of beef 
exposed for sale) and a per diem charge of twelve and a half cents that applied to all who 
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sold in the market. 
 In petitioning for lowered rents and fees, venders were careful to acknowledge not 
just their willingness but indeed their desire to contribute financially to the well being of 
the city. In return, however, they asked that the attendant costs reflect circumstances, 
particularly as demand (and the ability of customers to pay) fluctuated dramatically in the 
boom-and-bust antebellum economy. Market venders, particularly butchers, could expect 
the support of the broader community when they petitioned for lower rent. When High 
Street butchers were faced with rent hikes in 1836, the Public Ledger encouraged them to 
circulate a petition, which “thousands” would gladly sign and the councils dare not 
disregard.77 Taking their grievances over raised rents to the city council in 1826, Charles 
Reynolds and other poor “Gardeners” who sold in Baltimore’s markets were buoyed by 
the signatures of nearly five hundred citizens “who resort[ed] to the several markets for 
supplies.” Reynolds, noting the “scarcity of money” among both gardeners and 
consumers, believed the license (or rent) increase to be “truly oppressive to the best 
interest of the publick welfare.” Five hundred fellow residents agreed, as did mayor John 
Montgomery, who felt that “reduc[ing] the licence of $10 to $5 will give a larger revenue 
to the City, and will enable many to subsist their families.”78 
 As they announced in bold letters at White’s Great Cattle Show in 1821—“We 
Feed the Hungry”—venders embraced their roles as feeders of the metropolis. In appeals 
to city officials, they portrayed themselves as defenders of the ordinary consumer. 
Despite periodic eruptions of verbal and physical violence between buyers and sellers, 
the relationship that Reynolds and others forged with customers depended on honesty and 
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an effort on both sides to understand one another’s motivations, particularly when 
haggling over prices. Market venders took pride in the appearance not only of their 
products but also their surroundings. Anticipating the various factors that could drive 
even faithful customers away, venders appealed often for alterations that would make 
buyers more comfortable: more frequent cleanings, prohibiting the smoking of cigars, gas 
lighting to assist in buyers’ inspection of items, fresh coats of whitewash, roofs and 
siding that shielded marketers from the elements, and wider avenues between the stalls to 
accommodate market baskets.79 Like the broader urban community, however, they 
frequently blurred the distinctions between public and private interest in their calls for 
state intervention in the marketplace. This was especially true for butchers who had paid 
handsomely for the right to rent their stalls and expected an assortment of benefits 
alongside that right. Possessing the capital to “own” several stalls in markets throughout 
the city placed butchers like Baltimore’s Henry Pentz and George Rusk and 
Philadelphia’s John Gross and William White at the pinnacle of the market hierarchy.80 
Not only did this ensure a ready supply of customers but also the clout to shape municipal 
law and politics and thus infuse economic democracy with an artisanal quality.  
 Even for more modest victuallers, a sense of birthright pervaded dealings with 
city officials. And indeed many of them had inherited their stalls from fathers or mothers, 
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by virtue of municipal policies that treated leases as open ended. The extent to which the 
city defended this custom was evident in the case of butcher John Eckhart. Following 
many years serving customers at his Lexington Market stall, which he bought from the 
previous owner for $500, he died in August 1819. Shortly before his death, his stall 
license expired and was not renewed by the payment of rent. Previously unsuccessful at 
securing proprietorship of his own stall, John Staylor took the opportunity to request a 
license from mayor Edward Johnson for the vacant stall. Johnson, satisfied that Staylor 
was a “regular Butcher” (or had served an apprenticeship) and “an orderly and 
respectable person,” granted the license. For the next year Staylor sold various meats at 
Lexington Market, until the administrator of Eckhart’s estate arrived in town to contest 
Staylor’s claim. Arguing that the longstanding custom of “good will” entitled Eckhart’s 
descendants to equity in the stall, placing it “beyond the reach of legal coercion,” the 
administrator demanded the revocation of Staylor’s license. The “large sum” Eckhart had 
paid for his “equitable privilege … was not a matter of mere nominal import or only 
speculative value, but an object of heavy cost.” The administrator had already sold 
Eckhart’s two other stalls in Centre and Hanover Market and wished to do the same with 
this one.81 
 In a counterpetition, Staylor argued that he had stepped forward to take 
possession of the stall only once it was determined Eckhart had no relatives in the 
country, let alone the city. “I am a native citizen of Baltimore, willing to confer every 
labor in my line of business towards the general good of my fellow citizens,” he wrote, 
while his opponents have “never left their German lands to breath the air of this our 
native country.” The administrator countered that Mayor Johnson had granted Staylor a 
                                                




license only as a temporary privilege until a final decision could be made on the stall’s 
ownership. In the end, Baltimore’s city council sided with the claim of Eckhart’s heirs. 
Their opinion acknowledged “the invariable custom for holders of Butcher’s stalls … to 
sell what is commonly called the good will of such stalls.” In defending the custom of 
treating butcher stalls as a form of private property, however, the report emphasized that 
“the corporation has a clear and indisputable right to put an end to this practice.” To do so 
would enable the corporation to hold more frequent auctions for vacated stalls, which 
would drive prices up and provide more income to the city. Yet until the custom could be 
“abolished entirely, it ought to be protected in all cases.” Once the corporation had 
enabled market venders to view themselves as holding property in the market, rather than 
simply occupying space in it, there was little the city could do to reassert total control 
over the marketplace. The custom of good will—a concept that also had currency in 
Philadelphia—continued to exert influence over spatial and social relations in the 
marketplace.82 
 Conflicts over public and private understandings of the marketplace played out in 
other ways. The rate at which the city made repairs or improvements to market houses 
could only be described as painstaking. After initial approval of a petition requesting 
alterations, months passed while contractors submitted proposals, joint committees met 
and approved bids, councils directed regular or special funds from the annual 
appropriation, and materials were assembled from sources near and far. Impatient 
venders requested the power to take improvements into their own hands, offering to “fit 
up” their stalls or parts of the market house on their own account and in a style 
compatible with the rest of the space. One petitioner not associated with the market asked 
                                                




permission to erect an additional story over Fells Point Market in 1837 to house a militia 
company.83  
 Other market occupants requested compensation when alterations undermined the 
visibility and value of their stalls. A group of butchers holding corner stalls in Belair 
Market were dismayed to learn of a proposal to add four new stalls on the market’s 
central avenue. The addition would siphon off customers as well as eliminate the 
advantage of holding a corner stall, due to the concomitant narrowing of the avenue, 
thereby “destroy[ing] that which we purchased them for.” Two Centre Market butchers 
sought compensation for erecting siding to protect to them and customers from the 
“exposed situation” of their stalls to “the winter snows,” something they considered an 
improvement of a “public nature.” Having “been raised to the victualing business and 
having no other means of support,” the two “were compelled to pay a high price for the 
stalls,” over $700 each. One of the men was Robert Lawson, Jr., son of the former clerk 
of Centre Market.84 Municipal officials resisted efforts of venders to exert ownership of 
the physical marketplace. They dismissed requests of victuallers to “fit up” market 
houses on the grounds that the state had invested all power to govern the markets in the 
city corporation. Uniformity of construction was one reason set forth, but concerns about 
preserving public markets as a source of municipal revenue loomed large in their 
considerations.85 
 The frequently raised question of when to hold market days provides a window 
onto the public’s competing claims to the public market as an economic space. 
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Authorities readily noted that the days and times during which markets were held were 
fixed by “custom” and thus had earned a degree of semi-permanence. City officials were 
hesitant to alter market days not out of blind adherence to custom, however, but more 
practically to ensure that the different market houses of the city were as well attended as 
possible. This meant not having two markets open on the same day, as far as possible. 
“The Market days for each market has long been established both by Law & Custom,” 
rendering it “unwise and impolite” to change them, an 1830 report averred. Moreover, 
any change “would materially effect the receipts in the Treasury from said market.”86 
Nevertheless, times changed. Innovations in street lighting loosened certain constraints 
on work patterns, while transportation improvements sought to eliminate temporal 
limitations altogether, transforming the conveyance of goods big and small to market. 
Citizens became more conscious of the hours of the day, furnishing their houses and 
pockets with clocks, brought to them by itinerant peddlers, and allocating their precious 
and finite resource accordingly. Time had become thoroughly commodified by the time 
residents of northeast Baltimore debated whether to make Belair Market a morning or 
afternoon market in 1849.87  
 Baltimore lawmakers were ill disposed to alter established market days and hours, 
agreeing with an 1840 petition that viewed a proposed change in Belair Market’s days of 
operation as “hav[ing] a tendency to destroy the Fells Point Market” due to competition. 
Physical proximity was not the only issue, as the municipal market system invariably 
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privileged the larger markets with more farmers and customers. Across town from 
Lexington Market, neighbors of Fells Point Market asked relief from “the 
inconveniencies and privations” of having overlapping market days.88 Despite the 
reluctance of authorities, Baltimoreans pressed more insistently in the 1840s and 1850s 
for more flexible market hours. As a neighborhood marketplace along the northeastern 
edges of town that had come to be encircled by an extensive population, Belair Market 
became the subject of particularly extensive debates over market days and hours from 
1840 to 1850. After dozens of petitions amassed thousands of signatures, the city council 
acquiesced in 1850, reporting “that if the law were so altered as to make it a Tuesday and 
Friday morning market instead of an afternoon market, the committee think not only the 
interests of the market, but those of the whole of that section of the city would be greatly 
promoted.” More vitally, it admitted the power of marketers to take matters into their 
own hands: “Although it is by law an evening market it is apparent to every one that it 
can never become so in reality.”89 
 The debates concerning Belair Market’s establishment as a morning market 
illustrated conflicting standards of “convenience.” In 1842, butchers called for its 
continuation as an evening market so they could attend their stalls at Lexington and Fells 
Point Markets, while dealers and venders of meal pledged that a morning market would 
prove a “mutual benefit” to buyers and sellers.90 Seven years later, however, butchers led 
the morning market charge. As a result of “the arbitrary & unlawful stand taken by a 
certain class,” one petition wrote of the butchers, the market had “drooped from its 
former prosperous condition,” and the neighborhood “suffered a loss in trade of at least 
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$100,000.” It called for “a just discrimination … between taxpaying citizens wishes & 
those of needy speculators.”91 Deadpanning that “there is a supply of Butchers meat, but 
man does not live on meat alone,” another petition bemoaned that legislation to make 
Belair a morning market “tend[ed] to lessen the value of real estate … and produce 
inconvenience to every housekeeper.”92 What was convenient to one group of customers 
or venders was not to another, nor was it consistent over time. 
 Most consumers, it seems, agreed that a morning market proved more convenient. 
“That the people are in favor of the morning market,” George Kennard and about 250 
others deduced, “is evident from the fact that in spite of opposition from other quarters, 
the market is slowly to be sure but steadaily increasing in prosperity.”93 Conflating 
convenience and public health, an 1848 petition complained that vegetables, butter, eggs, 
and fruit were “exposed to a boiling sun, for the greater part of an afternoon, much of it 
too having perhaps been exposed for sale in the morning at other markets.” Writing a few 
months before cholera visited Baltimore, the prescient petitioners feared “that the 
vegetables & eggs & small fruits so exposed” were likely to become “impregnated with 
disease, to the great detriment of the citizens.”94 Another petition of 75 residents of Old 
Town noted that “a large majority of us are mechanicks and Labouring men and under 
our present sistem of Labour the change would enable us to attend market in the morning 
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and get to our work at the usual hour, thereby saving our wives the unpleasant duty of 
exposing themselves to the heat of the sun in the warmest part of the day.” This 
calculated allusion to their wives’ frailty aside, however, women were not mere 
bystanders to the Belair Market question.95 
 Reflecting their increasing stature as household consumers, women engaged in 
the debates, circulating several of their own petitions as well as signing others drawn up 
by male petitioners. Indeed, the petition drive of the late 1840s served as one of the most 
forceful and public articulations of women’s authority as consumers in Baltimore before 
the Civil War. Their three extant petitions, two for the morning market and one against it, 
drew the signatures of more than 700 women. The Sun took notice and reported “that 
ladies are arrayed in the case with considerable spirit and interest on each side.” Their 
“spirit” registered not only in formal political appeals but also in household-level politics, 
as another observer wrote that the debate left “families … arrayed against families, and in 
one case at least husband against the wife.”96 Two petitions justified women’s 
involvement by noting that they largely were responsible for shopping at Belair Market. 
“As it devolves upon us in a great measure to attend the said market for the purpose of 
purchasing market for our families,” Mary Ann Hopkins and 300 other “Ladies of Old 
Town” urged the city council to keep it an afternoon market. Lucretia Bond and 250 
women defended their plea for a morning market: “We are as much interested as any 
other in this change, and as the duty of purchasing principally devolves on the ladies, we 
as purchasers at this market, ask that some attention be paid to our convenience.”97  
                                                
95 City Council Records, 1849:632, BCA.  
96 Sun, May 18 and 17, 1848; For an example of a petition signed by both men and women (with over 1,000 
signatures total), see City Council Records, 1849:626, BCA. 




 Indeed, convenience lay at the heart of most appeals concerning Belair Market, 
but nowhere more so than in women’s petitions, which could simultaneously deploy the 
concept as a means of deferring to male authority and carving out an autonomous space 
for female consumers. In adopting the political identity of consumer-citizens, female 
petitioners diverged from the men’s petitions, which called for the need to advance the 
commercial interests of the neighborhood and city. In their petition, which was drawn up 
at a meeting held in the market house, Bond and the other morning market women called 
for the city council and mayor to “consult our own convenience, rather than of persons 
who reside in a different section of the city, and who never deal in, are certainly not to 
have their wishes preferred to those who do encourage, the Belle Air Market.”98 Other 
women also demanded their convenience be privileged. “Gentlemen, we the undersigned 
Ladyes residing adjacent to Bellair Market,” Mary Rennolds and 90 women wrote, 
detailing the “great inconvenience we have heretofore experienced” as a result of 
afternoon markets, including “expossure to the heat in summer which we have been 
compelled to endure” and “the Stale State of nearly every thing we can buy on an 
afternoon.” Rennolds and others resisted outlining “many other great and weighty reasons” 
but still felt “assured that you will look well to our intrest and convenience and not, along 
to the intrest and convenience of the citizens of Baltimore and Harford counties” asking 
for an afternoon market.99 
 As this suggests, the issue of convenience also mobilized rural producers. Elisha 
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Johnson and 200 other Baltimore and Harford county residents asked the city council “to 
take into consideration the interest and convenience of said counties.” A morning market 
would have required Johnson and others “to loose one more day in the trip” and 
ultimately “compelled [them] to abandon the market.” Nicholas Gulch demurred, 
informing the city council “that I have conversed with the Principal farmers & gardners 
within six miles of Baltimor and they are unanimous in saing give us a morning 
market.”100 For city authorities, catering to the convenience of farmers was an 
increasingly vital concern, because improvements in transportation and the emergence of 
provision wholesalers offered new options for farmers looking to sell their food outside 
the traditional marketing system. Indeed, while the Sun mocked the “Insurrection at Bel 
Air” in 1848, assuring readers that there would be no “émeute” (riot) as in Paris, the 
prosaic matter of market hours illuminated larger contests about the most effective means 
of distributing food in the growing metropolis.101 
 Customary and legal restrictions on market days and hours thus confronted new 
social realities, and the latter reigned. It did so not through the intervention of abstract 
market forces, however, but through the persistence of urban residents who compelled 
officials to amend or eliminate time restrictions. Petitioners circulated with pen and paper 
through the streets of Baltimore and Philadelphia—quite possibly on market day, when 
streets were thronged—exhorting the city to change morning hours into afternoon hours, 
or moving market days from Monday and Thursday to Tuesday and Friday. As the 
agency tasked with synthesizing consumers’ and retailers’ competing visions and 
enacting its own, the city corporation juggled its own set of ideas about what services and 
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interests the public market should prioritize. As Novak and others have shown, the 
rhetoric in market laws and ordinances enunciated an understanding of local and state 
governments’ power to intervene in the market economy. From the examples already 
compiled, however, it was clear that whatever ground-level authority the city wielded 
over the public market was contingent on the ability or willingness of clerks, inspectors, 
and constables and watchmen to impose the law—and on the cooperation of the public in 
accepting the law’s official interpretation and integrating it within its own vernacular 
understandings of urban space and political economy.  
 
Conclusion: A new kind of market 
 In early 1837, the Public Ledger published a letter announcing a new generation 
of marketing in Philadelphia with the proposed establishment of the William Penn 
Market south of Spruce Street between Sixth and Seventh. “The term Market is altogether 
relative,” it continued, for the planned edifice bore little similarity to the market houses 
“familiar from our childhood, and which beside being unsightly, have been constructed 
without any regard to humanity.” Those “who would dare to subject the keeping even of 
an animal to the bleak and exposed condition of such market houses are common to this 
city exclusively, would not escape the censure of his fellow citizens.” As an “ornament to 
our city,” the William Penn Market promised comfortable surroundings covering a lot 
396 by 192 feet. Each stall was to be equipped with access to a cellar for storage, but that 
was only the appetizer for the main course. There would be two dedicated rooms in the 
market house for the edification of farmers: one a general library and reading room, the 




would be a boon not only to farmers and consumers, but also to the public as a whole, as 
it would supplant one of the city’s most blighted blocks.102  
 Organizing, planning, and financing the market’s construction was not the city of 
Philadelphia, however, but a group of private citizens. A year earlier, a group of farmers, 
victuallers, and residents petitioned the select council to incorporate a company for the 
purpose of building a market house. Council members received the petition favorably, 
seeing a way to remove the hindrance in High Street. The council saw no conflict 
between public and private interest in the novel institution. “The founder of our city 
never intended High street to be obstructed by market houses,” a report noted, “for he 
was justly proud of the wide street, which was designed for the main entrance from the 
west.” It concluded that, “should the William Penn Market House be completed, and 
answer the expectations which may be reasonably anticipated, it will be a strong 
inducement for the erection of similar establishments in other sections of our city.” By 
arranging it “upon a plan different from our present open market houses,” the 
“enterprising citizens” responsible for its “architectural beauty” served up “an 
improvement highly beneficial to the southern section of our city.” With “the removal 
and scattering” of the block’s “many miserable buildings, and inhabited by a wretched 
population,” the market house “would unquestionably become a great public benefit.”103 
In March 1838, the state legislature passed a law incorporating the William Penn Market 
Company, with ground to be broken as soon as $400,000 was raised by stocks.104 
 Ground was never broken. Thwarted by the exertions of the “wretched 
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population,” the company died a quiet death in the aftermath of the publication of a 
pamphlet entitled, A Caution to the Public: The Project of the William Penn Market is 
Wholly Impracticable, and the Charter of the Company is Unconstitutional and Void 
(1838). Assisted by the counsel of congressman Joseph Reed Ingersoll, the block’s 
residents swayed public opinion that the William Penn Market was hardly a public 
improvement, but rather a “visionary and illegal project.” They were “unwilling to give 
up their possessions to a few eager speculators in corporation experiment.” Just as 
important, Ingersoll noted that the city would have minimal power over “the government 
and good order” of the proposed market house. City appointed inspectors would weigh 
and check for impurities, but this they did in private stores, as well. Power of eviction 
was permitted for public improvements, but this was a private corporation driven by 
private interests.105 
 The experiment of the William Penn Market represented a logical next step for 
market venders accustomed to a sense of ownership in the public market. It was yet 
another instance of the blurring of public and private in the marketplace, even if a more 
dramatic example by virtue of trying to evict over a thousand fellow citizens. In any 
event, many of these issues—the desire of victuallers and farmers to assert greater control 
over their spaces of trade, the increasing willingness of the city corporation to let them, 
visions of traditional market houses as dilapidated nuisances that thwarted commercial 
development (particularly by the railroad, which also sought access to the streets), and 
the ways that market proponents portrayed the “wretched” inhabitants of the block—
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continued to germinate. By the 1850s, these issues would burst forth in a renewed attempt 
to replace High Street Market with modern market houses more conveniently located 
throughout the city. To understand how the initial William Penn Market plan originated, 
as well as how later plans succeeded in its place, it is necessary to tread out from 
underneath the roof of the market house and explore other spaces of the civic economy, 
beginning with shops and sidewalks.  
 
Fig. 1.1. High Street & Market Shambles, facing towards the Delaware River, circa 18th 
century. The jail stands in the foreground, with a pilloried slave in front. 
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Fig. 1.2. “View of the Market Space—Canal,” insert detail from Warner & Hanna’s Plan 
of the City and Environs of Baltimore, 1801. The canal is lined by speculative rowhouses 
built by Thomas McElderry and Cumberland Dugan on their wharves. 
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Fig. 1.3. William Birch, “High Street Market, Philadelphia,” ca. 1800. A sparsely 






Fig. 1.4. “Bird’s Eye View of Philadelphia,” circa 1840. High Street Market (center-
right) remains a focal point, but increasingly it is being swallowed by commercial 
development, represented in the swarm of steam and sail ships. 
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Fig. 1.5. Philadelphia’s market houses, 1840. Adapted from Henry S. Tanner, A New 
Picture of Philadelphia (1840). High Street Market (1693) is in the center-right of the 
map, with North Second Street (1800) and South Second Street (1745) markets running 
perpendicular to it on the city’s eastern end.  
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Fig. 1.6. Baltimore’s market houses, circa 1855. Adapted from Colton’s City of Baltimore 
(1855). 1. Centre (1763), 2. Hanover (1784), 3. Fells Point (1784), 4. Lexington (ca. 






Fig. 1.7. John Lewis Krimmel, White’s Great Cattle Show, and Grand Procession of the 
Victuallers of Philadelphia, 1821. Library Company of Philadelphia. Krimmel documents 
one of the largest and most famous butchers’ parades of antebellum America. 
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Fig. 1.8. Centre Market and Fountain, from Fielding Lucas, Picture of Baltimore (1842). 
Social and commercial activity bursts out of the market’s regulated boundaries, with 
white and black marketers assembled without differentiation. 
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Chapter Two: Licensing Power 
 
 As the public faces of the license system, Baltimore’s city court clerks and 
registers earned the bulk of their salaries every May. The rush to take out or renew 
licenses during a short window that month lent a palpable rhythm to the business life of 
the city. Numerous city and state offices charged with the responsibility to license most 
of the city’s traders and tradespeople published newspaper advertisements in the weeks 
leading up to “the license season,” in which they informed licensees of where and when 
to apply, as well as the fines to be levied upon those failing to renew. And, with some 
notable exceptions, thousands of men and women intending to sell their goods, 
accommodations, or labor made their annual pilgrimage to the appropriate offices. “The 
mass of business people in Baltimore,” the Sun noted, was familiar with the month “as 
the annual period for the renewal of licenses.”1 Another article advised applicants to 
avoid “a big crowd and a long wait” by arriving early, or “the rush will be so great that 
some may not be served.”2 Many applicants carried with them into the court a bundle of 
documents that attested to their financial and moral solvency, including letters signed by 
community members that were themselves products of social negotiation. 
 As deadlines approached, licensing offices took on the appearance of the public 
market on Saturday morning. Confusion and delay typically accompanied any alterations 
to license laws. On the last day to apply for licenses in 1858, an observer noted, “The 
office of the clerk of the Court of Common Pleas was besieged … by hundreds of persons, 
who blocked up every portion of the counter, and frequently the entrance ways, eager to 
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obtain their licenses.” They may have been hoping for last-minute deliverance from the 
new license law, which had “so greatly increased the price of liquor licenses that very 
small restaurants and store-keepers are either unable or unwilling to take out a license at 
all.”3 Some may have been scrambling to secure the necessary funds for the license, 
which had become one of the greatest operating expenses for many of these petty 
entrepreneurs. Indeed, the 1858 law singled out the smallest retailers of beer and liquor. 
For keepers of “oysters houses, cook shops, victualing houses, and lager beer saloons” 
who paid less than $50 a month in rent, the license cost $50; for those who rented their 
ordinaries for $300 to $500 a month, it was $150, or less than half the relative cost of the 
smaller retailers.4  
 Whatever the individual reasons for waiting until the last moment, the scene at the 
clerk’s office was an apt illustration of men and women navigating a legal and social 
system that did not view all trades—or even everyone engaged in the same trade—as 
equally beneficial to the civic economy. As the system of occupational licensing 
expanded in the early republic to encompass a wide spectrum of commercial activity, the 
license itself was imbued with a range of new meanings. While the Supreme Court in 
1866 would declare licenses to be “mere receipts for taxes” paid by the licensee, for most 
of the antebellum period, at least at the local level, this was not the prevailing view.5 
Indeed, the system of licensing created one of the most robust points of contact between 
the state and the people, as the scene at the Baltimore clerk’s office indicates. Licensed 
men and women possessed certain expectations of what their licenses conferred and made 
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demands of city and state authorities accordingly. To those paying for licenses, the “mere 
receipt” was more than a permission slip. Rather, the license symbolized their right to 
engage in fair competition with other licensed traders. For their part, municipal and state 
legislatures and courts asserted the power to rescind licenses at any time and for any 
reason, viewing the license not as a contract between parties but as a temporary (and 
annually renewable) privilege.6 
 Similarly, not all licenses were created equal. As can be gleaned from the sheer 
variety of trades it encompassed, the license system was a dynamic and mutable 
instrument of regulation. Its flexibility was manifested in a warren of license laws that 
differed markedly from city to city and from state to state, to such an extent that one 
writer remarked in 1861 “that it is impossible to state any general principles by which 
they are governed.” Another late-nineteenth-century expert agreed: “The laws of the 
respective States are so varied upon this subject that few general principles can be 
extracted.”7 Licensing thus embodied the prevailing strain of localism that ran through 
antebellum legal culture, the contours of which, Laura Edwards shows, were deeply 
inscribed by local situations, customs, and power dynamics.8 One consequence of 
licensing’s numerous iterations and applications is the reticence of scholars to engage 
fully with such “an enormous and messy topic.” This has prompted some historians to 
                                                
6 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Taxation (Chicago, 1876), 407. 
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regard licensing often “as nothing more than a means of revenue.”9 What dedicated 
studies of licensing do exist date from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
when states and localities sought to augment their licensing powers, the prohibition 
movement sprang to life, and legal theorists looked to explain newer developments in 
taxation, criminal justice, and municipal administration.10 Antebellum treatises seldom 
addressed the practice of licensing directly, though this most likely suggests an implicit 
acknowledgment that licenses served a wide array of ends, and thus frustrated any 
attempts at generalization, rather than out of disinterest.11 
 There has been, however, a major exception to the licensing lacuna: liquor. 
Indeed, most studies of late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century licensing focus 
almost exclusively on taverns and temperance reform. Scholars of economic regulation, 
from Louis Hartz to William Novak, have devoted the majority of their examinations of 
licensing to the controversies over liquor retailing.12 This should not surprise, for liquor 
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loomed large in antebellum popular thought about licensing, as well. But the animated 
debates over tavern licensing between 1830 and 1860 grew out of a larger conversation 
about local and state license laws. Re-situating the temperance attack on liquor licensing 
within context of the civic economy sheds light on another antebellum development: 
liberalism. In particular, licensing adds dimension to Amy Dru Stanley’s forceful 
argument that liberalism, based on “the idea of personal volition,” became bound up in 
“the orthodoxy of market economics” in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century. 
It thus evolved into a “worldview” that “idealized ownership of self and voluntary 
exchange between individuals who were formally equal and free.” Stanley points to the 
dominance of the economic contract (as opposed to the older political compact) in 
antebellum thought as the defining feature of nineteenth-century liberalism.13 Petitioners’ 
use of the language of contract demonstrates how thoroughly this worldview saturated the 
civic economy, decades before abolitionists (whom Stanley most identifies with the shift) 
deployed a contract argument to champion free labor. By moving outward from the 
public market and examining the many other spaces of the urban marketplace, the 
broader social implications of the civic economy—and its emphasis on a contractual 
relationship between the license-holder and the state—come into view. 
 
I. Objects of licensing 
 Informed by his neighbor that he “must not work at my trade as usual, without 
first going to some officer of government, take a license and pay for it,” an Annapolis 
shoemaker vented his frustrations to the press: “Go to gaol! – be fined! take a license ! to 
                                                
13 Amy Dru Stanley, From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of 
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work in my shop and earn bread for my children. Are we free? Is this liberty? or am I 
dreaming?” Writing in the immediate wake of the War of 1812, he wondered if he had 
ridden “like a witch on a broom-stick” and magically landed in the “tyrannical 
government of England.”14 Since the Restoration, authorities at every level of English 
government had been employing the license system to regulate “houses” offering coffee, 
plays, drams, and a witch’s brew of seditious discussion. In so doing, they engineered 
“social control through selective taxation,” in the words of one historian.15 Licensing was 
among numerous common law practices that migrated to North America with British 
colonists and adapted to different social, economic, and political conditions.  
 The first decades of the nineteenth century witnessed a rising tide of license laws, 
as municipal corporations acquired more autonomy from state legislatures to institute 
their own licensing systems. Starting from their articles of incorporation, Philadelphia 
and Baltimore lawmakers adopted license requirements for a wide assortment of trades 
from the late 1790s to 1820s, including taverns, gaming establishments, public 
entertainments, appointed or hired public officials (from market clerks to 
chimneysweeps), common carriers (including ferries, hacks, carts, and drays), 
commission merchants (such as auctioneers), and brokers.16 Moreover, most retailers had 
to procure a trader’s license from the municipal or state government. This was 
particularly true of Maryland, which enacted the most extensive license system in 
antebellum America, cresting with an 1827 law that mandated a license for anyone 
selling 
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any dry goods, groceries, spirituous or fermented liquor, imported dried 
fruit, glass, crockery, hardware, drugs, or medicines, paints, printed books, 
stationery, saddlery, gold, silver or plated ware, jewelry, toys, wearing 
apparel, salted provisions, grain, meal, flour, timber, tobacco, cotton, 
leather, hides, lime, wrought or cast iron, copper or tin, or any other kind 
of goods, wares or merchandise, foreign or domestic.17 
This exhaustive list points to two things. First, it highlights the degree to which local and 
state authorities viewed licensing as a legitimate intervention in the market economy, 
whatever their intentions. Second, and more vitally, it signals something about those 
intentions, which were almost as diverse as the commodities themselves. 
 As municipal corporations and state legislatures expanded the corpus of license 
laws in the early republic, they had in mind four general objectives. The first and most 
evident was taxation. License fees, along with duties, tolls, and rents from commercial 
facilities like markets and wharves, formed the basis of municipal taxation in early-
modern England, in contrast to the property or poll taxes implemented in agricultural 
areas. British-American municipalities initially drew upon similar revenue sources, but as 
services like lighting, policing, and street paving fell under municipal control in the 
second half of the eighteenth century, an increasing number of colonies established 
property taxes in towns. Nevertheless, cities like Baltimore and Philadelphia only 
occasionally resorted to property taxes before the 1840s or 1850s, instead continuing to 
rely on a battery of more selective or direct fees like licenses. According to a historian of 
Baltimore municipal finance, license revenue, which was negligible before incorporation, 
“came ultimately to form an important item in the municipal budget” in the first third of 
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the nineteenth century.18  
 As forms of taxation, licenses were designed to fund specific services directly or 
indirectly associated with the occupation. Most obvious were the fees required to 
transport people and goods through the streets. Municipal lawmakers calibrated license 
fees for carts, wagons, and carriages according to their purpose (passenger or freight 
traffic), size, number and width of wheels, and number of draught animals. This was in 
part because larger vehicles contributed more to the constant need for road repairs. 
Licensing also sponsored the use of certain vehicles or wheels that would better preserve 
roads, as in the case of an 1801 Baltimore law entitled, “An ordinance to encourage the 
introduction and use of broad wheels.”19 Common carriers complained that differential 
fees “cannot but operate in a measure unequally.” Taxing only the wagons of those who 
lived within the city boundaries, a group of wealthier merchants complained in 1799, was 
“a boon which their neighbors removed only one foot beyond this ideal mark can with 
impunity enjoy.”20 Despite similar protests throughout the period, the municipal 
government, and most citizens, agreed that license fees should be graduated according to 
the degree to which carriers used (and used up) one of the most vital public resources, the 
street. 
 Considerations of revenue lurked behind virtually all forms of licensing. Even 
when licenses were employed to curb social dangers like alcohol, gaming, and dogs, the 
fees went directly to the regulation of those activities. A portion of tavern license revenue 
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was allocated to the construction of new jails and public dispensaries, the need for which 
was viewed as stemming directly from the social ills of alcohol. Dog taxes paid for the 
costs of hiring men and boys to catch, impound, and kill dogs.21 License taxes also 
assisted in the expansion of the municipal government itself from the 1790s onward. 
With more regulation came the need for more public employees like assistant market 
clerks and a bevy of product inspectors. Most of these officials earned part or most of 
their income from a variety of fees and penalties they levied, which could prove quite 
lucrative for some. To counterbalance the power and wealth that could be wielded by 
some of the best-positioned bureaucrats, Baltimore lawmakers assessed license taxes of 
most of its civil servants. Doing a brisk business, flour inspectors paid the largest annual 
fee, which as early as 1803 was $500 (raised from $100 in 1798).22 As with the common 
carriers, public officials routinely grumbled about exorbitant licenses cutting into their 
bottom line. Nevertheless, the licensing of public offices continued to serve as a principal 
means by which lawmakers created a funding feedback loop for the expanding municipal 
bureaucracy. 
 Common carrier, tavern, and dog licenses indicate a second application beyond 
revenue: legibility. Licenses contributed to a broader effort to account for and govern an 
increasingly mobile and anonymous urban population in the early republic, when 
municipal police forces remained small and fragmentary. Requiring carriers, 
tavernkeepers, and dog owners to prominently display their licenses facilitated their 
regulation by city police as well as residents, who could choose not to do business with 
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certain traders or inform on infractions. Ordinances stipulated that all wagons, carts, 
hacks, drays, and boats be “numbered with plain and conspicuous figures, done with 
black paint on a white ground,” with the number assigned by the city clerk.23 Leather dog 
collars included “a licensed number to be regularly furnished by the Register of the 
city.”24 Enterprises including taverns, boarding houses, and theatres were directed to 
place their licenses in a location where visitors could see it. Peddlers and other itinerant 
traders were to have their licenses on them at all times and to produce it whenever asked 
by a public official.  
 Beyond enabling the regulation of specific trades, licenses were a means of 
managing population in a similar fashion as tax lists and census records. Marriage 
licenses, for instance, carried at most a nominal fee to offset costs of keeping records that 
afforded local and state governments an important glimpse into the nature of their 
populations. At a more practical level, the license system generated documentation—such 
as lists of those who rented market stalls—that enabled authorities to see who was 
partaking of certain municipal services, for how long, how much they paid, and whether 
they paid on time. Moreover, by documenting the names, homes, nativity, and physical 
features of peddlers and other commercial itinerants, licensing accounted for a highly 
migratory population that often eluded tax or census lists.25 
 In antebellum Baltimore and Philadelphia, few groups were as routinely singled 
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out for their unlicensed movements as persons of color. This was especially true of 
African Americans engaged in trades based on mobility, such as carting, huckstering, and 
chimney sweeping, occupations in which a considerable number of free blacks worked.26 
Licensing offered white elites and slave owners a means to track and regulate the 
mobility of free persons of color in the state, where other attempts to pass laws 
constraining free blacks had failed. In concert with other legal instruments like vagrancy 
and apprenticeship laws, license laws that required free blacks to take out a license to 
engage in the trade of any agricultural products—and making the purchasing these goods 
from an unlicensed African American punishable under laws prohibiting the receiving of 
stolen goods—stymied their pursuit of economic independence, which rested upon their 
ability to pass from country to city and back.27 Rural slaveholders, in particular, 
advocated licensing as a way to police black mobility and economy. Baltimore’s pro-
slavery weekly, The American Farmer, referred readers to a grand jury presentment in 
South Carolina that painted tippling houses (licensed or not) as spaces where “assaults 
and batteries, riots, affrays, homicides, trading with slaves, and receiving stolen goods” 
frequently occurred.28 Another article tried to rouse owners into assisting “a revision of 
the license laws,” exclaiming that “neighborhoods are again infested with grog-shops, 
where men grow rich notoriously by corrupting slaves and receiving stolen goods.”29 The 
supposed link between African Americans and theft, while bereft of fact, gave pro-
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slavery proponents of licensing a handy justification, since pawnbrokers and tavern 
keepers—most closely identified with the fencing of stolen goods in the period—were 
licensed specifically to guard against theft.30 
 The third and fourth objectives prompted the most frequent and wide-ranging 
debates over licensing and the nature of market governance in antebellum America: 
competition and the preservation of public morality, health, and safety. Both influenced 
the 1827 Maryland license law quoted above, which regulated a broad range of traders 
and commodities. Each commodity came with its own bundle of rationales for 
regulation—some primarily for reasons of health (such as drugs) or safety (timber), 
others for morality (liquor), and still others for taxation and competition (jewelry and 
flour). The inclusion of each commodity inspired new rounds of discussion amongst 
lawmakers and petitions from retailers and consumers. State and local legislators were 
often deliberate in crafting license laws, even if ambiguity remained in the final 
language.31 As in other areas of the civic economy, traders came within the purview of 
the state’s licensing authority for a multitude of reasons.  
 Not that authorities were forthcoming in explaining their rationale, for they had 
incentive to keep the internal logic of licensing somewhat opaque and fluid. So long as 
the license was construed as a “privilege” that emanated from the state’s broad police 
powers, rather than a tax implying a contractual relationship between the licensee and 
licenser, they could be quite selective in its application and revoke licenses at will. An 
early-twentieth-century legal theorist called licensing “the path of least resistance … 
lend[ing] itself equally to wide discretion and to non-discretion, and private interests are 
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usually able to accommodate themselves to it without undue difficulty.”32 The postbellum 
jurist Thomas Cooley preferred legislation that explicitly prohibited activities deemed too 
dangerous to public safety or morality over “circuitous method[s]” like high license taxes. 
He agreed, however, that prohibition through exorbitant license fees were practical in 
cases where “the prohibition of an occupation which excites or gratifies the vices of large 
numbers of people, is met by a resistance so steady and powerful as to render the law 
wholly ineffectual.”33  
 Yet the blurring of licensing’s many instrumentalities was problematic in practice, 
creating room for alternative interpretations of the valence of licenses in the civic 
economy. This was most evident in the ambiguous distinction between licensing and 
taxing. Even legal theorists writing with the benefit of hindsight prevaricated on the 
difference. “The distinction between a demand of money, under the police power, and 
one made under the power to tax,” Cooley wrote in 1876, “is not so much one of form as 
of substance. The proceedings may be the same in the two cases, though the purpose is 
entirely different. The one is made for regulation and the other for revenue.” The 
challenge of disentangling the license’s multiple instrumentalities, accrued over several 
centuries of British and American common law traditions and court decisions, most 
certainly eluded those not academically versed in the law. It was not as simple as to say 
licenses were instituted for regulation and taxes for revenue, as Cooley admitted: 
“Custom has much to do in determining whether certain classes of exactions are to be 
regarded as taxes or as duties imposed for regulation.”34 But even if licensees did not 
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grasp the particularities of licensing’s meaning in common law, they knew how to shape 
its meaning in the civic economy. 
 Deciding whether licenses were to be classed primarily as taxes or as police 
regulations mattered because each generated a different set of expectations between the 
state and the individual. In his study of courts in early Massachusetts, Hendrik Hartog 
contends that lawmakers and citizens understood a license to be “private property,” not 
“an instrument of public authority,” by the end of the eighteenth century.35 A closer 
inspection of antebellum contests in the courts and streets over licensing suggests this 
reading of the license system was not as universal as Hartog suggests. Many licensees did 
conceive of licenses as private property, and they objected when city and state authorities 
restricted their ability to transfer their licenses to others or revoked them altogether. The 
remainder of this chapter, however, concerns those who viewed licenses as the malleable 
(and social) documents they were and made strategic legal claims of the state accordingly 
(Fig. 2.1). To do so entailed navigating a legal labyrinth in which individuals defended 
their reputation in the courts, in petitions to lawmakers, and in public. Tensions between 
licensing’s tax and police functions, and the liminal legal spaces that these tensions 
created for participants in the civic economy, animated antebellum debates over the 
nature of economic competition and the role of the state in policing public morality. 
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II. The business of reputation and respectability  
 There were some commonalities licensees across the social spectrum shared. 
Every applicant—bankers and auctioneers, oyster cellar keepers and hucksters—was 
required to account for their economic capital. What this entailed was similar for most 
applicants. On their honor, merchants and traders testified to their stock in trade in front 
of the clerk. Men and women at both ends of the commercial spectrum had reason to 
under-represent their holdings. Wealthier traders secured lesser fees, while poorer female 
traders avoided license fees altogether if their stock was below 100 dollars. Ambiguity 
was built into the system. Without having to open their books or take an oath before the 
clerk of the City Court, the Sun averred, “the business conscience of all parties enjoys a 
tolerable latitude of action.” Drawing attention to widespread discrepancies between the 
amounts declared to insurers and those given to license clerks, the same critic noted that 
all classes of merchants, including the wealthiest, flouted the law.36 For both wealthy and 
poor applicants, there was considerable room to maneuver within a system designed to be 
adaptable—though much more so for the former than the latter group. 
 Other licenses bore more heavily upon assessments of moral or social capital. To 
receive a license in Pennsylvania, for instance, tin and clock peddlers needed to supply 
“satisfactory evidence of [their] good moral character” to the clerk of the Court of 
Quarter Sessions.37 Evidence is scarce for the processes and standards by which licensees 
demonstrated their moral worth in Baltimore and Philadelphia courts—each clerk and 
justice had his own methods and prejudices. Still, an examination of applications for 
tavern and inn licenses reveals some of the contours of this process. Public-house licenses 
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hinged on the approval of neighboring residents and businesses. This additional stratum 
of public supervision aimed at the prevention of nuisances, a subject to which inns and 
taverns were inextricably linked. In the words of one expert, nuisances violated “the great 
social compact” through “the unreasonable, unwarrantable or unlawful use by a person of 
his own property,” or through “improper, indecent or unlawful personal conduct” that 
hindered or damaged the rights of another person or the public.38 The elasticity of the 
concept—reflected in Nathan Dane’s definition of nuisances as “strictly whatever annoys 
or damages another”—empowered the regulation of a wide range of commercial 
behaviors.39  
 No category of nuisances was as riddled with assessments of class, gender, and 
race as the “disorderly house.” According to an antebellum criminal lawyer, this included 
“bawdy-houses, common gaming-houses, and places of a like character, to which people 
promiscuously resort for purposes injurious to the public morals or health or convenience 
or safety.”40 As historians have observed, however, terms like “disorder” were suffused 
with cultural as well as legal values and meanings. The mere presence of members of the 
lower sort, particularly when accompanied by the “promiscuous” mixing of sexes or skin 
colors, was enough to warrant police intervention and criminalization. Owners of 
disorderly houses continuously battled with elites over interpretations of their commercial 
activities, and as one scholar notes, “a poor but enterprising tavern keeper would never 
have defined her house as disordered.”41 Just as reputation shaped one’s access to credit 
                                                
38 Horace Gay Wood, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances in their Various Forms (Albany, NY, 
1875), 1-2. The literature on nuisances is vast, but Novak provides an excellent summary of the concept 
and its many competing historical interpretations. Novak, People’s Welfare, 60-62. 
39 Dane, General Abridgment, 3:39. 
40 Bishop, Commentaries on Criminal Law, 2:170. 
41 Serena Zabin, Dangerous Economies: Status and Commerce in Imperial New York (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 62. 
 
 90 
and other instruments of business, it affected how easily one could procure a license to 
sell liquor or entertainment and how lenient authorities would be in identifying and 
shuttering disorderly houses.  
 Beyond making the business of opening a tavern or inn a public endeavor, 
requiring certificates of neighborhood approval enmeshed license applicants within well-
defined relations of power. As in colonial America, nineteenth-century license laws 
exhorted applicants to seek out the signatures of “respectable inhabitants” (at least twelve 
in Pennsylvania), whose stature in the community gave them the extra-legal authority to 
separate the worthy from the unworthy.42 When Andrew Allen applied for a theatre 
license in 1822, for instance, he accounted for his reputation with a certificate signed by 
fourteen “respectable” men and women who described Allen as “a sober, and in all other 
respects, a proper person to keep a house of public entertainment.”43 Laws required 
peddlers, itinerant preachers, and other traveling figures to procure a license from a 
county courthouse, after acquiring signatures from community members, in an effort to 
mitigate their rootlessness. The requirement of bonds further drew license-seekers into 
local circuits of authority, indebting them to those who served as sureties. By affixing the 
reputation of others to that of the peddler or innkeeper, however tenuous that link was in 
reality, licensing promoted mutual surveillance and reaffirmed the authority of the 
signatures of community leaders.44 
 Some powerful members of the community availed this authority to ingratiate 
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themselves with their working-class neighbors in ways that threatened to subvert the 
system itself. In 1819, a Pennsylvania grand jury drew attention to the increasing number 
of taverns, “many of which have been set up under licenses obtained by mistake and 
misrepresentation.”45 Instructing a grand jury a few decades later, one Philadelphia judge 
decried “the conduct of respectable citizens who are in the habit of signing the certificates 
of petitions for tavern licenses.” When a recent applicant, known to the court as unworthy, 
presented his certificate, “appended [were] the names of some of the most respectable 
citizens—men of the very first and highest standing in the community.” In a thinly veiled 
threat, he noted, “The names of these men, if known, would astonish the public.”46  
 Two related sources of anxiety undergirded these criticisms. The first was 
demographic: relative to colonial towns, nineteenth-century cities were quickly becoming 
defined as spaces of anonymous, impersonal interaction. Urban growth and the constant 
flow of people in and out of neighborhoods caused more vigilant residents to despair of 
the breakdown of community self-policing.47 Related to this was a second concern: the 
growth of political patronage. Signatures could be bought and sold (though this certainly 
had always been the case). The politics of patronage forced at least one “highly 
respectable man” into signing a certificate against his judgment. He came to court and 
requested it to deny a license, “saying he knew the applicant to be unworthy, but that he 
                                                
45 Patriot (Baltimore), June 22, 1819. 
46 North American, Nov. 4, 1845. Given that grand juries were often composed of the same social stratum 
that was the target of this assertion, one wonders if there were dual motivations behind the judge’s decision 
to stress this point in his instructions. 
47 Stuart M. Blumin, “Residential Mobility Within the Nineteenth-Century City,” in The Peoples of 
Philadelphia: A History of Ethnic Groups and Lower-Class Life, 1790-1940, eds. Allen F. Davis and Mark 
H. Haller (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), 37-51. Kenneth A. Scherzer contends that 
depictions of the nineteenth-century neighborhood as increasingly atomized and anonymous were 
exaggerated; Scherzer, The Unbounded Community: Neighborhood Life and Social Structure in New York 
City, 1830-1875 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992), 49-96. 
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did not wish to make an enemy by refusing to sign for him.”48 Not all license applicants 
could hope to mold the system at will. The class composition of the structures of local 
authority, upon which the license application process was based, changed dramatically in 
the antebellum period. Access to alternative networks of urban influence by the 1840s 
and 1850s—such as membership in political gangs—had given some working-class men 
the ability to challenge the deferential stance embodied in such practices as license 
certification.49 For others lacking this newfound political capital, however, the only 
option was to navigate a system of competing visions and agendas. 
 Ann Bruorton’s 1819 license application represented this delicate negotiation of 
unpredictable social and legal customs. In securing the necessary signatures for her inn 
license, Bruorton counted on local networks of community and commerce. From the 
eleven names appended to her petition, one can only speculate on how she procured 
neighborhood support. Like many in the recently settled, western part of the city, she did 
not have especially deep roots in the city. She had arrived in Philadelphia in late 1816 or 
early 1817 with her husband, George, a china-gilder from Liverpool. Her grocery store on 
Chestnut Street offered one venue in which to rouse support for her venture, particularly 
among loyal customers. Customers were not her only signatories, as the support of fellow 
neighborhood grocer, Henry Snyder, attests. Heading the list of signatories was patrician 
Godfrey Haga, a German redemptioner who had amassed enough wealth in the grocery 
trade to purchase the “Gothic Mansion” adjacent to Bruorton’s shop.50 Perhaps she 
                                                
48 North American, Nov. 4, 1845. 
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appealed to Haga as a fellow immigrant and grocer, or perhaps she appealed to his well-
known spirit of charity. Either way, the licensing system required Bruorton to tap into 
social and business networks she had cultivated over two or three years. 
 Certificates vetted not only the persons applying but also the private spaces 
awaiting transformation into public spaces. Bruorton’s petition assured authorities her 
house was “commodious” and “well calculated for the accommodation of the inhabitants 
and travelers.” The location of the house provided a distinct advantage: it lay west of the 
more settled parts of the city, and the absence of any licensed public houses “for many 
squares” strengthened her case. Fewer neighbors also meant fewer potential complaints 
of operating a disorderly house.51 Meanwhile, petitioner Peter Kennedy sought to 
capitalize on his house’s proximity to one of Philadelphia’s bustling public markets by 
noting “the promise of the large lot adjoining for the accommodation of Market Carts & 
Horses &c.”52 What is most readily evident in these petitions is their formulaic language, 
a fact that sustained at least two cottage industries. By the 1820s, local printers made fill-
in-the-blank forms readily available, while enterprising authors reprinted the precise 
petition language in various “every man his own lawyer” publications.53  
 As rigid or rote as the textual formulas may have appeared, however, applicants 
found ways to imbue them with meanings and utilities of their own. One way was to 
make adjustments or addendums to the script itself in order to emphasize certain points. 
In the blank left open for the applicant’s name, for instance, Catherine Baird inserted the 
                                                                                                                                            
(Philadelphia, 1884), 3:2298. On Godfrey Haga, see Henry Simpson, The Lives of Eminent Philadelphians, 
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52 Petition of Peter Kennedy (Dec. 19, 1822), MC-HSP. 
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Summary of the Laws of England… (London, 1736). 
 
 94 
words “a widow with four small children.”54 In competition for a limited number of 
liquor licenses, some sought an advantage by declaring how long they had resided in 
Philadelphia.55 Others found space to drop in details that cast their “commodious houses” 
in a more flattering light. In a blank left open for his address, David Gibb elaborated, 
“under the Eastern side of the Arcade, this establishment has been fitted up with superior 
eligance.”56 These alterations to the script of certification, however modest, represent the 
conscious decisions of men and women to strategically position themselves (and their 
prospective public houses) in relation to the fickle category of respectability. 
 Other men and women of limited means utilized the supplicatory qualities of 
license applications. Many would-be tavernkeepers appealed to the philanthropic spirit of 
authorities with well-worn tropes in their applications, as in the case of the widowed 
mother of four, Catherine Baird. Indeed, it is noteworthy that license applications took 
the form of petitions, a mode of political expression, Susan Zaeske writes, that “held 
radical potential for women” in nineteenth-century America precisely because of its 
“supplicatory nature.”57 Like the tangible form that license applications took, the 
elasticity of public house licensing was not a nineteenth-century development. In her 
discussion of the eighteenth-century tavern licensing system, Sharon Salinger notes that a 
“tension existed between the stated goals and the process.” Despite the clear language of 
many laws, authorities often imposed “unspecified and random standards,” although fines 
                                                
54 Petition of Catherine Baird (Feb. 17, 1819), MC-HSP. 
55 Petitions of Joseph Cowell (Sept. 15, 1827), John Filton (Oct. 15, 1818), and Bertrand Latouche (April 7, 
1828), MC-HSP. 
56 Petition of David Gibb (Sept. 22, 1829), MC-HSP. 
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and penalties were not givens. Taverns located on busy travel routes might have previous 
indiscretions overlooked due to their influence. In place of sobriety and honesty, 
poverty—particularly for women—was enough in many cases to qualify for a license.58 
Just as the poor “turned the lack of explicit standards to their own advantage” in their 
dealings with the almshouse and other state and private institutions, then, many also 
sought to inhabit the interstices of antebellum license laws.59 
 For middling and prosperous entrepreneurs, meanwhile, licensing could raise 
undesirable or problematic questions about the respectability of their businesses and 
themselves. Theatre operators were particularly frustrated with the tendency of license 
laws to class them with less legitimate activities. In 1797, Baltimore’s city council 
enacted a law “to restrain gaming, and to license and regulate theatrical and other public 
exhibitions,” because “true religion and good morals are the only solid foundations of 
public liberty and happiness.” Such license laws aimed to limit the audience size, time, 
and duration of theatrical performances. The 1797 ordinance prohibited performances 
between June 10th and October 1st, when “the collecting of great numbers of people … 
into theatres is productive of contagious fevers and other maladies.”60 Three weeks after 
an 1811 fire killed 70 theatregoers in Richmond, Virginia, 327 Baltimoreans petitioned 
the city council to suppress public exhibitions entirely. They argued that theatres and 
circuses were not only “dangerous to the lives of spectators” but also “highly injurious to 
Religion, the morals, and consequently, to the civil prosperity of society.” The city 
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council did not yield to the petitioners’ request; four years later, it extended the theatre 
season to July 5th and would continue to shorten the mandated off-season over time.61 
 Nevertheless, licensing requirements for public exhibitions shared the petitioners’ 
sense that there were certain social costs and that fees should be calibrated accordingly. 
Hence licenses for dramatic performances in 1807 were ten dollars per night, “feats of 
horsemanship” eight dollars per night, musical parties five dollars per night, wire dancing 
and puppet shows ten dollars per week, and all others two dollars per week.62 Theatre 
owners used many strategies to request reduced license fees, such as claiming their 
performance was for charitable purposes.63 Others decried universal fees and asked they 
be graduated according to size. This included Baltimore proprietor John Finlay, whose 
“so very small” theatre in North Street “will not yield one third as much when full as the 
Theatre in Holliday street and yet … is required to pay the same amount for a licence.”64 
In 1828, the stockholders and trustees of the Baltimore Theatre outlined numerous 
reasons why the fee of ten dollars per night should be “altogether removed or greatly 
reduced.” Given that “no city more requires … the increase of rational & refined 
amusement than Baltimore,” the proprietors were frustrated that Baltimore was the only 
“large City” to tax theatrical performance: “Drama is every where else regarded, as it 
ought to be, one of the Fine Arts, deserving encouragement, rather than restraint and 
taxation.”65  
                                                
61 City Council Records, 1812:455, BCA; No. 27 (1816), No. 2 (1818), No. 20 (1829), Ordinances of 
Baltimore. See also Calamity At Richmond; Being a Narrative of the Affecting Circumstances Attending the 
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62 No. 21 (1807), Ordinances of Baltimore.  
63 City Council Records, 1815:277, BCA. 
64 City Council Records, 1826:505, BCA. 
65 City Council Records, 1828:372, BCA. The petitioners also noted that Baltimore was the most 
“convenient” place for members of the federal government, marooned in Washington, “almost wholly 
deficient in these attractions,” during the winter legislative season. 
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 During the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Baltimore lawmakers 
gradually relaxed theatre and circus laws. An 1831 ordinance eliminated the license 
requirement for free performances, suggesting that officials were coming to view theatre 
licenses more strictly as taxes and not as means of regulating public morality or safety.66 
Municipal authorities turned their attention to ten pin alleys, billiards and bagatelle halls, 
flying horses, and other public entertainments that proliferated in the 1830s and 1840s 
and were associated with gambling and other vices.67 In refusing to sign an 1832 
ordinance that licensed flying horses (or “whirligig”), Mayor William Steuart noted that 
“they collected together young and old, and many of the most dissolute characters that 
inhabit our City,” while “the young were contaminated by the language and manners of 
those more advanced in life, in pursuit of an amusement said to be facinating to the 
young, particularly boys.”68 Most ordinances from this period contained provisions 
allowing the mayor to deny or revoke a license at any time and for any reason. The role 
of the mayor as moral exemplar was cinched by the fact that applicants for public 
amusement licenses were required to obtain them directly from the mayor. 
 Straddling the distinction between amusement and enlightenment, museums 
underscored the problematic of reputation and respectability in the licensing process. In 
1837, Baltimore’s city council compared museum licenses to those required of “the 
merchant and manufacturer upon whose prosperity the very existence of our community 
                                                
66 No. 11 (1831), No. 7 (1842), Ordinances of Baltimore. Still, licensing would serve as a latent instrument 
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depends”—in short, they were a tax and not a regulation.69 But this was not the case for 
all supposed “museums.” For every Peale’s Museum that could make claims “to 
disseminat[ing] a taste for scientific pursuits and a knowledge of the fine arts,” there were 
others that took out museum licenses to showcase nude “model-artist shows,” 
pornographic dioramas, and prizefights. Even well-established museums like the 
Baltimore Museum complicated the boundaries of licensing by putting on theatrical 
performances, forcing the city to decide how to classify and regulate them.70 While the 
city police would occasionally canvas the city to ferret out licentious (but usually 
licensed) exhibits, it was clear that lawmakers had little faith in the license application 
process to prevent them from opening in the first place. A system of community policing, 
forged through the application process, proved ineffectual. In the view of city leaders in 
the 1840s and 1850s, a more robust system of professional policing was required to 
confront vice.71  
 The reputational element of licensing was most intense for African Americans 
and the poorest urban residents. For Baltimore’s free black community, the ability to 
move through the urban marketplace was not a right but a privilege conferred by fiat. For 
most of the antebellum period, African Americans had to appeal directly to the mayor, 
usually with letters of support from white neighbors, for permission to gather in private 
or at night. Reliance on this system of surveillance spiked following real or imagined 
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slave conspiracies, especially Nat Turner’s 1831 rebellion.72 Whether asking for the 
“privilige” of holding an “oyster supper,” of having a “little Dancing party to raise some 
money” for one’s own benefit, or of taking one’s carriage out at night to conduct a little 
business, such petitions typically stressed the sobriety, respectability, and general good 
character of the black citizens in question. While these passes were not technically 
licenses, they shared many of the same qualities: they hinged on nebulous legal and 
cultural definitions of respectability, reinforced the absolute (and paternalistic) power of 
the mayor over socially marginalized residents, and framed African Americans’ ability to 
operate within the civic economy.73 To be a person of color in antebellum Baltimore was 
to experience licensing on a more corporeal level.  
 
III. Securing a place in the urban economy: The context of Brown v. Maryland 
 As a gatekeeping mechanism, licensing was at the heart of debates about 
competition in the civic economy. The issue of reputation was magnified by the 
unsparing competition that faced all trades in the antebellum city. After Baltimore passed 
an 1826 ordinance raising the license for billiard tables to $300 annually for each table, 
the city’s social clubs bitterly objected.74 Some decried the fact that they had to pay both 
a state (another $100 annually) and municipal license tax on their tables; others asked 
why each table had to be licensed separately. The Baltimore Club declared the double 
license an “unauthorized” exertion of corporate power, a case of the city operating 
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outside its “legitimate sphere” of jurisdiction.75 For most social clubs, however, billiard 
table licenses posed a practical problem in competing during the winter months, when 
their existence was already “rendered very precarious by the number of amusements 
which are then crowded into the city.” They asked for the option of a six-month license, 
since the majority of clubs operated only during the winter.76  
 During the 1820s, licensing occupied a prominent place in debates about the 
nature of economic competition in the antebellum city. Licensing—and specifically its 
byzantine relationship to taxation—provided the backdrop to one of the most momentous 
antebellum Supreme Court decisions in Brown v. Maryland (1827), which arose from an 
1821 Maryland law requiring importers and other wholesalers of foreign goods to take 
out a license for fifty dollars. Viewing it as an egregious “tax [on] Baltimore city, for the 
benefit of the state of Maryland,” Baltimore’s mercantile community vigorously 
contested the law. In November 1822, one of its most prominent members, Alexander 
Brown, was indicted in the Baltimore City Court for importing and subsequently retailing 
a shipment of foreign dry goods without a license. Chief Justice John Marshall declared 
the state’s law unconstitutional in view of the fact that the federal government’s authority 
to regulate commerce remained paramount until the original packaging of the imported 
goods had been opened. Nevertheless, Marshall’s judgment reaffirmed the state’s 
authority to tax and regulate trade when public health, safety, morality, or trade 
necessitated it, preserving a broad construction of the state’s license powers.77 While 
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scholars have thoroughly dissected Brown v. Maryland for its state and federal 
significance, it is worth situating the case within its local context—one in which 
merchants, shopkeepers, and petty traders routinely petitioned city lawmakers busily 
engaged in expanding the licensing system. 
 For petitioners, the question was not whether licensing promoted or curtailed 
competition. Rather, it was a matter of working through the license system to secure 
one’s place in an urban economy prone to wild fluctuations and cutthroat conditions. This 
was especially the case in the wake of the Panic of 1819, which combined with the 
structural shifts of industrialization to press thousands of urban residents into new, more 
casual labor arrangements. But it was true even of better-off merchants like auctioneers, 
who had to accommodate themselves to new market conditions—such as the reopening 
of trade relations with Britain—after the end of the War of 1812. Historians have 
examined the “auction-house conflicts” of the late 1810s and 1820s and found them to be 
a crucible for emerging ideas about the free market, consumers’ rights, and political 
patronage. The question of licensing insinuated itself into these debates at various points, 
nowhere more explosively than when politicians like Pennsylvania’s governor, William 
Findlay, were accused of granting licenses in exchange for personal favors. One observer 
noted that it was the fact that the governor had the authority to license auctioneers, “a 
most valuable monopoly,” that the office’s “obtainment should be the object of severe 
contest.”78  
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 Auctioneers’ licenses were a lucrative source of city and state revenue in the early 
republic. Baltimore auctioneers were required by an 1807 ordinance to pay $750 annually 
for their licenses. Laws also mandated they give account of their sales every three or six 
months, take oaths, transact their business only at certain places and times, and give bond 
in the sum of $30,000 to ensure they would “faithfully execute the office and 
employment of an auctioneer.” These stipulations reflected the perception, William 
Novak notes, that auctioneers served as “economic officers of the state”—indeed, they 
occupied a similar place as another set of quasi-state actors, lottery managers. On top of 
$750 for a general license, “special auctioneers” who bought and sold articles like horses 
and carriages, furniture, hardware, jewelry, clothing, and books, maps, and prints took 
out additional licenses ranging from $50 to $100 annually for each category of goods.79 
While auctioneers portrayed themselves as “cheerfully” paying for their general licenses, 
they complained that special licenses failed to take into account the constantly shifting 
nature of their trade—hemming them in at a time when auctioneering required being able 
to sell a variety of commodities as opportunities arose. There was some leeway, however; 
to facilitate estate sales (an important way in which auctioneers served in a state capacity), 
in 1817 Baltimore authorized those holding certain special licenses “to sell lands, lots of 
ground, tenements, [and] servants and slaves.”80  
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 Special licenses were a lightning rod for controversy in the civic economy. 
Booksellers, furniture dealers, and other retailers protested the various ways auctioneers 
undersold them by buying in volume and selling more cheaply than smaller retailers 
could: “These auctions do not flag,” an anti-auction pamphlet warned in 1817, “they 
increase and prevail, and regular bookstores are, in a manner, abandoned.”81 Three years 
later, Baltimore booksellers decried “the sales of single books at auction,” alleging “that 
nearly the whole of such sales are for account of foreign booksellers, and the proceeds are 
remitted hence [to] other Cities.” As one columnist sardonically noted, “the license 
money is all we shall ever see of the revenue from these auctioneers.”82 When 
auctioneers asked the city to include stationery in the special books, maps, and prints 
license—arguing it was “rather a matter of convenience to the public, than of profit to the 
auctioneer”—booksellers squawked. “To obtain cheap books is doubtless an advantage,” 
they wrote, “but to get them with certainty, without the expence of valuable time wasted 
at auctions or of imbibing a gaming spirit amidst their competitions, are advantages yet 
superior.” Paying “heavy rents and other expences in conducting their business and as in 
common with their fellow citizens they pay to the state and the corporation their taxes,” 
the booksellers believed “themselves [entitled] to protection in their property.” The city 
sided with the booksellers, requiring auctioneers to take out a separate license to retail 
stationery.83 
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 Auctioneers similarly believed high license fees entitled them to use their 
property in such a way that enhanced their competitive edge. In particular, auctioneers 
sought access to adjacent sidewalks and open spaces to conduct public vendues—that is, 
to engineer their own impromptu market spaces. Again they emphasized that the flood of 
commodities overwhelmed any and all attempts at restricting their circulation through the 
urban marketplace. Baltimore auctioneers defended their appropriation of sidewalks in 
1831: “In a city like this there are quantities of property coming under the denomination 
of furniture (changing hands from time to time at public auction) too ponderous and 
bulky for the limits of a warehouse used for other business.” It was not only “in the way 
of business” that “every good citizen [should] yield a little convenience to the 
prosecution of the business” of auctions. “Were it to be determined upon the question of 
right,” they averred, “no one’s claim would be greater thus to occupy the pavements than 
the auctioneer, because he pays a large portion of the revenue which indirectly comes to 
the city,” including license fees.84 Others disagreed with their construal of the “rights” 
conferred by licenses. An 1817 petition bemoaned “two persons who conceive 
themselves priviledged by taking out License as auctioneers to obstruct the footway and 
street each day.” During market day, “the footway is compleatly obstructed, and rendered 
Impassable” to the many women shoppers as a result of the auctions.85 
 The 1817 petitioners—shopkeepers—were concerned less about making the 
sidewalk a respectable space for promenading than making it easier for “females, who it 
cannot be expected would make a second effort to pass, after being once stopped by the 
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crowd gathered around there of Idle persons,” to see the goods they themselves displayed 
on the sidewalk. The 1831 petition of auctioneers referred to this competition with 
shopkeepers for sidewalk space when they argued their license fees gave them the “right” 
to occupy the pavement for “but a few minutes”—compared to “Merchants engaged in 
the Grocery or produce or General whole sale business” who obstructed them almost 
daily and paid a far smaller license tax.86 Sidewalk disputes were thus a spatial 
manifestation of the broader contests over the meaning of a free market in the civic 
economy (Fig. 2.2). 
 For shopkeepers, however, it was another set of licensed retailers laying claim to 
public spaces that proved most vexing. In early 1824, 43 Baltimore grocers met at Mrs. 
Winkle’s tavern—locally renowned for her turtle soup and a hub of associational 
activity—to discuss the forces arrayed against them. There were the aforementioned 
auctioneers, who retailed goods at wholesale prices “contrary to the established usages 
and customs of regular trade.” There was also the substantial financial burden they 
labored under, paying a “heavy license” on top of rent, property taxes, and other costs. 
This injustice was aggravated by the fact “that many articles of their assortment, are 
hawked about the streets, and sold in the market houses, by persons who incur none of 
those unavoidable expences,” save a paltry market license. The grocers referred to the 
sale of various manufactured goods in the public markets, occasionally practiced since 
the late eighteenth century but to a much greater extent since the Panic of 1819. They 
declared “the practice of hawking soap, candles, oil and imported fruits, spices and other 
articles in the grocery line [and] of selling cheese and corn brooms” to be “derogatory to 
fair and regular trade.” It was also “a prostitution of the market places to purposes 
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entirely different from those for which their founders intended them”—that is, for the sale 
of food.87 
 Yet those who sold corn brooms, candles, and cheese conceived of the public 
market in more liberal terms as “a depot for all those articles of traffic, which the wants 
or the luxuries of life may require.”88 The public market was an elastic institution that 
expanded to accommodate thousands of urban residents undone by the Panic of 1819. 
Changing labor patterns refocused the question of occupational licensing. Unable to find 
regular employment or unwilling to put up with heightened surveillance from master 
artisans in larger workshops, hundreds of journeymen and erstwhile apprentices moved 
into city marketplaces. They sold tinware, copper pots and pans, wooden barrels, clothing, 
hats, shoes, and an array of other manufactured goods from moveable stalls. Most took 
out the requisite stall licenses, which they understood in contractual terms as protecting 
certain economic rights—namely the right to compete with other retailers on equal terms. 
Petitioning street venders in 1827 were “perfectly satisfied to pay the sum now imposed 
upon them, as a Licence, but as they are debarr’d the right, which they do conceive they 
ought have granted to them,” they looked to the municipal corporation to restore their 
right to occupy “desirable places” in the public markets. Asserting a link between holding 
a license and being legitimate traders, they called the lawmakers’ attention to the fact 
they were “persons having a Licence” in the first sentence of their memorial. In addition 
to the fact “they [had] long enjoyed” the ability to sell manufactured goods in city 
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markets, their licenses “afford[ed] a considerable revenue to the City.”89  
 Shopkeepers countered that the licenses paid by street venders were negligible 
and gave them no right to compete on what they saw as demonstrably unfair terms. As 
historians have noted, the rise of urban manufacturing in the 1820s exacerbated class 
conflicts between artisans-turned-merchants and poorer mechanics.90 Styling themselves 
“regular dealers” (their itinerant opponents were “irregular”), aspirational shopkeepers 
emphasized the burdens of licensing and other costs in a steady stream of petitions to 
Baltimore’s city council. A strident 1827 petition summed up their argument: “The 
Corporation have no right to levy annually heavy and burthensome taxes on our property 
to build Market-houses, and convert those houses, for a pitiful Revenue, into shops, to the 
great injury and destruction of real property.”91 In contrast to the petty traders’ liberal 
vision, shopkeepers argued for a more rigorously controlled marketplace. But they also 
viewed licenses through the lens of contract, viewing the lack of adequate regulation as a 
failure of the state to uphold its side of the deal. Master mechanics worried that the 
vending of their articles in the marketplace by journeymen would erode their already 
tenuous competitive advantage as owners of small shops and “reduce to Bankruptcy and 
pauperism the regular mechanic and trader.”92 In their view, the vending of dry goods 
(such as shoes, boots, hats, tinware and crockery) was “a great nuisance,” “highly 
injurious to almost every class of citizens, particularly property holders, the merchant 
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who has established himself in rented houses and mechanicks.” This “unpresidented” 
trade, they fretted, was “bringing about a state of things unparelled in this or any other 
well regulated city.”93   
 For their complaints about being “heavily taxed,” shopkeepers and master 
mechanics nevertheless viewed licensing as a way to tilt the balance in their favor once 
again. Beginning in 1823, city clothiers, shoemakers, tinware manufacturers, and grocers 
agitated for laws that would “subject [itinerant traders] to the payment of a sum for 
license equal to the hire of a store or shop.” Clothiers “keep[ing] regular shops” were 
aggrieved that certain individuals “should be permitted to take advantage of them by 
takeing Stands in the Markets on Market days for the sale of ready made Clothes.” It was 
not self-interest that drove their complaints, they argued, but concern for “a great number 
of Indigent females [who] received their daily support from their employ.” Should the 
street venders “be permitted to continue to hold the undue advantage they have over them, 
they will be compelled to abandon those poor females to seek support from some other 
force.”94 Others explicitly asked the city to employ licenses as an instrument of 
prohibition. When Baltimore lawmakers proposed a $45 license fee for tinware dealers to 
occupy market stalls throughout the city—a sum already high enough to force out many 
venders—a group of tin plate workers led by Christopher Raborg petitioned to have the 
fee raised to $600 for each marketplace ($3,000 for all).95  
 Buoyed by the support of a number of powerful allies like merchant Hugh 
McElderry, journeymen tin plate dealers reacted swiftly to Raborg’s request. McElderry 
and others did not interpret the city’s proposed ordinance requiring a $45 license as an 
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attempt to “deprive the honest and industrious mechanic from vending his commodities 
in a place which to all intents and purposes was erected for that purpose.” More 
importantly, they saw something insidious in Raborg’s proposal. “Suppose the victuallers, 
or any other class of licensed dealers in the markets should enter into a combination to 
force an individual to leave the market,” they wrote. “Would the Council in such case 
sanction the measure?” They thought not. When the city conceded a little ground and 
raised the license fee to $50, tinware vender James Cortland warned lawmakers about the 
unintended consequences of raising the bar of entry to the marketplace: “If obliged to quit 
the Market,” he and his ilk would move across the street and occupy privately owned 
stalls, which “could be obtained for a trifling expence compared with a Market Licence.” 
The city would lose revenue, and the venders’ primary customers, “the Country people,” 
would follow them out of the public market.96 
 Nevertheless, by 1827, shopkeepers and master mechanics had won enough 
support in the city council to have an ordinance passed that barred the licensing of 
anyone selling goods, wares, and merchandise within market limits. Venders caught 
selling “any other article except eatables” would be fined between five and ten dollars for 
each offense.97 It was a watershed year for license laws in other ways, as well. In addition 
to Brown v. Maryland, state lawmakers enacted the most expansive licensing 
requirements yet seen in antebellum America, touching upon virtually anyone retailing 
any article, whether of domestic or foreign production.98 The year also coincided with a 
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sea change in local, state, and national politics, with Jacksonian Democrats achieving 
their first major electoral successes. Expanding Jacksonian influence held wide-ranging 
consequences for licensing. Presenting themselves as the party of anti-temperance and 
anti-coercion, Jacksonians set about dismantling license laws following their surge into 
local and state offices in the late 1820s and early 1830s. Throughout the country, trades 
from carting to medicine saw license requirements relaxed or eliminated.99 
 Soon after its passage, the Maryland license law was embroiled in a contest that 
exposed new political fault lines within the state (between Whigs and Jacksonians) as 
well as old ones (between Baltimore and the rest of the state). Politicians from 
Maryland’s rural, western counties initiated the exchange. Tapping into the fervor over 
the upcoming presidential election and feelings of marginalization in the state capital, 
politicians of all stripes latched onto the issue of licensing. “It is admitted by all,” 
Washington County’s four House delegates wrote in a published letter, “that the law is 
outrageously oppressive, and will bear heavily upon the poorer class of society who 
‘expose for sale or barter’ any article that they do not grow, make or manufacture.” 
Among this class were “Millers and Distillers who buy poor cattle and hogs to fatten and 
sell,” “Farmers or others trading in oysters, melons, potatoes, fresh fish, &c.,” “Hucksters, 
or others, who buy and sell apples, pears, peaches, nuts, &c.,” “and ‘last tho’ not least’ in 
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price, the Rag-man.”100 Another state delegate disclaimed responsibility for the bill’s 
passage: “The richest merchant, and the poorest milliner—the keeper of an oyster house, 
a booth or a stall—a rich jeweler, or a seller of crockery, bacon, meal, or fish … each 
have to pay twelve dollars a year license; and if this is justice I know not what justice 
is.”101  
 With the election approaching, the political associations of the bill’s supporters 
and detractors became more explicit. Responding to allegations that the Jackson faction 
was the main force behind the law, one writer noted that 33 out of 40 “Administration 
members” voted for the bill, while only 18 out of 30 “Jackson members” were in favor.102 
In another instance, “One of the Jackson Committee” addressed his support of the license 
law. Comparing the 1827 law to a similar bill proposed in 1826, he sought to disabuse 
readers of the notion that the law recently passed was more exacting than previous state 
laws. Whereas the 1826 bill would have required ordinary keepers to pay 18 dollars for a 
license and produce a certificate “signed by at least ten respectable inhabitants,” the 1827 
law required only the fee of 18 dollars. Citing “the common sense meaning” of 
“merchandize,” he argued that the law did not apply to those selling “apples or water 
melons, or fresh fish, or oysters, from boats or waggons,” nor were drovers to be termed 
“merchants,” nor cattle, horses, sheep, or hogs “merchandize.” Finally, he absolved his 
party from blame for turning the entire issue into a “Presidential question,” but warned: 
“If the friends of Mr. Adams will persist in connecting the subjects, the friends of Gen. 
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Jackson are prepared to meet them.”103 
 As the somewhat convoluted nature of these debates suggests, the rise of 
Democrats did not have the same effect on license laws in Maryland, where licensing was 
deeply entrenched in local and state legal cultures, as it did elsewhere. Class-inflected 
complaints about the 1827 law led lawmakers to revise it at the next session, clarifying 
that those who sold “only cakes, bread, beer or cider, apples, water-melons, chesnuts or 
other domestic fruits”—foodstuffs associated with poorer urban traders—need not be 
licensed.104 In 1832, lawmakers augmented the 1828 law to require a license of anyone 
who “shall expose for sale, or sell, any goods, wares or merchandise, with a view to profit 
in the way of trade.”105 (For comparison, in Pennsylvania, only retailers and wholesalers 
whose “goods, wares, and merchandise, wines, or distilled liquors, drugs or medicines” 
were not “the growth, produce, or manufacture of the United States” had to take out a 
license, with the exception of auctioneers and tavernkeepers.)106 Still, the effects of 
Jacksonian critiques of licensing as an instrument of the wealthy and politically 
connected rippled through Baltimore and the rest of the state. Baltimore’s traders and 
tradesmen were more likely to see licensing, as an 1833 pamphlet described it in spatial 
terms, as “an inequitable and oppressive form of taxation … hedg[ing] up the entrance to 
any business, and thus giv[ing] those who are already engaged in it an advantage to 
which in strict justice they are not entitled.”107  
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IV. Limits of licensing: Temperance challenges in the 1830s and 1840s 
 Jacksonian politics also portended another force that would come to shape 
antebellum attitudes towards licensing. Writing about the licensing of the liquor trade, a 
Prohibition-era writer noted that the first half of the nineteenth century saw “the 
breakdown of regulation by license.”108 Beginning in the early 1830s, temperance 
reformers agitated for wholesale changes to the licensing system for alcohol. In the late-
1840s, the crusade against liquor licensing peaked when Americans throughout the 
country headed to the ballot box to vote on local option laws. They were presented with 
two options—“license,” which would grant local officials the power to issue licenses for 
the sale of liquor as they previously had, or “no-license,” which would prohibit the 
issuance of licenses and the sale of alcohol altogether. No-license activists scored few 
victories throughout the United States, but their challenge to the licensing status quo 
carried larger significance for the license as an instrument of regulation and local and 
state government’s roles as agents of moral police. As Kyle Volk has argued, “local 
option was American popular sovereignty incarnate,” raising the fundamental question: 
“Was the United States a democracy (or to some, a republic) where elected officials and 
government officers made policy decisions or where the people acting through their 
agent—the majority—would directly decide public policy at the ballot box?”109  
 In Pennsylvania and Maryland, local-option legislation was debated but never 
acted upon. Nevertheless, debates over liquor licensing prompted widespread 
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examination of how the system worked in Baltimore and Philadelphia, including how 
tippling houses were policed (and who policed them), whether courts or lawmakers had 
more influence over the system, whether the granting of a license (whether for liquor or 
any other commercial activity) represented an act of moral sanction by authorities, and 
whether restricting the number of liquor licenses was counterproductive. On this last 
point, proponents of licensing as a way to regulate alcohol and other potentially 
dangerous trades long had believed in restraining competition as a way to preserve moral 
order in the urban marketplace. Despairing of the propagation of poorly policed public 
houses, John Adams asked a 1760 town meeting in Braintree, Massachusetts, to consider 
limiting the number of licenses granted. Arguing that fierce competition among too many 
houses forced otherwise legitimate owners to sell to “the trifling, nasty vicious Crew,” 
Adams’ proposal was rejected.110 Yet Adams championed what would become common 
practice by the early-nineteenth century. 
 As the legislative bodies responsible for establishing tavern regulations, Maryland 
and Pennsylvania sought to establish artificially high barriers to entrance into the liquor 
trade. They did so not through costly license fees but rather through adjusting the number 
of licenses granted on a yearly basis.111 When a Philadelphia judge suggested in 1820 the 
need for “encreased vigilance” to check the proliferation of intemperance, the grand jury 
disagreed with his solution. While they agreed for the need for more stringent policing, 
particularly of tippling shops operating “under the mask of Grocery Stores and Oyster 
Cellars,” they asked “whether publick morality and happiness, might not be greatly 
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promoted, if licenses were granted with more caution, and less frequency than 
heretofore?”112 A quarter century later, with the court’s licensing authority under attack 
from temperance advocates in Philadelphia, a judge defended the record of the Quarter 
Sessions by revealing it had only granted 500 licenses to operate ordinaries in 1845, 
down from 1300 previously.113 Laws typically did not stipulate how many licenses would 
be granted every year. Rather, to account for shifting public and political attitudes 
towards the problem of alcohol, judges and grand juries negotiated with the mayor, city 
councilmen, and police officials over where to set the bar. As with other aspects of the 
license system, primary responsibility sat with the mayor. Baltimore’s bailiffs were 
required “to ascertain the situation, number, character, and condition” of tippling shops 
and their owners and “report quarterly to the Mayor, in order that he, in concert with the 
judges of the City Court, may adopt such measures as may be deemed requisite in order 
to reduce the number and regulate the order of such shops.”114  
 Critics saw the manipulation of the number of available liquor licenses as both 
harmful and disingenuous. Advocates for more lenient license laws, which included 
powerful liquor dealers and their allies, viewed such attempts to constrain competition as 
crowding out small-scale entrepreneurs from the licit trade, forcing them to conduct their 
businesses in the shadows of the civic economy, placing the ordinaries that most needed 
oversight out of reach of the authorities. They decried the no-license movement as a 
dangerous form of “pure democracy” that endangered the rights of local minorities.115 
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Local-option supporters, meanwhile, saw attempts to engineer competition for liquor 
licenses as fostering corruption within the administration of licensing and producing less, 
rather than more, vigorous regulation of the liquor trade. They pointed to the apparent 
willingness of many authorities—from judges to clerks, aldermen to watchmen—to turn a 
blind eye to unlicensed taverns.116  
 What statistics scholars have at their disposal back up their claims, at least to an 
extent. One historian puts the rate of conviction for liquor cases in Jacksonian 
Philadelphia at a mere 15 percent of the indictments going to trial. This number itself 
comprised a tiny fraction of the unlicensed taverns in the city, contemporary (though 
biased) estimates of which ranged from the hundreds to the thousands. While grog-shops 
held a high profile in the public discourse of immorality, they avoided persecution due to 
lapses in the antebellum criminal justice system. Bribery of individual watchmen, who 
were said to covet beats that included unlicensed shops, and ward constables, responsible 
for reporting names to the criminal court every month, stemmed from a host of systemic 
inadequacies.117 One landlord of an unlicensed tavern alleged he had been “taxed” 
fourteen dollars three times in one day and allowed to continue his trade.118 Poorly 
compensated and stretched thin across a quickly expanding urban landscape, constables 
and watchmen stood to benefit more from informal policing of saloonkeepers than from 
the five dollars they received for each court session.  
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 City officials who walked from street to street, drafting lists of licensed and 
unlicensed tippling shops, operated within an ad hoc system of policing. In 1817, it was 
not police but the superintendent of streets who was required to investigate the number, 
names, location, and character of Baltimore’s tippling houses. An 1821 ordinance 
transferred this duty to the city bailiffs.119 Some policemen used the lax definition of their 
responsibilities to their advantage, as a case from Philadelphia’s South Mulberry ward in 
1840 illustrated. Residents called upon the ward constable to “procure the necessary 
evidence” to prosecute the owner of an unlicensed tippling house. After six weeks and no 
response, several residents inquired of the constable, who told them he had interviewed 
the landlord and was informed that only “porter, beer and oysters”—which did not 
require a license—were sold on the premises. “This, he said, was all he had done, and all 
he intended to do, as he had now done his duty,” a writer added, despite the fact that “it 
[was] known to hundreds that spirituous liquors are retailed in the house.”120 Imagine 
then the frustration neighbors of grog-shops felt when judges disclaimed the power “to 
remedy the evils arising from tippling houses” and charged that it was “the duty of the 
citizen, and the subordinate officers,” to do so.121  
 Reflecting the piecemeal and limited reach of municipal police forces in the 
period, liquor license regulation depended heavily on informers such as those in South 
Mulberry. Yet few were willing to get involved, particularly if their living situations were 
not directly affected by the tippling shop in question, without the promise of reward. 
Thomas W. Griffith understood this—“motives of duty only” were not sufficient—and 
requested Baltimore’s mayor to grant a portion of recovered fines to those who informed 
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on the “many persons selling liquor by small quantities without licence.” Reliance on 
informers raised its own issues, as an 1827 petitioner complained of “vexatious suits … 
by every needy informer.”122 With individual informers seeming to have little effect on 
the system as a whole, citizens turned to different forms of informing. Philadelphians 
meeting in 1825 “insist[ed] on the Peace Officers being more vigilant in the Western 
parts of the City (Market Street particularly) in enforcing the Laws against the violation 
of the Sabbath & suppressing Houses not licensed to sell Liquor.”123 Other petitioners 
sought state intervention; Harrisburg lawmakers received over 40 petitions regarding the 
granting of licenses to taverns and restaurants in the first half of 1832 alone.124 Still 
others sought out allies in the press to apply pressure to lawmakers and courts. A 
Kensington resident inquired why his ward’s constable did not make returns, as was his 
“duty,” while “Public Good” called on the attorney general to inform the residents of 
Southwark “how many of the one hundred tippling houses of said ward have been 
returned to the present Quarter Sessions.”125  
 Beyond just the practical difficulties in enforcing liquor license laws, there was 
the issue of moral complicity. Critics viewed the licensing system as a means of tapping 
the problem of drunkenness for revenue, or worse as society and government’s tacit 
approval of immorality (Fig. 2.3). William Moseley, editor of the Public Ledger, opined 
“that when a municipal government attempts to raise a revenue by licensing tippling 
houses, it gives special permission to violate the laws of God and man, and receives the 
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wages of iniquity.”126 Poet John Pierpont was elegiac in his criticism: “For so much gold, 
we license thee, / So say our laws, ‘a draught to sell, / That bows the strong, enslaves the 
free, / And opens wide the gate of hell. / For public good requires that some, / Since 
many die, should live by RUM.”127 For these observers, regulating the retail of alcohol for 
the public good was incommensurate with regulating it for profit. A critic in 1847 
declared the license system a “bundle of blunders … a collection of unconsidered and 
inconsistent enactments, heaped up from time to time, as Indians are said to heap up their 
monuments, each passer-by casting upon it a stone.” Noting that unlicensed liquor sales 
outstripped the licensed kind—an assertion variously made or disputed throughout the 
antebellum period—the writer contemplated the broader moral and social effects of 
relying on a law that was “violated and laughed at with entire impunity.” He questioned 
whether licensing incentivized illicit commerce rather than circumscribing it.128 
 Among the most earnest efforts to perform “the duty of the citizen” and “remedy 
the evils arising from tippling houses” were the proposed local-option measures, which 
sought to place the decision of licensing taverns in the hands of voters.129 Some reformers 
viewed local option as the most “republican” way to regulate the liquor trade, since it did 
not force licenses upon all communities and purportedly removed the question from the 
realm of politics.130 While these efforts produced legislative changes only in New 
England, temperance agitation shaped public attitudes towards licensing in many states, 
including Pennsylvania and Maryland. In December 1837, Maryland’s general assembly 
took up a petition signed by three thousand Baltimore residents “praying the passage of a 
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law to amend the license system,” only to be rejected overwhelmingly in the house.131 
Another round of petitioning ten years later resulted in a committee report favorable to 
local option. That same year, Baltimore’s city council issued a resolution supporting local 
option, but little came of it. When lawmakers met in Annapolis in 1850 and 1851 to 
debate a new state constitution, delegates debated including local option but declined.132  
 With a strong associational tradition and as a Quaker stronghold, Pennsylvania 
provided more fertile territory for licensing reform. In the absence of a charismatic leader 
like Maine’s Neal Dow, however, local option never became a legislative reality in the 
Keystone State. Instead, temperance advocates, newspaper editors, and judges called for 
three specific reforms: higher license fees, greater transparency of both the system of 
licensing and of taverns themselves, and fewer licenses. One columnist proposed 
increasing the cost of the license from $100 to $500 or $1,000, which he hoped would 
make “each licensed tavern keeper a jealous and interested watch upon the illicit 
trader”—that is, make tavern keeping resemble a guild system. It would also provide 
revenue for a special police “devoted to the discovery and punishment of the wretch 
unlicensed to distribute misery.” The same article called attention to a prominent theme 
in license debates, as with the auction houses, claiming that political interests had become 
too deeply entrenched in the courts’ administration of licenses. Even when licenses were 
distributed as a form of patronage, another writer suggested, “Judges are overburdened 
with other business and cannot be expected to know personally the character of the 
                                                
131 “Legislation in Maryland,” Journal of the American Temperance Union 3, no. 3 (March 1839): 37. 
132 Report of the Select Committee on the License Law (Annapolis, 1847); Resolution No. 8 (1847), 
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houses licensed.”133 Others felt courts wielded their authority too lightly, as one writer 
alleged: “The sentence of the Court frequently is, ‘Fined one cent and costs,’ a fine which 
[unlicensed tavern keepers] readily pay, considering it as a license to continue the 
traffic.”134 Nevertheless, not everyone agreed on the need to remove license 
administration from the courts—residents of the county met in 1844 to voice support for 
the Quarter Sessions.135  
 Debates returned again and again to the relationship between licensed and 
unlicensed taverns. Did limiting the number of licenses to be granted, raising license fees, 
or more providing more effective surveillance of licensed shops actually limit the 
unlicensed trade in liquor? Or did clamping down on licensed retailers only encourage 
more to resort to selling liquor without a license? Were unlicensed tippling shops the 
problem, or were taverns in general to blame? Opinions diverged around these questions. 
Some calls to root out the evils of alcohol focused only on unlicensed shops, like an 1849 
report on Philadelphia’s African American community.136 For others, little distinguished 
licensed and unlicensed tippling houses; as one Philadelphia grand jury pronounced in 
1820, both were “overflowing foundations of misery and vice of every description.”137 
This problematic at the heart of liquor licensing was not to be resolved, at least not during 
the antebellum period (and, ultimately, not until the end of Prohibition). “Few 
temperance leaders were so naïve as to believe that the end of licensing would mean the 
end of liquor sales,” one historian maintains. “Rather, they wanted to drive the sellers 
                                                
133 North American, Nov. 6, 1845 and Feb. 18, 1840.  
134 North American, March 6, 1841. 
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underground and destroy their legitimacy within the community.”138 Still, for all the 
aspersions cast, many still viewed licensing as the most effective way for the public to 
police the sale of liquor—and that licenses should remain rooted in the neighborhood-
level micropolitics of reputation. 
 
Conclusion: The long view of licensing 
 Licensing thus illuminates the transforming relationship between the individual 
and the state in Jacksonian America, when the state assumed a more indirect role in 
supplying the rule of order, socially and economically. Licensing also provides an index 
to shifting attitudes towards regulation in nineteenth-century America. This is in large 
part because license laws were designed, according to a late-nineteenth-century legal 
theorist, to “fluctuate with the changes of feeling continually occurring in society as to 
the best mode of regulating subjects having in them, when unregulated, an element of 
danger to social interests.”139 This reference to social “dangers” points to another facet of 
licensing’s significance—its use by social and political authorities in containing the 
geographic mobility and economic autonomy of a number of groups, especially African 
Americans and the poor, who were cordoned off from the new liberal order. Particularly 
in the second half of the nineteenth century, licensing would be employed to preserve the 
status quo. An increasing number of professions, from medicine to barbering (which was 
first licensed in 1897), leaned more heavily on license requirements to police the 
boundaries of trade. Likewise, municipal corporations adapted licensing to function 
                                                
138 W. J. Rorabaugh, “Prohibition as Progress: New York State’s License Elections, 1846,” Journal of 
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alongside nuisance ordinances, and in the twentieth century zoning laws, in restricting 
which types of commercial activities could be legally pursued in the city and where. In 
treating licenses as dynamic regulatory instruments, Progressive-era urban authorities 





Fig. 2.1. Fanny Legwald’s trader’s license, 1839. Her small retail shop on Franklin Street 
was required to keep less than $500 in stock, and she paid Maryland $5 annually for the 
license. Maryland Historical Society. 
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Fig. 2.2. Philadelphia horse & carriage bazaar, southeast corner of Ninth and George 
Street, 1848. Herkness’ auction house dwarfs the street. Library Company of Philadelphia.
125 
Fig. 2.3. James Akin, “Philadelphia taste displayed; Or, bon-ton below stairs,” ca. 1830. 
Posted to the bar in front of the African-American bartender is a hastily written note: 
“City Privilege still without license.” Like formal licenses, it was displayed so occupants 
could see it. Historical Society of Pennsylvania. 
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Chapter Three: Standard Issues 
 
 Piled up on the wharves at the foot of Centre and High Street Markets were the 
symbols of the early republic city’s integration into the global economy: casks (Fig. 3.1). 
Not only did casks contain the commodities—flour, meal, tobacco, meat, fish, guano, 
alcohol, and the like—that keyed the growth of Baltimore and Philadelphia into world 
port cities, but the vessels themselves were also significant. Officially appointed product 
inspectors emblazoned these casks with a series of hieroglyphs intended to convey the 
quality and quantity of the commodities contained within. Impersonal and abstract market 
transactions—captured in the image of uniform and opaque casks standing in rows along 
the waterfront—required assurances of value across time and space. In the early republic, 
city and state officials forcefully assumed responsibility for this substantial task, 
developing regulatory systems that mandated the inspection of everything from the 
firewood burned in nearby homes to the flour consumed by West Indian slaves. 
 The municipal inspection system had two principal, overlapping objectives: 
promoting the city’s commercial reputation and protecting consumers near and far from 
fraud. But its effects were far more expansive. Inspection fused the reputations of an 
increasingly intricate web of commercial actors into a single brand, an effective form of 
shorthand for conveying value to buyers around the world—a commercial lingua franca 
that made possible the governance of commodities’ increasingly rapid circulation through 
the global economy. The municipal brand promoted a series of narratives about a 
product’s value relative to an identifiable standard, the expertise of officials to render a 
commodity’s inherent qualities legible, the expanding scope of the city or state’s 
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commercial influence, and the power of the state to orchestrate the economic activities of 
the people. While all engaged in domestic and foreign commerce found the various 
symbols on otherwise identical casks indispensible, what those symbols denoted and who 
controlled their use and meaning were contested issues. Many contemporaries were quick 
to write off inspection as a relic of mercantilism, an arcane and futile attempt at 
protectionism in an open marketplace. Nevertheless, the diversity of these contests over 
the meaning and practice of the brand suggests inspection laws were anything but 
backward looking. 
 The inspection system represented perhaps the most all-encompassing, certainly 
the most ambitious, attempt by the antebellum state to shape the economic and social 
contours of the marketplace. Indeed, with product laws, local and state governments 
sought to mediate virtually every stage of the production and sale of commodities, both in 
domestic and foreign markets. Despite sustained interest in the emergence of 
standardization, a hallmark of nineteenth-century capitalism, the role of local and state 
inspection practices has received scant attention from historians. Scholars, most notably 
William Cronon, usually identify Chicago’s grain trade as the point of origin for modern 
grading standards, developed by mercantile leaders in the 1840s and 1850s to facilitate 
quicker processing and evaluation of grain as it poured through the city. In Cronon’s 
evocative analysis, grading liberated grain from the burlap sacks in which it was 
transported from farm to market, effectively erasing the identity of the producer and 
recasting the boundaries between industry and nature.1 This chapter places this 
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development earlier in time and points to the active role of the state in the abstraction of 
commodities from their sources. 
 The ambitious reach of the municipal inspection system illustrates how the 
identity of producers long had been concealed from the end product. Furthermore, the 
municipal inspection system produced and normalized the infrastructures (warehouses, 
improved roads and expanded wharves, railroad depots), routines (work processes of 
farmers, packers, and tradesmen), and criteria that urban capitalists—working through 
quasi-state entities, boards of trade—would adopt and refashion as “industry” standards 
in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, direct oversight of 
branding and trademarking shifted from city and state governments to an increasingly 
consolidated mercantile community after 1850.2  
 Recovering the place of local and state government actors in nineteenth-century 
commodity chains serves to illustrate Arjun Appadurai’s claim that the circulation of 
commodities is an inherently political process—not only because it underscores the 
dynamics of “privilege and social control,” but also because commodities persistently 
contravene structures of evaluation established by those in power to contain the flow of 
goods. Each step along the commodity chain was marked, as another theorist has written, 
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by ever-present “drama … in the uncertainties of valuation and of identity.”3 As global 
commodity chains grew in scale and complexity from the 1790s to the 1850s, Baltimore 
and Philadelphia authorities found managing the circulation of goods through geographic 
and commercial space to be untenable and, more importantly, undesirable. City leaders 
turned their efforts to more liberal forms of regulating the flow of goods. Namely, they 
worked to ensure commodities’ circuitous paths through their cities would encounter as 
little friction as possible, for the city’s commercial reputation depended more and more 
on considerations of time rather than quality. 
 
I. Flour inspection and the business of reputation 
 The foundations of modern commodity inspection—creating quality standards, 
establishing uniformity in weights and measures, and centralizing its administration—
were forged through centuries of negotiation between the state, human labor, nature, and 
technology. Every society that engaged in medium- or long-distance trade instituted its 
own system for gauging the value of goods. These systems of measurement arose from 
local practice, producing an endless variety of customs that resisted all efforts at 
standardization or codification. Rather than adhere to any sense of objective accuracy, 
James Scott writes, “every act of measurement was an act marked by the play of power 
relations,” from the size of the bushel to the methods in which grain was packed.4 The 
                                                
3 Arjun Appadurai, “Commodities and the Politics of Value,” in The Social Life of Things: Commodities in 
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birth of the Enlightenment, the development of the nation-state, and growth in long-
distance trade finally enabled Britain and France to impose a standard from above.5 As 
will be seen, however, this hardly ameliorated the micropolitics involved in every act of 
inspecting the quantity or quality of a commodity. 
 French and British attempts to create national (and imperial) standards provided 
colonial and early national Americans with their primary sources of inspiration. 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic reforms in France proved an extensive, centralized, and 
well-ordered system of inspection was possible. The development of inspection was 
closely tied to the consolidation of state power, as the British reforms of the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries reflect. Impelled by a growing faith in science 
and a desire to more effectively levy taxes on commerce, the Crown set to work enacting 
an expansive system of weights and measures at the end of the seventeenth century. In 
addition to maximizing revenue, Miles Ogborn argues, regularizing the “capacity of the 
cask” and the system by which officials inspected and taxed those casks served to 
consolidate state authority, not least of all because imposts funded new wars. In particular, 
the use of numbers—scribbled in excise ledgers and stamped on barrels—was “an 
attempt … to make intelligible and controllable, through an imagined geography (and 
anatomy) of boundaries and circulation, the workings of a ‘political oeconomy.’”6 By the 
last half of the eighteenth century, then, there existed a growing faith in the state as the 
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final arbiter of the standards by which commodities crisscrossing the Atlantic were to be 
evaluated. 
 In America, British influence was most immediately felt in the welter of colonial 
inspection laws. English weights and measures were notoriously stubborn to 
standardization before the nineteenth century. Beyond the discrepant physical criteria of 
standards—relying most often on human-scale measurements that varied from person to 
person—rural adherence to moral economy thwarted enforcement of weights and 
measures that did not accord with custom.7 Staple commodities intended for export were 
almost universally singled out for compulsory inspection: lumber, beef, and pork from all 
colonies; fish from New England; flour from Pennsylvania; tobacco from Maryland and 
Virginia; and rice and indigo from South Carolina. The consensus among economic 
historians has maintained that inspection laws were haphazardly established to respond to 
falling staple prices and “usually abandoned with the recovery of prices for the principal 
export.”8  Some colonial legislators seemed more attuned to their long-term commercial 
reputation than this interpretation grants them. Pennsylvania’s first law prohibiting the 
export of unmerchantable flour in 1724 arose from complaints of Jamaican planters “that 
the reputation of a place once famed for the best flour in America, has become so 
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corrupted, that housekeepers are scarcely persuaded to look on Pennsylvania flour.” Still 
not satisfied with foreign opinions of the state’s flour, the assembly strengthened its 
regulations a decade later.9 
 Colonial inspection legacies played out in two important ways in the early 
republic. The first was to leave weights and measures in disarray, with the federal 
government alternately unable and unwilling to create a national standard. Concerted 
attempts made in the 1790s, 1820s, and 1840s failed to yield a national system of weights 
and measures. It was not for lack of political acumen or effort among its supporters, 
among them Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams.10 Nor was there any indication 
of resistance among the nation’s commercial communities, only impatience. In 1803, city 
residents petitioned the state legislature that Baltimore’s mayor and city council “be 
empowered to provide for the safe keeping of the Baltimore County Standard of Weights 
and Measures of the City and Precincts, until Congress shall find it expedient in their 
wisdom to provide otherwise.” Acknowledging that “much fraud and imposition may be 
practiced from the want of such standard,” the state granted the petitioners’ request.11  
 Federal inaction thus allowed state and local weight and measure standards to 
proliferate. While parties of two different states might agree to the use of a bushel for 
measuring purposes, their definition of a standard bushel might differ. A ton might not be 
a ton—and so it was for merchants whose states required the use of long tons (2240 lbs.) 
even when they dealt with traders employing short tons (2000 lbs.). A hundredweight 
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(100 lbs.) might not even correspond to another hundredweight (112 lbs.)! In his 1821 
report advocating a national standard, Adams assiduously detailed the warren of 
standards in use. As late as 1810, Pennsylvania’s weights and measures were based on a 
1700 statute, which replicated the capricious terminology of a London assize law meant 
to crack down on retailers of spirits. The picture was no clearer for Maryland’s weights 
and measures, which as of 1821 still operated from a 1671 statute, based on a 1496 act of 
Parliament. Not only were the laws antiquated but sometimes even the physical 
instruments used to enforce them. Philadelphia’s keeper of standards informed Adams 
that his instruments were over a century old, brought from England by William Penn. In 
continual use ever since, he noted, “of course they cannot be very correct.”12  
 While critics like Philadelphia’s keeper of standards viewed the irregularity of 
weights and measures as a “serious evil” that disrupted interstate trade, the diversity and 
fluidity of quality standards provoked little hue and cry. This partly arose from 
differences in geography and soil, since wheat grown in Pennsylvania possessed different 
physical and fungible properties than Virginia wheat.13 Indeed, it will be seen that 
different quality standards on the whole facilitated competition between urban markets. 
In contrast to weights and measures, however, precedents for establishing a 
comprehensive system of quality standards in the early republic were sketchy. Far more 
room existed for interpretation and conflict in distinguishing between first- and second-
rate products than in ascertaining their volume or weight. This built-in uncertainty 
provided the state its impetus for intervention, taking control of processes that had 
developed over centuries through everyday practices of traders in various articles to 
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placate their customers.14 If quantity standards represented “a ‘package’ of artifacts, 
customs, and regulations,” as economic historian Aashish Velkar puts it, then quality 
standards offered another “package” for legislators, officials, and customers to unwrap.15 
 The need for technical standards to evaluate, describe, and ultimately price 
commodities was especially acute for wheat. Not only was wheat (especially flour) the 
most perishable article in the early-nineteenth-century Atlantic economy, it was also the 
wellspring of Baltimore and Philadelphia’s commercial prosperity. As tobacco declined 
as the principal American staple, wheat gained and in 1790 became the new nation’s 
chief export (before being eclipsed by cotton). What made the grain trade such a boon for 
the two cities, in contrast to staples like tobacco, was the variety of economic activities 
and innovations it fostered. Miller-merchants leveraged a prodigious amount of capital to 
construct mills using the newest technologies, at the same time that flour sparked 
investment in mid-Atlantic internal improvements.16 As early as the 1750s, but 
particularly after 1790, Baltimore and Philadelphia jockeyed for command of central 
Pennsylvania’s amber waves of grain, a rivalry that profoundly shaped the contours of 
commercial and political life in the two cities for many decades to come. 
 Scores of municipal ordinances and state laws from the 1770s to the 1810s testify 
to the high stakes of dominating the mid-Atlantic grain trade. “Whereas flour has become 
the great staple of the State of Maryland,” one of Baltimore’s first ordinances began in 
1797, and “a principle article of exportation from the City of Baltimore … it is highly 
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important to establish its reputation by every wise and prudent measure.”17 Private 
interest no doubt informed some of this legislative activity, as a high proportion of the 
two cities’ political elite was personally invested in the flour export trade. Some flour 
merchants, like Robert Wharton of Philadelphia and George Stiles of Baltimore, 
ascended to the mayoralty.18 Many others connected with the trade were elected to the 
city councils. Reflecting more hidden circuits of power, the signatures of Baltimore’s 
most prominent merchant-milling families—Owings, Ellicott, Hollingsworth, Jessop, and 
Tyson—were strewn across petitions to the city council in the first decades of 
incorporation. If lawmakers needed prompting beyond self-interest, however, fluctuations 
in the flour trade between 1793 and 1815 provided it.  
 Flour provides a clear illustration of the first of two stimuli for product laws: 
building, preserving, and restoring the city’s reputation abroad. “In our Inspection laws,” 
Mayor James Calhoun instructed Baltimore’s city council in 1804, “the principal object 
must be to support the credit at foreign markets of our exports.”19 Few things mortified 
merchants and city officials more than foreign customers complaining that their flour 
arrived in poor condition. Whether the degraded condition of the flour arose from a 
subpar wheat crop, negligent milling practices, or inferior coopering of barrels, 
Baltimore’s brand suffered all the same. Nearly all parties in flour’s production held a 
stake in maintaining the brand, however, and submitted readily to inspection. Reputation 
reflected not only quality, but also predictability. Foreign consumers quickly tired of 
receiving shipments that varied in fineness, purity, and weight. One customer, an English 
merchant, wrote of his “reason to dread [Baltimore flour] having never been lucky in the 
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article from that quarter.” He instead preferred Philadelphia’s flour.20 Because reputation 
was relational, lawmakers and inspectors frequently calibrated their standards with those 
of competing markets, sending for samples of flour and other commodities from other 
cities to compare with their own. 
 Commencing in the 1790s, one historian writes, Baltimore and Philadelphia 
engaged in “a commercial conflict, waged by traders and merchant millers who competed 
in the marketplace, aided by legislators writing new laws, and measured by export 
statistics.” Baltimore may have captured the majority of the mid-Atlantic wheat market, 
but Philadelphia remained the leading port for flour exports. Between 1793 and 1815, 
Philadelphia flour typically outsold others by two dollars per barrel. So long as 
Baltimore’s inspection standards lagged behind Philadelphia’s “more elaborate and 
stringent” system, mid-Atlantic farmers and merchants channeled their product through 
Philadelphia.21 That they did so in spite of the potential headaches posed by the greater 
vigilance and discrimination of Philadelphia flour inspectors attests to their belief in the 
power of the municipal brand in the early republic. 
 Maryland lawmakers, noting the “great disadvantages” under which Baltimore 
commerce suffered “by reason of the inspectors of said city not being authorized to 
inspect flour and other articles,” granted the city more independence from state laws to 
appoint its own flour inspectors, determine inspection fees, and manage standards in 
1804.22 It seems the city already had begun ramping up its efforts, however, as one 
petitioner recalled that a “vogue for Inspectors and such things seized the minds of the 
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People” in 1803.23 Baltimore passed its first flour ordinance in 1797 and spent the next 
three decades refining the inspection and weighing process, enacting laws in 1803, 1804, 
1807, 1809, 1812, 1819, 1821, 1822, and 1826.24 It seemed to work. Even as the city 
faced unprecedented obstacles to trade by the British blockade and an ice-choked harbor 
in 1813, Baltimore’s mayor could rejoice: “Our regulations for the inspection [of flour] 
previous to exportation … have raised its character & credit in foreign markets.”25 That 
Baltimore had inspected a record number of barrels of flour in 1812 (553,000) supplied 
cause for enthusiasm, but the mayor may have tempered it had he known that 1813 and 
1814 would witness a dramatic drop (to 291,000 and 156,000) and that it would not be 
until 1820 that the port again inspected over 500,000 barrels.26 Nevertheless, the numbers 
supplied by inspectors, combined with visual evidence of more ships’ masts thronging 
the harborscape, buoyed the city’s efforts to enact rigorous laws.  
 Philadelphia’s city council and flour inspectors responded in kind, but their efforts 
illustrate the risks of raising quality standards above what the market could sustain. Many 
viewed the city’s flour inspectors as the most demanding and skilled in the nation. An 
1813 editorial praised Philadelphia flour inspectors’ “rigor, severity and exactitude” in 
maintaining the city’s standards, which were validated by “the general high character of 
the Philadelphia brand in all foreign markets.”27 Philadelphia’s flour inspectors ruled with 
an iron brand, quick to reject not only the flour of individual millers but of entire regions. 
Their tendency to view “all of the flour from Virginia & Maryland” as substandard 
                                                
23 City Council Records, 1819:253, BCA. 
24 No. 13 (1797), 16 (1803), 14 (1804), 32 (1807), 15 (1809), 15 (1812), 7 (1819), 45 (1821), 31 (1822), 22 
and 35 (1826), Ordinances of Baltimore. 
25 City Council Records, 1813:465, 1817:384, BCA. 
26 James Weston Livingood, The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry, 1780-1860 (Harrisburg: 
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revealed a regional bias for Pennsylvania and Delaware flour. As a result, mid-Atlantic 
merchant-millers increasingly brought their lower quality flour to Baltimore, where it 
might receive a higher rating and fetch a modestly better price.28 Most of this flour was 
shipped to the Spanish West Indies and later South America, much of it fed to slaves. 
With the end of imperial warfare in 1815, the European market for higher-quality 
American flour dried up. Meanwhile, West Indies and South American demand for 
coarser flour (less prone to spoilage in heat and humidity) proceeded unabated, with 
Baltimore ideally positioned to supply it. That year marked the first time Baltimore’s 
flour inspections surpassed all other American ports. The city would reign until 1827, 
when the opening of the Erie Canal finalized New York’s ascension as the preeminent 
flour market.29 
 
II. Unraveling the commodity chain 
 Related to the issue of reputation, inspection also sought to eliminate traces of 
fraud from the commodity chain. Potential for deception lurked at several points in the 
production process, most obviously at the point of sale. Public markets, according to 
many observers, abounded with venders using false measures or furtively placing a finger 
on the scale while weighing. That deception was associated with particular individuals or 
trades illustrates another valence of reputation in the inspection system. An 1821 petition 
requested the city “adopt some standard for the measurement of Ashes … for the 
characters and habits of the Ashmen are well known.”30 When the products of wealthier 
merchants were found to be fraudulent in quantity or quality, these men sought to 
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dissociate themselves from the deception. In 1815, merchant-miller Jesse Tyson sought to 
lay blame with his miller’s assistant, whom he immediately fired. He offered to pay a fine 
for forty-seven barrels of flour found underweight, admitting that it was the perception 
“that I wished to take an advantage [that] grieves me most.”31 Tyson was not willing to 
have his own reputation tarnished to preserve the Baltimore brand and, like many 
employers, willingly sacrificed his hired help to save face. This dynamic became 
increasingly salient during the first half of the nineteenth century, as rural wage labor 
grew and Maryland’s merchant-millers found their competitive advantages dwindling in 
the international market by the 1830s.32 
 With commodity chains growing more intricate, there emerged many more 
opportunities for fraud to insinuate itself into the string of transactions. This fact 
prompted authorities to police not only the products themselves, but also their packaging 
and even the inspectors. Each product presented its own dilemmas for regulation. Largely 
homogeneous bulk articles, like coal, salt, hay, or ice, required only measurement to 
determine its value.33 For wood, lime, pot and pearl ashes, plaster of Paris, turpentine, 
and other construction or manufacturing materials, closer visual inspection was necessary 
to check for surface imperfections or improper admixtures, in addition to measuring or 
weighing.34 Not all product laws had a long lifespan. Brick briefly was subjected to 
inspection in 1797—at the same time wooden building construction was being outlawed 
in the city—only to be repealed the following year after complaints from brickmakers 
                                                
31 City Council Records, 1815:283, 282, 284, 346, BCA. 
32 On the nature of rural wage labor in Maryland wheat production, see Max Grivno, Gleanings of 
Freedom: Free and Slave Labor along the Mason-Dixon Line, 1790-1860 (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2011). 
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that it added unnecessary costs and labor.35 
 An issue of public health as well as economy, foodstuffs entailed a far more 
exhaustive set of checks. In addition to weighing articles, sometimes emptying barrels of 
their contents to verify the tare, inspectors of beef, pork, and fish pried open one out of 
every few casks to determine how many cuts had been packed, whether there were visual 
or olfactory indications of unsound provisions or improper cuts, and the amount of 
pickling solution. Butter and lard inspectors bore a hole in the cask and withdrew a 
sample, inserting a specially designed “hollow iron searcher of one half inch in diameter” 
diagonally to ensure the contents were sound beneath the surface.36 The inspection of 
wheat, corn, flaxseed, and other dry provisions used the same method of extracting a 
sample to compare with standard samples supplied by the general inspector of the city or 
state, closing the hole with a wooden plug. Finally, gaugers of whiskey, rum, and wine 
started a trickle directly into their hydrometer, which measured the alcohol content.37 In 
addition to protecting consumers from fraud, the inspection of articles such as salted fish 
served, city lawmakers wrote in 1824, as “ramparts [erected] entirely around the city to 
repel the attacks” of yellow fever and other diseases. As a form of consumer protection, 
then, product inspection worked with other public health and safety regulations, such as 
quarantines and gunpowder storage requirements, to ensure the safe transmission of 
potentially deadly commodities through the antebellum city.38 
 Product laws also established the dimensions of the container in which goods 
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36 No. 9 (1797), 27, 28 (1807), No. 8, 9 (1803), Ordinances of Baltimore. 
37 No. 13 (1797), 40 (1800), 1 (1805), No. 98 (1798), 15 (1799), Ordinances of Baltimore. 
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were shipped, as well as the manner in which they were to be packed. A 1799 ordinance 
regulating the inspection of casks of liquor was typical in its exactitude, declaring casks  
shall be made of well seasoned white oak, free from sap, round at the bilge 
and heads, the staves thereof shall not be less than half an inch in 
thickness at the thinnest part thereof, and not more than three-fourths of an 
inch at the thickest part thereof, and shall be made tight and secured with 
twelve good and sufficient hoops on all barrels, and sixteen good and 
sufficient hoops on all double barrels and hogsheads.  
The ordinance was a response to “the badness of casks” and “fraudulent practices used by 
persons bringing such liquors to the city of Baltimore for sale.”39 How authorities came 
to these specifications seldom was spelled out, though it appears the (often contradictory) 
input of inspectors, merchants, manufacturers, and coopers, combined with past customs 
and methods drawn from other cities, shaped package requirements. In his 1811 
application for reappointment, the city fish inspector noted the “general derangement” of 
the trade before his arrival, which he corrected by preventing the use of “old barrels” and 
“new ones slightly made.” To assume more complete control of the packing process, 
lawmakers also enacted laws regulating the inspection of oak staves and heading used in 
coopering.40  
 Poorly coopered barrels threatened the integrity of the contents as well as the 
inspector and the city brand (Fig. 3.2). In 1814, fish inspectors requested the authority to 
condemn poorly constructed casks. Noting that “it is not uncommon for men intoxacated 
and small apprentices and careless Boys” to cooper the barrels, they often had “found the 
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Barrels leaking, not nailed, the hoops loose, and in every respect in bad order.” With the 
pickle leaking and flies swarming, the fish would “keep but very little while.” Unable to 
condemn the product on “bad cooperage” alone, they wrote, “it is very painfull to us to 
Stamp them with the public Brands” when they know it “is spoiled irrecoverably.”41 The 
value of commodities—and thus the reputation of all involved—was contingent on its 
packaging. 
 As stipulating the size and construction of containers mattered only if they were 
properly filled, there was a move to standardize the packing process. Here, as in other 
respects, customs collided and created room for flexible practices. Proponents of a 
heaped or rounded measure, which took into account loose articles that settled over time, 
clashed with those who preferred a struck or level measure for its perceived uniformity. 
A petition of millers in 1821 against the selling of wheat offal (bran, shorts, and ship-
stuff) by heaped bushels indicated the general trend towards regularity. It bemoaned “the 
impossibility of fixing the precise quantity of the articles sold by this mode, mak[ing] so 
great a difference in its value” as to produce “a greater variance of price therein than in 
any other article” the millers manufactured.42 The city complied, passing an ordinance 
that stipulated wheat offal “shall be stricken with a straight strike, rounded on the edges 
of at least three-quarters of an inch in thickness, and not less than four inches broad.” 
Uniformity was limited to the measuring of individual articles, as an 1830 ordinance 
provided for cut straw to “be heaped as long as it will lie on the measure without 
pressing.”43 After a certain point, the products of nature dictated their own methods of 
regulation, regardless of the technologies at the disposal of the state. 
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 Ultimately, the inspection system functioned only as well as the inspectors 
themselves. Their ability to make accurate and quick judgments was essential to 
orchestrating the flow of commodities through the city. Because of requirements that 
appointees “shall be skilled in the knowledge and properties of butter,” to take one 
example, most inspectors had previous experience with the product in some capacity.44 
Work could be grueling, as inspectors traversed the city several times and lifted untold 
thousands of pounds every season, and clients were not always gracious. Each article 
required inspectors to work quickly in all types of weather, with workloads fluctuating 
from season to season. Fish was especially prone to backing up in the inspector’s queue, 
as one observer lamented: “They have often to stay here a week before the inspector can 
examine them, owing to the great quantity brought here towards the last of May [and 
beginning of June] & all this time the fish have to lay in the sun on the wharves.”45 The 
potential for errors in judgment and disputes with clients was present every time the 
inspector lifted the top of a cask or placed a cartload on a public scale. His 
responsibilities also included maintaining the finances of the office, providing detailed 
reports monthly and annually, charging appropriate fees, and paying for his specialized 
instruments, weights and measures, and hired help—costs that could top $2000 a year.46  
 With the reputation of the inspector bound up in the products he judged, and thus 
in the city brand, inspection laws demanded his faithful performance of duty. They 
required the inspector to pledge to perform his office “without fear, favor, affection, 
malice, partiality or respect to persons … to the best of his skill and knowledge.”47 
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Reflecting early republican fears of religious and ethnic outsiders as predisposed to 
deceptive practices, Baltimore’s first inspection laws (before 1800) mandated only those 
who professed a belief in Christianity could be appointed—a requirement for the city’s 
market clerks, as well.48 Inspectors were prohibited from having any current involvement 
in the branches of trade related to his product. Flour inspectors could only purchase flour 
for the use of their own families, beef and pork inspectors could not be connected to the 
vending or coopering of any cask, and so forth. To limit the potential for corruption, 
whenever there was more than one inspector appointed to a particular article, the men 
exchanged districts every week or two. His oath of office was underwritten with a bond 
amounting to several thousand dollars, on top of which he paid an annual license fee. The 
latter helped finance the inspection system and, as the previous chapter demonstrated, 
served as a malleable instrument for policing behavior and reputation.49 
 A physical extension of the inspector’s reputation, the iron brand played a central 
role in the theatre of public inspection. Product laws required inspectors to own and 
maintain a set of iron brands with which to mark barrels as “Baltimore [product]” or 
“Baltimore packed [product]” as well as the determined quality of the contents and the 
inspector’s name. Others left their mark, too, as millers, packers, and others responsible 
for the product all possessed brands with their last name and first initial. Scales, patent 
balances, and platforms required the stamp of the city’s inspector of weights and 
measures (“B.S.,” or Baltimore Standard) to be valid and were condemned with a mark, 
“C.”50 In most instances, brands also included the day, month, or year in which it was 
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packed or inspected. To render this potentially dissonant assortment of markings easily 
readable, laws directed the size and placement of these brands, at least three-quarters of 
an inch in height on the head of the barrel. While some complained that initials like “S.P.” 
(State of Pennsylvania) were “too obscure a designation,” few states or municipalities 
appeared to experiment with alternative nomenclature.51 Finally, articles deemed unsound 
or unmerchantable were emblazoned with the sign of a broad arrow, an English symbol 
for all things (or persons) condemned or forfeited. (Indeed, branding irons served as 
instruments for torturing and punishing slaves, sailors, and others held in servitude not 
only because they inflicted great pain but also because they marked a person as 
transgressive and confirmed his or her status as a commodity.)52 
 Preserving the Baltimore brand necessitated that only authorized individuals 
could brandish a branding iron. In addition to fines for altering the inspector’s marks after 
he had made them, product laws established severe penalties for using or counterfeiting 
another person’s branding iron. For instance, an 1831 Maryland law for the inspection of 
leather required payment of $100 or confinement in jail. These were not idle reproaches. 
In 1824, the city indicted Thomas Wilson “for a cheat in falsifying the brands of the flour 
inspectors in the City of Baltimore.” When the case was removed to the Harford County 
Court, Mayor Edward Johnson dispatched the city solicitor to Bel Air to make the case 
against Wilson, as “the interests of the community required that the case should be 
attended.”53 John Hardy took advantage when the inspector of beef and pork left his 
branding irons at Hardy’s slaughterhouse, having private brands struck to appear exactly 
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like the inspector’s except with Hardy’s name. The inspector learned of it a few days later 
as he strolled through Bowly’s wharf and spied barrels with the imitated marks. While 
Hardy contended that “the imitation, if any, was not complete” since his own name was 
used, the city and courts disagreed and fined Hardy twenty dollars.54 
 In some instances, former official inspectors manipulated the municipal brand for 
personal gain. In 1829, a former inspector of long and dry measures offered his services 
in the city’s public markets, branding half and quarter peck measures with the year and 
his initials, “R.S.” Customers, including many of the “poorer class,” petitioners 
complained, were fooled into believing it was the city’s mark, “as the difference between 
the ‘B’ and the ‘R’ is scarcely perceptible when made with a burning brand. Thus in an 
indirect though wilful manner, is one of our most important Laws violated,” and the 
municipal brand adulterated by someone familiar enough with the process to pass as an 
official inspector. While his actions violated city ordinances, “R.S.” was only one of 
many former inspectors who sought to ply their trade as authorities on various products, 
blurring the line between municipal and personal reputation. In an advertisement for his 
new “Flour & Grocery Store” on Howard Street, former city inspector George Baxley 
boasted of “his long experience in the article of Flour, and his knowledge of the best 
Mills.”55  
 In other instances of falsification and impersonation, inspectors took the initiative 
of repairing their injured reputation. William Waite, the city’s beef and pork inspector, 
grew frustrated with a “meddlesome” cooper who “had taken my scales, rigg’d them up, 
had all hands weighing and packing, as tho he actually was the Inspector.” When he 
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reinspected the products, he found that the “best part of the said lot were condemned, tho 
[the cooper] had passed them nearly all second quality.” By bringing this to the attention 
of the city council, Waite hoped, the cooper’s second “career is about to be stopt.” Waite 
viewed others using his branding iron as a personal affront—an attempt to assume his 
professional identity. He took great satisfaction that “not one of the barrels of provision I 
inspected, over hauled, and repacked have ever yet been returned on the merchants hands 
or mine. But on the contrary, the provisions were so nice and elegant, well managed and 
put in such good order.” When others used his branding iron, they threatened the very 
foundations of his professional reputation with clients.56 Casks thus resembled 
palimpsests, retaining not only the marks of its various producers but also the dynamics 
of power between them. 
 
III. Contesting the standard 
 The effectiveness of the municipal inspection system depended on its ability to 
command the behavior of participants in the commodity chain, starting with the product 
itself. Every element of uncertainty that entered into the process of inspection—and there 
were many—threatened to undermine this command and, ultimately, weaken the brand. 
Whether products of earth or man, commodities resisted the system’s attempts to classify 
and govern. Brick, flour, fish, coal, corn, bread, beef, hay, ice, whiskey, butter—
inspected commodities were by nature irregular, perishable, and transmutable. Even the 
most adroit inspectors could not account for all the contingencies involved in growing, 
manufacturing, storing, and shipping goods for local or international markets. 
Exacerbating this was the reality that the system of inspection did not operate in a spatial 
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vacuum but rather was woven into urban landscapes susceptible to congestion, delay, and 
decay. Delays in the inspection process were not only an inconvenience to farmers, 
merchants, and captains, but could endanger the value of the commodities if, for instance, 
left in the sun too long. Efforts to lend order to global market transactions ran up against 
the limits imposed by the products themselves, the urban spaces through which people 
and goods circulated, and the instability of the standard itself. 
 Take flour, one of the most exhaustively regulated products. As seen in the 
preceding section, lawmakers devoted considerable effort to ensuring that flour brought 
to the city for sale or exportation was “merchantable and of due fineness, without any 
false packing or mixture of coarser, or sour, oily, stale or other flour or meal.” Laws 
empowered flour inspectors to determine the degree of fineness and, if found 
merchantable (“fine” or “superfine”), it was branded “Baltimore” and set for export. If 
deemed unmerchantable (“middlings”), its market was limited and would not bear the 
Baltimore brand, sharply undercutting its value (though not as much as being condemned 
and marked with a broad arrow, rendering it unsaleable in a formal sense).57 But 
ascertaining the quality of a sample of flour at one moment in the product’s lifespan did 
little to guarantee it would arrive in the same state of freshness months later, however 
well packaged. Many factors affected the perishability of flour, from the wetness of the 
hay upon which wheat was stored after harvesting to how densely it was packed in 
barrels. Mold spores could take up residence in barrels, undetectable even to the most 
fastidious observer, only to turn the flour rancid after months stored at high temperature 
and humidity. The speed at which millstones ground wheat could adversely affect the 
flour in the long run by introducing heat and releasing oils from the germ that would 
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eventually turn rancid.58  
 Flour was hardly the only product subject to changes in quality over time. For 
instance, imperceptible barrel imperfections could render beef, pork, and fish inedible 
over the course of several months, as the pickle leaked from seams in the cask. 
“Notwithstanding the care and vigilance” of inspectors of salted fish, Baltimore’s city 
council wrote to the state legislature in 1822, “heavy complaints have at different times 
been received from foreign places of the unsound and unmerchantable condition of them.” 
Because salted fish was “particularly subject to injury” and required “great care and 
frequent examination,” the council averred, it was essential the city hold the authority to 
re-inspect barrels of salted fish exported from Baltimore.59 Whiskey and rum, meanwhile, 
were prone to losing or gaining degrees of proof. Too many degrees lost left distillers 
subject to penalties, while any gain in proof above the legal standard did not necessarily 
enable distillers to charge more for their product, as a group of York, Pennsylvania, 
whiskey distillers lamented to Baltimore lawmakers in 1821.60  
 Thus, the moment the inspector extracted a flour or whiskey sample or lifted the 
head of a cask of salted fish represented a snapshot of the much longer lifespan of a 
commodity’s value. This was as true for quantity as it was for quality. As wheat, flour, 
corn, and other agricultural products cured in barrels—which they would continue to do 
long after they were inspected—the lost moisture content left barrels several pounds 
lighter than when they were initially weighed. When merchants were fined ten cents per 
barrel for underweight flour in 1815, they protested that “the long and almost total 
cessation of business” had forced them to store their packed and weighed barrels for as 
                                                
58 Public Ledger, Aug. 1, 1843 and June 24, 1851; Patriot, June 22, 1831, Feb. 3, 1821. 
59 Patriot, Feb. 7, 1822. 
60 City Council Records, 1821:482, BCA. 
 
 150 
long as two years. While this delay had allowed the flour to “become perfectly seasoned,” 
it also reduced its density and weight.61 Moreover, even well coopered barrels were not 
airtight. One baker noted that “a barrel of flour after being knocked about in railroad cars, 
wagons, drays, &c., and loosing what the inspector takes out with his augur, does not 
contain by the time it reaches the door of a private family or bake house, more than 195 
pounds,” some ten or twenty pounds less than it originally contained.62 
 Attempts to affix standards upon commodities that were stubbornly irregular were 
not simply quixotic episodes in statecraft, but rather had direct impacts on the men and 
women who collectively made up the chain of production. If the inspection system sought 
to regulate the entire course of a commodity’s path from producer to consumer, it did not 
disperse the burdens equally—instead, the changes reflected dynamics of power and class. 
Every substantive alteration or addition to a product law set off a series of reactions down 
the chain of production, from pricing and marketing to transportation and finally to 
growing or manufacturing. This included hikes in inspection fees. Even if buyers or 
retailers at the end of the chain were responsible for paying the inspector, traders factored 
these costs in negotiating lower prices from farmers and artisans at the other end.63 For 
farmers, laborers, and craftsmen responsible for growing wheat, milling flour, curing 
straw, butchering cows, pickling fish, glazing brick, baking bread, or coopering casks, 
quality and quantity standards posed significant obstacles to longstanding work routines, 
not to mention earning a living income.  
 Class tensions suffused the inspection process, leading to conflict among laborers, 
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manufacturers, merchants, and inspectors. Peter Zacharia hinted at this when he informed 
the council that “if the wood corders are not protected from abuse” by the watermen 
bringing firewood to the wharves, “no man of delicacy can hold long the office.”64 Other 
producers employed the petition to complain of undue product restrictions. When the city 
passed a brick inspection law in 1798, Baltimore’s brickmakers protested that the 
requirement of larger bricks would require “a degree of labour which we deem 
unreasonable and few men who now understand moulding will be competent to the task.” 
Children no longer could perform menial tasks with their small hands, while kilns would 
have to be rebuilt and require more fuel. Relaxing the restrictions, the petitioners hoped, 
“would incourage poor men and boys” to work there and “bricks would then be made 
better” than by the black laborers who outnumbered whites four to one in city 
brickyards.65 Added to these economic burdens of inspection were rebukes. Often the 
blame for failing to adhere to strict measurement or quality standards devolved to hired 
help, as when merchant Jesse Tyson blamed his millers’ assistants for errant weights. 
Assuming the blame for fraud could lead to incarceration for those unable to pay fines, as 
it did for William O’Bryan, who violated the ash ordinance in 1826.66  
 The burdens of inspection on laboring classes were magnified by systemic delays, 
something all members of the commercial community suffered, if not equally. Farmers, 
fishermen, and craftsmen often needed to factor in the additional time and cost of 
traveling to inspection warehouses or public scales with their products. In a rapidly 
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growing city with poor roads, getting one’s flour, fish, or scale beams inspected and 
stamped could turn into a daylong affair. When the state passed a law requiring the 
assaying of silver, silverware manufacturers complained of the “loss of time (money to 
working people) … in running to and from the assayers.” There were also unintended 
consequences of delays. An 1804 ordinance requiring meal to be weighed proved “a great 
injury to the poore,” because few farmers had their own scales and weights. Since 
hucksters did, however, the law “thr[ew] all the Business into a few Individuals hands.”67 
In 1817, Andrew Snyder and eleven other tinware dealers pleaded the city to combine the 
offices of weights and measures to save them from being “compelled to call on two 
persons remote from each other” even “if only a single Beam and Measure are wanted to 
be stamped.” The city assented in this instance, but at other moments it prioritized 
convenience to the corporation by requiring traders and producers to attend at one central 
inspection location.68  
 When Mayor George Stiles proposed in 1818 to move all fish inspections to a 
warehouse on the City Block, halfway between Fells Point and the basin, fishermen and 
merchants demurred. Believing they possessed “a right to have their fish landed and 
inspected at such places as they may find most convenient,” they felt that “expel them 
from those parts of the city” and funnel all fish through one inspection warehouse would 
diminish the value of their property (as their own warehouses would sit empty). More 
importantly, ships carried not just fish but other merchandise to the city. Requiring them 
to land and unload at multiple locations “would have a tendency to drive them from our 
city.” With public warehouses, moreover, commission dealers could not provide 
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incentives like free storage. Following the mayor’s advice, the state legislature 
established a fish inspection warehouse on the City Block. The issue remained a sore 
subject for fishermen and traders into the 1820s and 1830s, when petitioners complained 
that the “heavy expences attending the inspection of their shad in our city” drove North 
Carolina fishermen to Philadelphia and New York.69 
 One of the chief reasons municipal leaders like Stiles advocated central 
warehouses was to eliminate nuisances posed by a system where inspectors traveled from 
site to site. As a potential hazard to public health, the inspection of fish was singled out, 
particularly after yellow fever visited the city in 1819. A few years later, Stile’s successor, 
Edward Johnson, boasted that “our wharves have never been so free from offensive and 
deleterious smells as during the past summer” as a result of the fish house, which was 
“cool and pleasant with a free circulation of air.” An 1824 city report noted that the 
central fish house enabled city police to immediately quarantine and remove suspect fish 
during epidemics. Such policing was impossible if the barrels had been “dispersed in so 
many places” throughout the city. Even with a central fish house, however, barrels of fish 
awaited transfer from the docks in the hot sun, leaking pickle and drawing flies, a 
bouquet of rotting flesh wafting across the city.70  
 Other commodities awaiting inspection posed less a threat to health than to public 
convenience and urban mobility. Certain restrictions forced farmers and merchants to 
scramble to secure space for their products. When the city council considered a law 
requiring flour to be inspected outdoors—better lit than dark warehouses—merchants and 
wholesale dealers remonstrated. Out of 200 to 300 barrels of flour they received every 
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day from country millers, “frequently from 50 to 100 barrels remains uninspected,” for 
which they could not “find room on the pavement fronting their own property.” 
Neighboring dry goods businesses would “not grant permission to have their flour 
unladen & inspected on their pavements,” even “in rainey weather.” The commercial and 
political influence of the flour merchants did not prevail in increasing capacity. When 
merchant Charles Gwinn asked permission to extend the docks behind his warehouse 
fronting the basin “for want of sufficient room to inspector our flour” in the open, the 
council denied his request.71 Others, however, took advantage of these spatial limitations. 
As nuisance ordinances permitted barrels awaiting inspection to obstruct footways 
temporarily, some grocers and mechanics exposed goods for sale beyond the twelve or 
twenty-four inch limit, under false pretenses. The city, for its part, benefited considerably 
from wharfage paid by dealers bringing wood and other products to public docks prior to 
inspection.72  
 A more common source of aggravation, however, was the unpunctual inspector. 
Establishing an effective inspection system was not only a matter of prudent political 
economy but also required a well-devised circuitry for the movement of goods as well as 
inspectors. Whether caused by inspectors being spread too thin or being too deliberate in 
their actions, delays produced a ripple effect spreading across the city, into the 
countryside, and eventually across oceans and mountains. Farmers routinely were held up 
a day or more while they waited for inspectors to judge the value of their articles. In 1824, 
butter and lard dealers lamented that their “friends from the West” often could not 
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“obtain the Inspector in the hurry of business,” waiting as long as “twenty four hours 
after putting our names upon his slate.” The entirety of Baltimore was “too large a district 
for one person,” they averred. In 1821, Baltimore’s city council acknowledged the “great 
and serious inconvenience from the delay consequent upon the attendance of the flour 
Inspector” in the eastern part of the city. It resolved to fine inspectors three dollars for 
every hour they made customers wait beyond two hours, but it is unclear whether such 
penalties were enforced with any regularity.73  
 To address the problem, many called for the appointment of additional inspectors 
and smaller districts. Citing the “increased quantity of domestick Liquors brought to 
market and the vast extent of the district composed of Old Town and the Wharfs,” liquor 
dealers requested another gauger in 1825. The city complied, appointing a third 
inspector.74 Baltimore’s largest butter and lard dealers had less success in 1839 and 1840. 
Led by the firm of Robert Garrett & Sons, they sought two additional inspectors on 
account of “the great increase of business in Butter & Lard in Howard St.” and western 
neighborhoods. In spite of their assurances that “public convenience & the despatch of 
business” would be facilitated, the city denied the request. Several factors worked against 
Garrett and others’ appeal. The first was a report of the joint committee on police that 
cast doubts on the need for another inspector. Establishing that the current inspector 
averaged 400 kegs daily, or one to two percent of the annual kegs inspected, the report 
noted that, if pressed, he could examine 1100 kegs in a day. While the need for more 
inspectors would likely come in the future, it averred, “that period has not yet arrived.” 
Second, and more significant, most butter and lard dealers—generally operating more 
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modest outfits—disagreed with Garrett and others, viewing one inspector as sufficient.75  
 For the dissenting butter and lard dealers, and other producers and traders, more 
than one inspector translated to more than one standard. With a second or third inspector, 
they predicted in 1840, “the standard of Inspection would become uncertain” and drive 
producers to cities with more trusted standards.76 Flour merchants, millers, and farmers 
long had confronted similar circumstances. In 1812, sixty-seven millers and dealers 
declared that a third inspector “would be injurious to the Interest of the city by producing 
an irregularity in the quality of Flour and dissatisfaction.” When a third inspector was 
appointed over these objections, merchant-millers demanded redress. Citing complaints 
from western millers that “for some time past the standard quality of flour inspected in 
this city has been very unsettled,” merchant-millers fretted: “Flour which passed at one 
season is condemned at another, so that the manufacturers are at a loss to regulate their 
prices for wheat & frequently incur serious losses.”77 
 Compounding the uncertainty of standards was the establishment of a more 
discriminating grading system. Commercial and political leaders hoped that the 
introduction of more grades would elevate confidence in the city’s products by assuring 
buyers and sellers the closest possible correlation between quality and price. Some 
thought otherwise, criticizing authorities for creating abstract designations within 
commonly accepted categories of “superfine,” “fine,” and “middlings.” In addition to 
arguing that inspectors should not be granted such broad discretion, many producers felt 
the practice enabled city merchants and lawmakers to raise and lower the municipal 
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standard at will, to the ruin of farmers and millers. In 1834, Frederick wheat farmers and 
millers complained that the city’s efforts to promote “the best brand of any other 
inspection” had “produced an excess of refinement in the flour inspection of Baltimore.” 
Flour previously branded “superfine” was now “fine,” and so forth. This produced 
“uncertainty and fluctuation in the grade of the city inspection,” leaving country millers 
unable “to regulate their brands according to the market standard.”78  
 The plasticity of the terminology itself provided city merchants still more 
opportunities to benefit. Observers noted the existence of two flour standards in 
Baltimore, “Howard-street” (or “wagon”) and “Wharf” (“city mill”)—the former milled 
and brought from western counties, the latter milled near the city. While not formally 
legislated, the operation of two parallel flour standards appeared deeply entrenched in 
practice. One writer complained that Wharf flour was held to lower standards, allowing 
city millers to grind wheat more than twice as quickly (producing “weaker” flour) and 
still yield similar prices as country millers.79 Another commentator drew attention to the 
fictitious lexicon of inspection. “‘Extra superfine’ may be allowable in a newspaper 
advertisement,” he averred, “but surely it smacks a little too much of the superlation of 
language when used in legislative laws.” With such literary flourishes, “we may next 
expect superlatively fine flour.” In his opinion, the only distinction that mattered—the 
only brand required on a barrel of flour—was its origin, whether “Howard-street,” 
“Wharf,” or otherwise.80 As will be seen, his preference that barrels be branded only with 
their place of original production, not the city of inspection, was prescient.  
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 Even the checks in place to assure the resolution of disputes over standards were 
subject to controversy. In 1821, a group of millers called for “an independent & 
disinterested tribunal” in place of the current appeal system, which was comprised of the 
three inspectors. “Serious uncertainty and perplexing contradictions frequently occur” 
with little resolution, because the inspectors “feel great reluctance” to reverse each 
other’s decisions. Lawmakers relented, replacing the current board with six appointees, 
two each drawn from the city’s shipping merchants, millers, and bakers, and a seventh 
drawn from the flour inspectors.81 The overwhelmingly urban orientation of the board’s 
composition led some western farmers and millers to allege the “united interests” of the 
three groups were “exerted to confirm the opinion of the Inspector.” To heap insult upon 
injury, having lost the appeal, the country producer was required to pay its expenses. It is 
difficult to detect from records whether these allegations had grounding, though it is 
worth noting that tribunals were known to reverse decisions.82 
 As these examples suggest, discord over inspectors and standards transcended the 
commotion of the streets and wharves, spilling into wider debates over governance of the 
market. Rural counties frequently complained that the inspection system turned them into 
vassals of the municipal brand, citing differential treatment and pricing. Many rural 
consumers and producers saw the benefits of municipal branding, however, including 
some from the Eastern Shore who pleaded for a city inspector of sweet potatoes to 
prevent fraud.83 Both viewpoints recognized that, as major trading centers, Baltimore and 
Philadelphia long had set quality and quantity standards for the rest of their states or 
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regions. By 1821, Delaware buyers and sellers employed Philadelphia weights and 
measures, John Quincy Adams reported, while the “Baltimore standard … now governs 
all the dealings and business of [Maryland].”84 While speaking to weights and measures, 
these observations also applied to quality standards.  
 In the 1820s and 1830s, debates came to a head over the power of appointing 
inspectors. As the city effectively established the statewide standard for most 
commodities, and its reputation was bound up in the goods it inspected, municipal leaders 
believed the power to appoint sat with them. Impelled by agricultural interests and rural 
constituents, state legislatures took over the appointment of inspectors of flour, fish, 
lumber, lime, hay, plaster of Paris, and other articles, vesting it in the governor rather 
than the mayor. Only beef, pork, potash, flaxseed, and other commodities prepared or 
brought from out of state remained under municipal control.85 As in many other instances, 
flour provided for the most dramatic contests over the boundaries of municipal power. 
Around 1820, complaining that their reputation suffered as a result of being subsumed 
under the lesser reputation of the Baltimore brand, western farmers and millers began 
encouraging the state assembly to establish inspection offices in Frederick and 
Hagerstown. So that these inspectors would operate on equal standing with those in 
Baltimore, the petitioners exhorted the governor to appoint all flour inspectors and make 
re-inspection noncompulsory.86  
 City leaders took the threat seriously. In 1819, the mayor decried the petitions of 
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Frederick producers as “bold strides toward curtailing and interfering with the Powers of 
the Corporation.” Western petitions set in motion a flurry of correspondence between 
municipal authorities and the city’s representatives in the state legislature. Writing from 
Annapolis in 1822, John Pendleton Kennedy warned the mayor “that the session will be 
marked by more than one act of unequivocal hostility … knowing how much we are at 
the mercy of the Counties.”87 A few years passed, during which time state lawmakers 
placed the power to appoint inspectors of salted fish in the hands of the governor, to the 
great dismay of municipal leaders.88  
 A renewed push by western farmers and millers in 1825 and 1826 brought the 
subject back to the top of the legislative agenda. Seeking to disprove the argument that 
the city “derives a revenue from the Inspection of flour,” Benjamin C. Howard implored 
fellow representatives not to remove the power of inspection—and thus control of the 
standard and brand—from the city. “Great confusion would ensue” from the proposed 
change, as would the unnecessary disunion of the interests of “the farmer, the miller, and 
the shipper.”89 His and Kennedy’s efforts failed, and two weeks after Howard’s speech, 
the state authorized the governor to appoint four inspectors annually, three in Baltimore 
and one in Frederick.90 This conformed to the general pattern of commercial regulations 
in the state from the 1820s to 1840s, during which time no state legislature was more 
active in regulating city inspection, rather than simply granting the city power to act, than 
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 Even without the authority to appoint inspectors, the city maintained considerable 
influence over standards and branding. Indeed, in 1834, western farmers and millers still 
alleged “the unjust and arbitrary terms” of city merchants. Two years earlier, the state 
established a general inspector of flour, who devised the statewide standard from his 
office in Baltimore.92 If the removal of appointment power from the city did not weaken 
urban merchants’ grip on the inspection system, it did reflect an important shift occurring 
in how all market actors conceived of the municipal brand. In a widely reprinted 1821 
speech, New Yorker Benjamin U. Coles provided a trenchant critique of the role of 
municipal government in the production of flour. After describing the difficulties in 
defining the inherent qualities of flour, Coles bemoaned the declining condition of 
American wheat. “The radical source of the evil we now lament,” he maintained, “may 
be traced to the principles upon which the office of inspector of flour is constituted.” 
Namely, inspectors benefited from the degraded standard of flour, for their fees were 
dependent on the quantity, not quality, of flour they inspected. Likewise, it was in the 
interest of manufacturers to produce flour below standard, because they could make as 
much from the worst flour, if it passed inspection, as from the best.93  
 The crux of the problem, Coles argued, was in the intrusiveness of the municipal 
brand. “This is a ‘good inspection,’ and that is a ‘bad inspection,’ are terms very usually 
employed to denote the value of the article offered for sale,” he noted, “the reputation of 
the manufacturer, or producer, being thus wholly kept out of view, and merged in the 
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Inspector’s brand.” As a result, “when an inspector designates the quality of an article, 
that responsibility or accountability, which is the great security for correct conduct and 
judicious management, is completely taken away from all parties.” Every participant in 
the production of flour was obscured, “level[ing] all distinctions of persons, and 
prevent[ing] the acquisition of individual reputation.” The product itself ceased to be the 
object being bought and sold, but rather the brand and the fictional standard it 
promoted.94  
 An editor for the Baltimore-published American Farmer opined that Cole’s points, 
while interesting, were misguided: “Although we may not be able to ‘define the quality 
of flour with mathematical accuracy,’ still we can reach a degree of probability so near to 
moral certainty, as to assure us of the intrinsic, relative value of commodities.” Indeed, 
public faith in the ability to eliminate uncertainties and impose standards in the 
production of commodities never wavered. As for the matter of the producer’s reputation, 
the American Farmer suggested that “the fanciful names of our mills … now often 
branded upon our flour” be replaced with “the real names of the manufacturer.” In 
offering this recommendation, the newspaper unwittingly anticipated the battle for the 
brand that would reshape the inspection system over the next three decades.95 By the 
1840s, the municipal brand no longer represented a unifying force that bound the 
reputation of producers and the state for the economic benefit of the whole community.  
 
IV. Antebellum free trade zones and the demise of the municipal brand 
 Even at the height of its influence from the 1790s to 1820s, municipal inspection 
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engendered calls for reform or elimination. Many of these pleas focused on the 
beleaguered inspector, frequently portrayed as partial, incompetent, or overpaid. In 1798, 
wheat dealers balked at paying a man “Stiled a Measurer of Grain,” whose “large salary 
is raised from the pocketts of one class of citizens.” Silverware dealers expressed 
aggravation over “the secret & artificial means” by which lawmakers extracted inspection 
fees only to pay the “useless office” of silver assayer. Grocers lamented an 1817 change 
to the measuring of salt, “arbitrarily made by the measurers” for profit and convenience. 
Eight years later, another group of grocers alleged that the office of inspector of weights 
and measures had become “a sinecure for the purpose of individual support.” In the view 
of butter and lard dealers, the inspector was paid too much “for an Office requiring so 
little exertion, talent and expence.” These artificial costs, merchants noted in reference to 
an 1805 law requiring flaxseed to be cleaned prior to inspection, were ultimately paid by 
consumers.96 With more city residents seeing such appointments as a bastion of political 
patronage, appeals to limit inspection fees, eliminate the fee system and pay inspectors 
annual salaries, or abolish fees altogether accelerated in the 1840s.97 
 Political patronage was the focus of one of the most scathing indictments of the 
antebellum inspection system. In the late 1830s, New Yorker William Leggett, a strident 
advocate of free trade and direct taxation, composed several essays calling for the 
abolition of “tidewaiters and gaugers, appraisers and inspectors.” Among the “army of 
incubuses,” he focused on the inspectors of coal and weights and measures, though he 
called for “all their brother inspectors, too numerous to mention,” to take up “more 
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democratic species of avocation.” Excoriating a New York law establishing the office of 
Weighmaster General as “fastening another shackle on the limbs of trade,” Leggett 
opined that “the weighing of merchandise is a matter with which legislation has nothing 
to do.” The roots of democracy were endangered not only by “banks, insurance 
companies, railroads, [and] manufacturing establishments,” but also “inspectors of 
rawhides, sole-leather, beef, pork, tobacco, flour, rum, wood, coal, and, in short, almost 
every necessary and comfort of life.”98 While many merchants found his brand of free 
trade too radical, his economic critiques of the system presaged many of their arguments 
in the following decades. 
 Leggett’s formulation of free trade as “the buyer and seller being left to make 
their own bargain” clearly contravened the inspection system, but in doing so it tapped 
into widely shared views among urban commercial actors.99 Bakers were especially 
prominent in promoting caveat emptor in everyday transactions. As the “staff of life,” 
bread was the canary in the coalmine of antebellum regulation. Following an 1802 
ordinance, loaves of bread were subject to as much scrutiny as casks of flour, leading 
bakers frequently to complain “that all attempts to Regulate Bread has been Inadequite to 
the purpose & a sourse of oppression & vexation.” The only purpose of bread regulations, 
a petition noted in 1820, should be to establish “a just scale … between the Bakers and 
the Citizens,” not to stipulate the price or weight of loaves. Consumers and competition 
would weed out bakers who set their prices too high or baked inferior bread. While 
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lawmakers viewed bread regulations as “of too much importance for hasty legislation” as 
late as 1842, bakers and customers by then had established new trade customs. In 1836, 
Mayor Samuel Smith informed his New York counterpart that Baltimore’s bread laws 
were “dead letter,” as “the Bakers resisted and would not permit the publick officer to 
enter their door.” Within a decade, the city council had come around to the bakers’ view, 
doubting it had “any right to say what compensation the Bakers shall have for baking a 
loaf of bread.” The market price of flour would perform that work for them, and 
consumers would ensure it.100 
  In the 1840s and 1850s, more powerful commercial interests translated these 
arguments about the sanctity of the buyer-seller relationship in the context of long-
distance trade. Weights and measures were one point of contention. Advocating a hard 
line, Leggett believed government ought to set standards and let buyers and sellers 
“conform to it or not, as they choose.” “Let the purchaser take care of himself” from 
fraudulent measures, he wrote, for “a man’s eyes are his best chapman, contains more 
wisdom than our corporation ordinances.”101 In the late 1840s, Baltimore’s lawmakers 
sought to place more authority in the hands of consumers in matters of weights and 
measures. When Jesse Marden implored the city to establish a quart measure for milk that 
was “used in all other cities but Baltimore,” which used a wine measure for milk, the city 
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denied his request. “So long as both vender & purchaser understand what amount they 
give or receive for a Quart,” a committee reported in 1847, “it would make no difference 
to the Publick whether there is three or five half pints in a Quart.” Marden persisted, 
claiming that the distinction between the two measures was “not generally known.” The 
city again dismissed his appeal, noting that a larger quart measure would increase the 
price and “result to no advantage to either the buyer or vender.” Avoiding a similar hassle, 
coal dealers widely publicized its 1854 decision to sell coal by the short ton (2000 lbs.) 
instead of the customary long ton.102 
 More vitally, dealers sought freedom of choice by making inspection 
noncompulsory. In 1844, butter and lard dealers—including Robert Garrett & Sons, who 
previously resisted lowered inspection requirements—appealed for inspection to be 
“optional as buyers and sellers agree.” To enforce compulsory inspection, they contended, 
would amount “to a prohibition” of the city’s forwarding business.103 Two years later, 
merchants and manufacturers of pot and pearl ashes aimed to demonstrate how 
compulsory inspection effectively closed the market. They noted that an 1838 inspection 
ordinance had dried up the city ash trade to the extent that the law became a “dead letter” 
and inspectors were not appointed. In the “free system” that emerged in their absence, 
“the trade revived and considerable quantities began to come forward from the West 
which met with ready sale.” When the city again appointed an inspector in 1845, 
“supplies from the West … entirely ceased so that there is not a single barrel for sale in 
the City.” To procure pot and pearl ashes, manufacturers relied on other eastern cities, 
paying a premium. Baltimore’s lawmakers relented and made it lawful to purchase or sell, 
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for manufacturing purposes, pot or pearl ashes in the city with or without inspection.104 
 Another group of butter and lard dealers opposed to the 1844 petition contended 
that making inspection noncompulsory “would virtually put an end to the Inspection”—
or worse, promote bad inspection. Leaving inspection up to the choice of buyers and 
sellers, they claimed, would only encourage inspectors to do whatever possible to make 
them happy, rather than as the quality or tare of the package required.105 Nevertheless, 
support for compulsory inspection continued to erode among buyers, sellers, and 
lawmakers in Maryland and Pennsylvania. A significant factor accelerating this process 
was New York’s 1846 constitution, which abolished “every description of inspection” by 
state-appointed officials. When Maryland’s legislature met to revise the constitution in 
1850, New York’s “free inspections” system was on the minds of the conveners. The 
convention considered an amendment that “all offices for the weighing, gauging, 
measuring, culling or inspecting any merchandize, produce, manufacture or commodity, 
whatever, except tobacco, [be] abolished.” Concerns that it would destroy the reputation 
of Maryland flour, coupled with resistance from those who feared a voluntary system 
would deprive inspections of their “State character,” sunk the proposed amendment. 
Nevertheless, as one legislator predicted, the debates proved to be “the entering wedge of 
a new scheme” resembling New York’s system.106 
 Critiques of the political economy of inspection developed in tandem with spatial 
transformations in the urban marketplace. As historians have shown, the transportation 
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revolution entailed a fundamental reconfiguration of the built environment, political 
priorities, and labor patterns. For eastern city boosters, inspection mandates seemed an 
obstacle to the competitive spirit of internal improvement. Delays and added costs 
generated by inspection detracted from the salutary benefits of railroads, which by the 
1830s and 1840s had become central to the commercial and civic identities of Baltimore 
and Philadelphia.107 Some of these restrictions resembled those faced by artisans and 
farmers decades earlier. Coal dealers complained of having to weigh at public scales, 
leading to “great delay, additional cartage, the expence of weighing, &c.” With new 
forms of transportation enabling dealers to ship their commodities differently, package 
requirements proved a hindrance. Using a supposed shortage in coopered barrels as 
pretext, merchants asked permission to ship New York-bound flaxseed in bags in 1841. 
They worried of “the serious injury that the commerce of the port would sustain” if 
flaxseed conveyed to the city “by means of the newly added facilities to the inland 
navigation, can find no issue on account of the restrictions unwisely placed by ourselves 
on its exportation.”108 
 The pervasive logic of “natural advantage” offered one of the most powerful 
agents in the attack on the artifice of government inspections. Mayor Sheppard Leakin’s 
1839 report was characteristic in praising how “the abundant crops produced in the fertile 
region which surrounds us, have been poured into our city, giving life and activity to 
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trade, and diffusing general happiness.” The source of Baltimore’s “commercial strength,” 
leading businessmen reported in 1852, was “cheap and quick transport.”109 Drawing on 
the common trope of promoting the city’s “natural advantages,” beef and pork dealers 
noted “the very favorable position of our city for the prosecution of an extensive foreign 
provision trade” should “proper legislative liberality” encourage it. City leaders were 
responsive to such appeals, particularly in light of the city’s growing financial and 
emotional investment in opening up “the Great West by means of our great lines of 
internal improvement.”110  
 Objections coalesced around the compulsory re-inspection of export commodities. 
Critics of the re-inspection requirements ultimately looked to the establishment of free 
trade zones. Prior to the 1840s, Baltimore ordinances stipulated that all products exported 
from the city, whether packed there or elsewhere, were to be inspected and marked with 
the Baltimore brand. This included articles, previously inspected in or bound for other 
American cities, sent to Baltimore for transshipment.111 Merchants complained that all 
this accomplished was to tax the city’s burgeoning forwarding business. The city’s joint 
committee on police agreed in an 1839 report on butter and lard, noting that “the 
reputation of Baltimore requires that articles sold or shipped from this port … be of the 
quality represented by the dealers.” In cases “where articles are packed in the interior, 
and the aid of Baltimore shipping is afforded only for their carriage,” they concluded, 
“this reputation is in no way affected.” This marked a distinct contrast from a report 
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fifteen years earlier, which contended that, in the absence of compulsory re-inspection, 
Baltimore’s brand “would materially suffer in foreign ports … if there should be any 
error or impropriety in any of the Inspections.”112  
 Whereas commercial rivalries in the early republican period encouraged city 
officials to promote the municipal brand through more thorough inspection laws, 
competition after 1830 produced the opposite result. Prior to this shift, municipal leaders 
sought to distinguish themselves through ordinances and distinctive standards. After the 
shift, city corporations worked to eliminate differences in commercial regulations. 
Baltimore, according to one petition, “stands alone in her adherence” to “utterly useless” 
inspection laws. “No such obnoxious regulation imposing onerous restrictions to trammel 
and destroy commerce,” butter and lard dealers wrote in 1840, "exists in any of our Rival 
cities of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Richmond, Charleston, New Orleans, nor any 
other commercial mart of the world.”113 Another petition noted that laws in New Orleans, 
Boston, and New York permitted provisions to be sold or shipped without re-inspection, 
allowing those cities to “engross nearly all that branch of trade, notwithstanding 
Baltimore is a better point for reshipment.” It called for Baltimore to “be placed on the 
same footing of free trade as are the other Atlantic cities.” As late as 1855, coal dealers 
lamented that Baltimore was “least favorable to easy hauling” due to inspection 
requirements.114 As New York, New Orleans, Philadelphia, and other port cities reduced 
physical and legal obstructions, creating free trade zones for the transshipment of goods, 
Baltimore fell further behind. In an increasingly integrated national marketplace, 
commodities took the path of least resistance.  
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 Reflecting not only the persuasiveness of these arguments but also the growing 
influence of shippers and other commercial intermediaries in municipal politics, the city 
council began dissembling Baltimore’s inspection system in the late 1840s and early 
1850s. Assigned to an 1852 petition that claimed “that with a compulsory inspection as in 
Baltimore the western packers naturally avoid us,” a committee of councilmen echoed the 
petition’s sentiments: “It becomes us as a great commercial community” to remove the 
“unnecessary and improper restrictions” of compulsory re-inspection to “successfully 
compete with the other Atlantic cities,” where trade with the west was “free and 
unfettered.” Chairing the committee was councilman Hugh A. Cooper, who was 
emblematic of the interconnected mercantile interests of Baltimore’s forwarding trade, as 
well as its political capital. One of the city’s preeminent shipbuilders in the 1830s and 
1840s, Cooper eventually held directorships of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the 
Second National Bank, and various insurance companies.115 One by one, commodities 
were exempted from re-inspection in the city, beginning with butter and lard and 
continuing with pork, beef, and pot and pearl ashes.116 
 With the demise of compulsory inspection, responsibility for the brand passed 
from the municipal corporation to the individual merchant. Producers of commodities 
remained “wholly kept out of view,” as Benjamin U. Coles had put it in 1820, but urban 
capitalists, not public officials, took the lead in regulating and adjusting standards. There 
had been hints of this shift as early as the mid-1830s, when boards of trade were 
established in Philadelphia (1833) and Baltimore (1836). In both cities, the board of trade 
proved instrumental in the takeover of the municipal brand, submitting frequent 
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memorials to city and state lawmakers on the deleterious effects of inspection on trade 
and agriculture.117 After disintegrating in the early 1840s, Baltimore’s board of trade was 
revived in 1849 and incorporated in 1852, corresponding with the peak of anti-inspection 
agitation. Five months after its incorporation, the board called for comprehensive reforms 
of the system, beginning with restoring responsibility for the product in the manufacturer 
and merchant. “The interposition of the inspector takes away the responsibility of the 
producer, owner, or seller,” the board wrote, leaving “no inducement to attempt anything 
beyond an unwilling compliance with the law.”118  
 City lawmakers anticipated this shift in ownership of the municipal brand in 1846, 
when a committee deemed the publication of names of venders selling underweight butter 
too extreme a penalty. The loss of butter was sufficient without “bring[ing] discredit upon 
innocent individuals who are selling as agents for others.” With more out-of-state 
merchants acting as agents, there were ample opportunities for individuals to be “totally 
unacquainted” with either a commodity or Baltimore’s laws on it, as another petition put 
it. In addition, commercial intermediaries operating elsewhere did not want to be bound 
by the Baltimore brand. “The Inspection and brand upon provisions going from this place 
to Philadelphia, New York and Boston is a positive injury instead of an advantage,” city 
beef and pork dealers wrote in 1852, “parties there (if inspection is desired) preferring to 
adapt it to the standard of their respective markets.” Pressure came from abroad, as well. 
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“In the foreign markets,” beef and pork dealers shrugged, “the price is determined by the 
actual value of the good, not by any inspection brand.”119 
 Indeed, municipal brands carried little of the meaning they once did. Uncertain 
measures of value, they did not perform their fundamental task of stabilizing value in an 
anonymous marketplace. Foreign consumers disregarded or, worse, were suspicious of 
what these branding marks signified, in addition to expressing frustration at having to 
shoulder the costs of municipal inspection systems thousands of miles away. Lack of 
confidence in the municipal brand was compounded by allegations of widespread fraud 
and counterfeiting. This was especially pronounced in the flour trade. Foreign consumers 
in the 1850s regularly complained of “a gradual deterioration in the quality” that 
observers like the Belfast Mercantile Journal attributed “to the introduction of ‘free 
trade’” in the sale of flour. It called for leaders “to do away with the branding of the 
quality of the flour altogether” and “let the miller’s name … be branded on the barrels as 
a matter of course.” At home, meanwhile, customers had become conditioned to look for 
other designations of a barrel’s value, such as the use of white-hooped barrels, which 
fetched as much as fifty cents more per barrel for its flour. As observers readily noted, 
opportunities for fraud abounded in both alternatives to the municipal brand, including 
fabricated trademarks and deceptive packaging. In spite of rampant counterfeiting of 
brands in the 1850s, however, critics did not long for a return to the state or municipal 
brand, which had been already discarded as devoid of utility and meaning. Instead, critics, 
including the London Journal of Commerce, sought American courts to put an end to the 
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forgery of private brands by heavily penalizing the worst transgressors.120 Litigation 
would replace regulation in the securing of standards, further consolidating the power of 
a merchant elite that could deploy lawyers at will. 
 With commercial interests near and far calling for the dissolution of the municipal 
brand, Baltimore’s leaders conceded. No longer would the reputation of its commercial 
community “depend entirely upon the integrity and qualification of the Inspector,” Hugh 
Cooper’s 1852 report announced, but “the respectability of the vender will be so deeply 
involved for his own protection that he will be bound to maintain the reputation and 
standing of his House.” Should customers “deem the character and standing of the vender 
… not sufficient,” they may elect to have the casks inspected.121 Allegations of 
incompetent or biased inspectors accelerated this shift in the brand. Recognizing the link 
between the reputation of the inspector and the character of the brand, some merchants 
sought to undermine the former. In 1849, Baltimore’s beef and pork inspectors were 
forced to respond to claims that, among other things, they “would not know what meat 
was when they saw it.” Some critics were more diplomatic, criticizing the office but not 
the men, but the effect was the same, weakening public confidence in the appointed 
officials. Mayor John H. T. Jerome likewise expressed “embarrass[ment]” at holding 
absolute power to make “numerous important appointments” and the “great difficulty 
experienced in making the proper selections.”122  
 City and state lawmakers, having relented on questions of compulsory inspection 
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and re-inspection, took radical steps to restore faith in the office: they relinquished their 
authority of appointment. Beginning in 1852, “competent and well skilled” men 
unaffiliated with the trade could apply for a license to inspect beef and pork.123 
Merchants advocated the change in the belief that open competition would eliminate 
much of the “compulsion, incompetency, and uncertain tenure” that plagued an office so 
tied to “party venality.” Once licensed, inspectors opened up storefronts and warehouses 
to inspect and store beef and pork in the city, their rates of compensation dictated by 
competition rather than fiat. Immediately, former official inspectors as well as several 
butchers opened their own establishments, including Henry Krebs, who announced to the 
public that he was a “regularly licensed Inspector of Beef and Pork” in late 1853. 
Encouraged by its initial effects, the board of trade pressed for more offices of inspection 
to be opened up to public competition.124  
 Dealers and politicians immediately were drawn to licensing as a catchall solution 
for inspection. Only a year after the city passed its first ordinance authorizing the open 
licensing of beef and pork inspectors, the state moved to extend these provisions to all 
state inspection offices. An 1853 bill proposed that “any free white citizen of the state” 
may apply for a license to be an inspector of flour, fish, leather, gauger of casks, liquors, 
plaster of Paris, lime, firewood, black oak bark, lumber, and coal. Only tobacco would 
continue under the old system of appointment. Some objected to this exemption, calling 
attention to the state’s “large invested interest … in her extensive warehouses for tobacco 
inspections, and from which she derives considerable revenue.” Others groused about the 
inclusion of flour in the bill. An editorial by “Consumers’ Rights” predicted that with 
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licensed flour inspection “there will be as great a difference in the grade of inspections as 
there is in the elasticity of India rubber consciences,” with each dealer or commission 
merchant having his own inspector. Under a system of “private inspections,” fraud, 
inconsistency, and self-interest would impair the “standing of the Baltimore brands of 
flour” in foreign markets (Fig. 3.3).125  
 Lawmakers left both flour and tobacco out of the final law, which passed with 
little notice in 1854—a sign that most had come to accept, if not prefer, a system of 
private inspections. In 1860, state laws provided for the inspection of bark, coal, fish, 
flour, gauging of casks, grain, guano, hay, leather, lime, livestock, lumber, manure, 
tobacco, and wood. Yet these regulations carried little of the force of previous inspection 
laws.126 Meanwhile, flour had been the commodity that first drove the city and state to 
further articulate and extend the inspection system. In the 1850s and 1860s, it would 
epitomize the diminished power of the municipal brand to regulate the entire commodity 
chain and merge its various participants into a symbol of the city’s political and 
commercial influence. With the shift of the grain trade to Chicago, the increasing 
integration of a national and global market, and improved technologies of storage and 
transportation, authority over the standardization of flour would fall to merchants and 
commercial exchanges. Cities remained important commercial intermediaries, but instead 
of actively governing the relationship between buyer and seller, it served a more passive 
function, facilitating the most efficient movement of goods between them.127  
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Laws and Public Local Laws, eds. Otho Scott and Hiram M’Cullough (Baltimore, 1860). 
127 Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis; Hill, Grain Grades and Standards. 
 
 177 
Conclusion: A prehistory of corporate branding 
 For as swiftly the municipal inspection system expanded between the 1790s and 
1820s, its collapse was just as abrupt in the 1840s and 1850s. Despite the confusion and 
resentment it bred, particularly among the producing classes, product inspection thrived 
well into the 1830s as a result of widespread support from the city’s commercial leaders, 
whose political influence was bolstered by the fact that many of them served in official 
municipal and state capacities, as well. As new developments remapped the antebellum 
city and its orientation to the market economy, however, elite confidence in the 
inspection system wavered. Political-economic arguments, particularly those of free trade 
advocates in the 1840s, sharpened longstanding critiques of inspection and articulated a 
common cause among farmers, manufacturers, and merchants—three groups that long 
had been at odds over the inspection system. Among the most frequently aired complaints 
were the system’s potential for corruption and the lack of choice accorded to buyers and 
sellers. Meanwhile, a transportation revolution and the evolving imperatives of industrial 
capitalism spurred local and state lawmakers to reorient cities around the transshipment 
of commodities. The drive to transform cities into vessels for the rapid and unrestrained 
traffic in commodities—formally legislating free trade zones at crucial transportation 
nodes—ran squarely against the system upon which municipal and commercial leaders 
previously built a brand. 
 The flood of commodities that inundated the early-nineteenth-century city was not 
the only force that prompted new ways of thinking about and regulating movement 
through urban space. As consumer goods circulated more rapidly through the homes, 
streets, wharves, shops, and market houses of antebellum Baltimore and Philadelphia, 
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plebeian economic activities proliferated. These activities quite often straddled shifting 
cultural and legal boundaries of what constituted acceptable commercial behavior. One 
form these informal economies took was huckstering, which by definition took place 
along the physical and figurative edges of the well-regulated marketplace. Hucksters’ 
ability to circumvent market regulations stretched public markets’ formal boundaries, 
demonstrating both the potential rewards of and heightened anxieties about mobility in 




Fig. 3.1. An 1858 advertisement showcasing busy wharf scene on the Delaware River, as 
coopers construct barrels and stevedores haul them on and off of waiting ships. Library 
Company of Philadelphia. 
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Fig. 3.2. A New York comic valentine mocking coopers as dim-witted, ca. 1840-1880. 
Library Company of Philadelphia. 
180 
Fig. 3.3. Another New York comic valentine, ca. 1861-1865, that speaks to larger 
suspicions about the ineffectiveness and corruption of inspectors, particularly during the 
Civil War. Library Company of Philadelphia. 
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Chapter Four: Trading on the Margins 
 
 On the afternoons and evenings preceding market days, Philadelphia’s Second 
Street was abuzz in commercial activity. Farmers braved the rutted roads leading in from 
north and south to sell the products of household labor. Wednesdays and Saturdays 
marked the greatest activity, when “the Streets leading to and from the Markets seem 
almost to groan, with the loaded baskets, piled in every direction,” while “ranges of 
waggons extend[ed] through Second and Market Streets, for more than three miles.”1 In 
Baltimore, Howard Street served as the terminus for the wagons that twice a week 
flooded into the city, a “country produce imporium, where lusty farmers, athletic servants 
and crowds of 4, 6, and 8 horse carriages” bustled about. John H. B. Latrobe remarked in 
1824 that the busiest parts of the city, aside from the wharves, were Howard Street, West 
Franklin Street, and Pennsylvania Avenue, “where the Conestoga wagons bringing 
country produce … were unloaded for distribution to the markets.”2 Authors and artists 
alike found these scenes of rural producers passing the urban threshold on market day 
teeming with creative possibilities. Farmers and their travels to and from market likewise 
have drawn sustained inquiry from historians seeking to identify the causes, 
consequences, and chronology of capitalist development in early America.3   
 Meeting the farmers along the country roads that funneled into Second and 
Howard streets, traveling in both directions, was a motley set of itinerant traders called 
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hucksters. While these women and men have occasioned less commentary from 
contemporaries and historians, they too forged relationships with an increasingly 
complex and integrated market economy. Emerging out of inefficiencies in the public 
market system, hucksters quickly became integral to the urban consumer economy in the 
early republic. Like the archetypal farmer sitting in his market-bound Conestoga wagon, 
the peripatetic huckster embodied a number of important features of antebellum 
capitalism. First, the huckster underscored the intermediated character of market 
capitalism in an era where commodities passed through more and more hands before 
reaching their consumers. Hucksters so thoroughly insinuated themselves in market 
relationships that it proved difficult to visually distinguish them from farmers, butchers, 
and other venders. Second, as a trade based on mobility and, in particular, the work of 
poorer men and women, huckstering captured the dynamic qualities of a capitalist 
economy predicated on moving people and goods ever more rapidly through the city and 
countryside. But because the people supplying this kinetic energy were poor, often 
women, and sometimes persons of color, hucksters’ labor was scrutinized in ways that 
other commercial intermediaries’ labors were not.  
 This points to a third feature of antebellum capitalism, the widespread application 
of formal as well as informal mechanisms to police women and men in the market 
economy. As prominent members of a mobile working class in antebellum America, 
hucksters found their ability to move at liberty challenged and disputed at every turn. 
Like other urban and rural laborers, free and unfree, hucksters operated under many legal 
restrictions, but more onerous were the extralegal burdens they endured: social authorities 
casting aspersions on their personal reputation and independence, police and market 
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officials mistreating them and randomly enforcing dead-letter laws, butchers and 
shopkeepers banding together to banish itinerants who tried to occupy market stalls and 
sidewalks, and the constant threat of violence. In part because hucksters proved difficult 
to formally regulate, competing retailers and middle-class residents increasingly 
portrayed hucksters as subverting the moral, spatial, and economic order of the city. As 
Michael Zakim and Gary Kornblith have argued recently, a fundamental problem facing 
the development of capitalism in antebellum America was how to establish a durable 
social and political order upon “a system of profitmaking based on the perpetual 
movement of goods and persons.”4 The case of hucksters and other mobile poor people 
points to an important way this order was established—through the production of fluid 
categories of legitimate and illegitimate movement that, by virtue of their inscrutability, 
justified the expansion of policing in late-antebellum America. 
 Finally, contests over hucksters’ access to market houses and sidewalks 
showcased the many valences of property that influenced urban regulation. Because they 
were privately owned but publicly accessible, sidewalks generated many complications 
for regulation.5 Shopkeepers, market renters, and property owners all argued that because 
hucksters did not operate from stable storefronts, and thus did not pay rent or taxes, they 
were not entitled to the same rights as “regular” dealers, who owned or occupied 
storefronts. Other property holders wielded their power for more benevolent purposes—
granting hucksters permission to vend in front of their buildings—but to similar ends: 
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they were also asserting authority over the sidewalk as an extension of their own property. 
Recognizing that a storefront could not only prove more lucrative in the long run but also 
serve to legitimate their commercial reputation, some hucksters moved into storefronts as 
soon as they were able. For most of the antebellum period, the number of huckster shops 
remained small in Baltimore and Philadelphia, but this changed in the 1850s, when 
hundreds of hucksters opened provision stores or “green groceries.” In addition to 
decentralizing the late-antebellum retail landscape, the shift further undercut the 
economic independence of hucksters who were unable to rent storefronts, reinforcing the 
importance of property holding to the regulation of the urban economy. At the same time, 
the spread of green groceries across Baltimore dramatically illustrated how hucksters and 
their conception of vernacular capitalism—huckster capitalism—broadened the 
parameters of the marketplace in the early republic.6 
 
I. Opening the marketplace 
 For as long as there had been public markets in Baltimore and Philadelphia, there 
had been hucksters to facilitate access to the products sold in them. One of the signal 
features of the public market was that it designated where and when farmers, butchers, 
and consumers could transact. Not all marketers confined their business to the “limits of 
the market,” nor did the freshness of foodstuffs neatly accord with authorities’ well-
defined market schedule. Accordingly, the spatial and temporal constraints of the 
regulated marketplace promoted—indeed compelled—a secondhand economy in 
vegetables, fruit, meat, butter, bread, and other perishables. Huckstering was not always 
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sanctioned in state and municipal laws; even when it was, the legitimacy of this trade 
remained in doubt in the minds of middling and elite urban residents. Yet hucksters 
remained an intrinsic part of the consumer economy, purveyors of not just fresh 
provisions but also prepared foods and daily essentials from pins and combs to cambric 
and candles. By the first decades of the nineteenth century, hucksters were vital nodes in 
the commercial landscape, reflected in their growing prominence in popular portrayals of 
city life as well as legal and political discourse.  
 Hucksters formed ligaments of exchange in several regards. They mediated the 
buyer-seller relationship by acting as conduits between isolated urban consumers and 
rural producers and making food available outside traditional market hours. Hucksters 
brought the market to consumers in neighborhoods cropping up farther from city market 
houses, charging higher prices for their service—what they viewed as a reasonable 
charge for convenience (critics thought otherwise). Many of their customers came from 
the poorer classes of urban society, families unable or unwilling to devote the time to 
walk to the market house at least once a week. To a notable extent, then, hucksters 
spanned the market’s spatial and class asymmetries. Relatedly, hucksters articulated 
between different scales of exchange, purchasing in bulk to sell “by the small” as well as 
acquiring goods from many sources to retail to wholesalers.7 Just as significant, 
huckstering itself was a bridge of sorts for navigating transitions in the lifecycle or, more 
often, lean periods. The result was a heterogeneous set of men and women taking up 
baskets to get by or get ahead on a combination of guile, grit, and geographic mobility.  
 Like other itinerant merchants in early America such as peddlers—whom David 
Jaffee characterizes as “facilitating the shift from local exchange, fostering the expansion 
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of production in the countryside, and expanding the role of commodities in everyday 
life”—hucksters were both distributing agents and independent traders.8 With the striking 
of the market house bell at ten or eleven o’clock in the morning, after most customers had 
made their purchases, hucksters hustled from stall to stall, buying up unsold, damaged, or 
overripe fruit and vegetables from farmers at a discount. Others visited city bakeries, 
looking to purchase underweight loaves of bread from bakers. Prohibited by assize laws 
from selling the deficient bread, bakers were more than happy to find a ready outlet. An 
1824 petition estimated there were 800 bread hucksters in Baltimore (compared to 80 
master bakers), many of whom bought up bakers’ underweight or irregular loaves. It was 
customary for bakers in Philadelphia, memorialists wrote in 1829, “to sell bread by the 
dozen loaves to the hucksters, by whom the poor are generally supplied.” These loaves, 
instead of weighing sixteen ounces as required by the assize, often were several ounces 
lighter.9 Butchers divested themselves of imperfect cuts of meat through the agency of 
hucksters, as did sawyers and ship captains with their splintered, underweight, and 
mildewed firewood.10 Indeed, while the itinerant traders competed with propertied 
retailers for customers, shrewd shopkeepers relied on hucksters to sell off stock and 
circumvent municipal ordinances—or, more to the point, shift the blame for their 
transgressions. 
 For many Americans in the early republic, the term “huckster” principally evoked 
images of men and women bartering with farmers as they approached the city. While 
some country producers inveighed against hucksters for hectoring and deceiving them 
                                                
8 David Jaffee, A New Nation of Goods: The Material Culture of Early America (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 157.  
9 City Council Records, 1824:348, 1823:533, BCA; To the Honourable the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the State of Pennsylvania… (Philadelphia, 1829).  
10 City Council Records, 1815:281, 1831:668, 1837:845, 1841:445, BCA. 
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into selling their goods before they were ready (not yet having determined their market 
value) or for less than they were worth, many farmers undoubtedly found the 
intermediaries a convenience. In 1805, “A Citizen,” a former farmer who taken residence 
in Philadelphia, outlined the various “benefits arising from hucksters and higglers.” First 
and foremost, hucksters saved farmers from the time and costs of retailing their own 
products. Freed from “the time spent sitting in market, selling a few half pecks of 
potatoes, a few strings of onions, &c.,” farmers could improve their lands and produce 
more for urban customers. As it was, all one had to do to see the deleterious effects of 
farmers attending market two or three times a week was to visit farms just west of the 
Schuylkill River, “the soil matted over with garlic.” Worse, he continued, farmers were 
“corrupted by leaving their industry to depend on the casualties and caprice of customers,” 
learning bad habits and language. Hucksters thus enabled an appropriate division of labor, 
made all the better by dint of preserving the good morals and “sacred fire” of the country 
people.11  
 Channeling Adam Smith and Thomas Jefferson, “A Citizen” elided the complex 
networks that sustained agricultural labor, ignoring for instance rural women who sold 
butter and homespun wares alongside the family’s fruit, vegetables, and meat in city 
markets.12 Likewise, others would have contended that hucksters, rather than saving 
farmers from having to experience the disorienting and debasing effects of the city, 
brought these effects to the countryside. A British traveler boarding a sloop on the 
Hudson River in 1822 was “assailed by a host of fellows carrying baskets with fine 
                                                
11 Aurora General Advertiser, Feb. 9, 1805. 
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apples, oranges, lemons, or ginger cakes.” These hucksters ignored all marks of rank and 
respectability, “push[ing] themselves into any company, or place. … No situation is a 
sanctuary from their attacks.” Noting that “most of them appeared to be blundering 
Irishmen,” he concluded that the hucksters “completely eclipse the oyster dealers, or fish 
and apple wives of Edinburgh, for sauciness.”13 Nevertheless, it seems rural producers 
shared views the views of “A Citizen,” and not simply because hucksters enabled them to 
focus on production. For a rural population skeptical of the cash nexus, hucksters 
remained an outlet for barter, which provided many lacking ready access to cash with a 
way to engage with capitalist markets on their own terms. With stock immediately on 
hand, hucksters could supply country people with articles ranging from basic to exotic, 
allowing the weary farmer to return home at the end of market day with a full wagon.14 
Hucksters also provided market access to farmers otherwise disinclined or unable, as an 
1816 petition noted: “We generally buy from those who would not bring to Market what 
we buy.”15 
 In making their purchases and re-selling them, hucksters demonstrated a keen 
grasp of changing consumer tastes, price and availability, and market geographies. For 
instance, watermelons not sold at Centre Market might be on sale in Lexington Market 
the following day, Belair Market a few days after that, or on doorsteps and sidewalks 
throughout Baltimore. All but the most spoiled produce, meat, and fish found a consumer, 
                                                
13 “Narrative of a Journey through the United States, 1821-1824,” vol. 1, ch. 12 (June 12, 1822), N-YHS. 
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even if that consumer was one of the countless pigs or goats that poorer urban residents 
raised. Thus fruit and vegetables cycled through the city’s public markets until they were 
eventually purchased or consumed. While the particularities of this food cycle were a 
form of trade knowledge—jealously guarded by hucksters—one French visitor summed 
up what it would have appeared to an outsider: “Wednesday and Saturday are market 
days” in Philadelphia, while “on other days one finds only scrap meat and vegetables.”16 
The farther food traveled and the more hands through which it passed, the more likely it 
ended up consumed by the poor—to say nothing of its freshness. While it will be seen 
that middling or elite critics frequently excoriated hucksters as monopolizing and 
speculating to the great detriment of poorer customers, many laboring households would 
have viewed hucksters as a crucial link to a marketplace in which they already exercised 
limited or contingent forms of choice as consumers.17 
 Another way in which hucksters democratized consumer access to the 
marketplace was by downscaling products to meet the budgets of customers who scraped 
by week to week. For some consumers, smaller portions allowed them to enjoy delicacies 
they otherwise had to forego. By repackaging butter into smaller rolls, cutting fresh beef 
into smaller pieces, and breaking loaves of white bread in halves and quarters, hucksters 
gave poor families a taste of the good (or at least comfortable) life. Hucksters did more 
than peddle the occasional indulgence; for many, they were outlets for a range of more 
basic household provisions. In the early 1820s, with laboring families still reeling from 
                                                
16 Kenneth Roberts and Anna M. Roberts, eds., Moreau de St. Méry’s American Journey, 1793-1798 
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the Panic of 1819, Baltimore hucksters who dealt in bacon and other smoked (read: 
cheaper) meats defended their trade from efforts to ban them from the markets. Because 
they sold “Small cut pieces” to customers unable to “purchase by the Large,” their 
expulsion from the market would only harm “the poorer class of purchasers.” Another 
petition echoed these sentiments, arguing they had been able to sell cured meats “for a 
reduced price, from what it would have been in case those persons had been prohibited 
the priviledge of cutting up and selling outside.” Referencing both their customers and 
themselves, the hucksters noted that “the afflicting state of the times require economy, 
and the industrious poor ought not to be forgotten by your Hon. Body.”18 Fresh food was 
only one of several services hucksters provided to their urban clientele, who could also 
purchase smaller portions of wood, soap, candles, cotton, pins, toothbrushes, and tinware 
from these mobile groceries. A New Englander recalled how hucksters “would split a 
cracker, cut a candle, or halve a row of pins.”19 As working-class households had fewer 
facilities to store a side of beef or other bulky items, compared to wealthier families who 
could afford the cost and space, hucksters scaled the market to the needs and capacities of 
the poor. 
 Indeed, hucksters typically resided in the same streets and courts as their 
customers. As the petition of Baltimore’s bacon venders suggests, and Seth Rockman has 
argued, huckstering provided some with a means of “opting out” of a cutthroat labor 
market. In the early republic, and particularly in the wake of the Panic of 1819, more men 
and women turned to street vending to buffer themselves from the boom-and-bust cycles 
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of nineteenth-century capitalism.20 A small but increasing number of hucksters doubled 
down on their successes by opening shops, often in the basement or first floor of their 
dwellings. In early national Philadelphia, many widows and sailors’ wives operated these 
humble storefronts in small streets and courts. “Notwithstanding the variety of articles 
kept,” an observer wrote, “the whole stock of some of them might be stowed into a 
bushel basket.” Such shops provided enterprising poor women one of few paths to 
upward mobility, even if many continued to take in washing and knitting work on the 
side.21 By the middle third of the nineteenth century, at least a few male hucksters 
leveraged their economic success into careers as large-scale middlemen. 
 More often, huckstering was a temporary economic strategy employed by white 
and African American men and women with limited class mobility. For young women 
arriving from the countryside, retailing provisions and prepared foods offered 
possibilities for stable (if temporary or part-time) employment when demand for 
domestic servants slackened. Knowledge gained from working on family farms lent itself 
to retailing fruits and vegetables, while domestic skills such as cooking and baking served 
well those who vended soups like pepperpot, creamed corn, cakes and confections, and 
hot meals in city streets and markets. For African American women in Philadelphia, 
huckstering offered a modicum of economic autonomy in a labor market that rendered 
them doubly vulnerable on the basis of sex and skin color. This is exemplified in the late-
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1780s case of Dina, a slave who absconded from a Chester County plantation and passed 
as a free woman. She sold pepperpot in Philadelphia’s market houses for over a year and 
a half before her master tracked her.22 Abrupt changes or seasonal patterns in household 
economy also drew many into small-scale retailing, often to supplement other forms of 
employment. Wives and female relatives of maritime workers, for instance, often peddled 
food and homespun wares in addition to operating boardinghouses or taverns. When 
family members departed more permanently through death or desertion, many urban 
residents took up a basket and began huckstering—a business that required a certain 
degree of tenacity and commercial competency but little in the way of start-up capital.23 
 The first decades of the nineteenth century witnessed an attendant growth in the 
presence of hucksters in city streets. It is difficult to quantify this growth, for a number of 
reasons. City directories offer only a partial glimpse, given their typical 
underrepresentation of laboring and itinerant populations. That many Philadelphia 
hucksters were African American only contributes to their elision, since directories only 
sporadically enumerated free blacks in the early republic. As a seasonal or makeshift 
form of employment, huckstering might not have been the occupation listed for all 
hucksters. Or in the case of many women, they may have been listed simply as widows—
this appears to have been the case for an 1816 petitioner known only as “widow Brown.” 
Thus when Philadelphia’s 1800 trade directory counted 53 hucksters out of a population 
of 41,000 and growing, it likely fell well short of the actual number of hucksters 
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traversing the city’s streets and market houses.24  
 Popular sources suggest an increase in their numbers (or prominence) during the 
first third of the nineteenth century. For artists and authors seeking to understand the 
cultural landscape of the American city, hucksters illustrated the humor and casual 
amalgamations of everyday urban life (Fig. 4.1). German-born painter John Lewis 
Krimmel was immediately drawn to Philadelphia’s hucksters, spotlighting them in works 
that showcased multiracial and mixed-sex scenes, such as Pepper-Pot: A Scene in the 
Philadelphia Market (1811) and Nightlife in Philadelphia: An Oyster Barrow in front of 
the Chestnut Street Theater (1811). Others recorded the oral culture of hucksters, whose 
street cries were preserved in a popular genre of early-nineteenth-century juvenile 
literature known as the Cries (of London, of New York, of Philadelphia).25 Visitors like 
Anne Royall in 1824 marveled at the “perfect phalanx” of hucksters “station[ed] at each 
end of the market-houses” in Baltimore: “Here an old woman sitting with a table spread 
with nice bread and butter, veal cutlet, sausages and coffee; there another, with a table 
bending under the weight of candy, sweet cakes, oranges and apples; another with choice 
vegetables; another with fowls, as fat as corn could make them.”26  
 Early-nineteenth-century observers generally acknowledged that hucksters played 
a significant role as intermediaries in the urban marketplace. Whether hucksters were 
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beneficial or not prompted far more disagreement. Many middling and elite 
commentators contended that hucksters did more harm than good to farmers, urban 
consumers, and in particular the poor. Looking back on the city since independence, 
Philadelphia antiquarian John Fanning Watson characterized hucksters in 1830 as “a 
genus now so prevalent in our market—an irresponsible, unknown, but taxing race.”27 
Others were more pragmatic in their assessment. Writing in the Mechanics’ Free Press in 
1831, “Joe” posed the question: “Are the hucksters of any use? It appears to me that they 
must be a convenience, either to the farmer or to the citizen,” or else “why does the 
farmer find it convenient to sell to them before selling to the citizens? or why does the 
citizen purchase from them if they are not a convenience to him?”28 Most Baltimoreans 
and Philadelphians—including poor consumers whose opinions can only be deduced 
from their continued patronage of hucksters—likely would have agreed with the 
sentiments of an editorialist in 1824. After alleging that the high cost of food could be 
traced directly to hucksters, he admitted that the itinerant traders were “a useful class of 
traders in a populous city, when properly restricted.”29 What constituted a “proper 
restriction” was another matter.  
 
II. The limits of municipal authority in the marketplace 
 Mediating the relationship of producers and consumers, hucksters were subject to 
a host of laws aimed at restricting their mobility. Most notable were prohibitions on 
forestalling, engrossing, and regrating—three practices by which hucksters circumvented 
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the temporal and spatial controls of the public market. Forestallers purchased provisions 
from farmers before they reached the marketplace or in the market before it officially 
opened for the day. In addition, forestallers circulated rumors about the supposed 
availability of supplies in an attempt to manipulate prices. Engrossers and regraters also 
interposed themselves between producers and consumers, concentrating bargaining 
power in the hands of intermediaries. Engrossers hoarded particular commodities with the 
intent of driving up prices through artificial scarcity. Regraters bought products in the 
market in order to sell them at a marked-up price. Forestalling, in particular, connoted a 
physical as well as economic interposition between producer and consumer—according 
to a 1750 definition, it was both “to intercept on the Highway” and to purchase goods “by 
the Way as they come to Fairs or Marketts to be sold … to the Intent to sell the same 
again, at a higher and dearer Price.”30 While not all hucksters were forestallers, 
engrossers, or regraters, they were historically linked to these practices. 
 In contrast to other itinerant intermediaries in the early republic, such as peddlers, 
hucksters were understood as a distinct regulatory issue because they trafficked in fresh 
food. In 1788, Maryland lawmakers bemoaned the “divers persons, in and about 
Baltimore town,” who “made a practice of purchasing up and engrossing the provisions 
coming to the said markets, and selling the same again, thereby enhancing the price to the 
great injury of the inhabitants.”31 To counteract the problem, forestalling laws established 
a ring stretching several miles outwards from city limits, within which hucksters were 
prohibited from buying provisions with the intent to resell them. When Philadelphia and 
Baltimore received their corporate charters and thus broader power to legislate their 
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public markets in 1789 and 1797, they also acquired the power to police hucksters 
beyond the city, as far as ten miles according to an 1805 Baltimore ordinance.32 Such 
ordinances were yet another instance, alongside inspection laws, of municipal leaders 
seeking to expand their economic influence beyond the political boundaries of the city. 
 By bounding commercial activity in time as well as space, public market controls 
instituted other mechanisms to limit forestalling by the cities’ hucksters. Laws that 
established the opening and closing of the market aimed to allow urban consumers to 
have an opportunity to purchase the freshest and most wholesome provisions. To ensure 
these temporal restrictions were sufficiently promulgated, authorities early on installed 
bells to alert farmers and customers from miles away about the impending opening or 
closing of the market. In 1727, Richard Armitt complained to Philadelphia’s common 
council that “many Hucksters in this City [were] buying provisions in the Markett, and 
often meet[ing] the people Coming to Markett at the ends of the Streets [to] buy up 
provisions.” The council resolved to appoint “an Hour, both Winter and Summer, for the 
Ringing the Bell” to signal the times when hucksters were permitted to enter the 
marketplace. The ringing, repairing, and replacing of market bells remained an important 
responsibility of market clerks well into the nineteenth century.33 Only after the close of 
market day, in the late morning or early afternoon, were hucksters permitted to buy all 
unsold provisions from farmers, and only within the limits of the market. 
 And yet, public markets proved far more effective in attracting an array of 
commercial activity than in containing that activity. Municipal prohibitions on 
forestalling, regrating, and engrossing did little to keep hucksters from entering the public 
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market before the appointed time, from converting the streets into ad hoc markets, or 
from accosting farmers arriving in the city. Observers frequently bemoaned hucksters’ 
brazen attempts to forestall the marketplace in the early republic. Farmers like “Ezekiel” 
from Montgomery County, north of Philadelphia, complained of constant harassment by 
hucksters and “being teazed almost to death” every time they entered the city on Second 
or Third Streets. His experiment of traveling down Front Street left him worse off, as he 
was divested of most of his articles by a huckster who, “with the assistance of his two 
young devils,” badgered him into selling his poultry and flax seed for a fraction of their 
worth.34 In 1795, “Ironicus” mockingly praised hucksters for assisting “our good friends 
from the country,” who “are often at a loss to determine on the prices at which to sell 
their commodities.”35 Farmers bringing their produce to market by water fared no better. 
During the yellow fever epidemic of 1797, market clerks fled Philadelphia, leaving 
hucksters free to forestall with abandon. “Before we could get on shore,” a citizen 
complained to Mayor Hilary Baker, “the boat was attacked by nine hucksters at one time, 
[seeking] to know the price of the articles, and their eagerness was such in jumping on 
board, that the boat was near being filled with water before we could possibly have time 
to land.”36  
 For critics of huckstering, such scenes pointed to the slackness of municipal 
authority. At issue, they believed, was not the strength of the market laws but their 
implementation. After noting that an 1802 Philadelphia ordinance required penalties of 
hucksters who bought up and “monopolize[d]” fresh provisions and sold them “at 
extortionate prices,” a resident queried the mayor: “Why is not the law put in force 
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against these [hucksters]?”37 “A Householder” averred in 1805 that market laws were 
“very ample for the purposes intended” but were “openly, glaringly and impudently 
violated daily … whilst the gentle ministers of regulation passed heedlessly by.”38 City 
officials disclaimed blame, with some calling for more power to regulate hucksters and 
others for more assistance from the public. Mayor Robert Wharton informed 
Philadelphia’s common council in 1810 that there existed a dire need for the state to 
augment “the powers of the Corporation to prevent Hucksters from selling in our 
Market.”39 In Baltimore’s inaugural mayoral address in 1797, James Calhoun 
acknowledged that the goal was to “check if not intirely prevent, the evil practice of 
forestalling the immediate necessities of life.”40 This required consumers to inform on 
forestallers—something they were disinclined to do, as one Baltimore market clerk 
wrote: “Citizens often complain that they see those things, yet they will not give the 
officer any assistance, nor are willing to be stigmatized with the name of an informer.”41  
 Throughout the antebellum period, hucksters by and large evaded restrictions on 
their commercial mobility. There were two primary reasons for this. The first stemmed 
from the paternalism of the early republic’s social and political elite. Acting out of a 
sense of duty as social betters as well as a desire to limit public tax burdens, city fathers 
encouraged the poor to be industrious and self-sufficient. They recognized that 
huckstering offered opportunities to widowed mothers, physically disabled men, and 
other “worthy” poor to earn a living. Hucksters in turn understood the power of 
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paternalism and manipulated it in their petitions to city leaders.42 As a result, city 
lawmakers were ambivalent towards hucksters well into the 1840s, occasionally passing 
legislation to curb forestalling, engrossing, and regrating, but only once attempting to 
outlaw the trade altogether. What ordinances they did pass proved difficult to enforce for 
a second reason: the illegible character of huckstering. Hucksters and the articles they 
retailed often looked no different from farmers, butchers, and their products. Forestalling 
could be indistinguishable from wholesaling and other widely accepted mercantile 
pursuits, a fact that vexed lawmakers striving to create clearly defined commercial 
categories. Before examining the consequences of the law’s tacit permission of hucksters, 
it is worth considering the issues of paternalism and legibility. 
 Because of the diverse social composition of hucksters and the mobile nature of 
their work, the regulation of huckstering was virtually always entangled in politics of 
class, gender, and race. Indeed, hucksters embodied the fluid social geographies of the 
early republic city. In Baltimore and Philadelphia’s neighborhoods, one had to inspect 
closely for indications of residential stratification by class. In the early nineteenth century, 
residents from across the social spectrum still inhabited overlapping residential and social 
spaces, though neighborhoods were becoming more homogeneous over time.43 The cities 
were perhaps even less segregated along lines of race in the early republic. Fells Point 
and Southwark were the central nodes of the two cities’ African American populations, 
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but both neighborhoods also contained a sizeable (but perhaps more transient) portion of 
laboring and middling whites. Spatial proximity did not imply social egalitarianism, 
however. In the absence of geographic differentiation, the twin principles of deference 
and paternalism did the work of maintaining class and race boundaries. While these two 
ideals only barely masked mounting social tensions—and frequently collapsed under the 
weight of collective violence, as in Baltimore’s 1812 riots—they nevertheless 
characterized urban governance in the early republic.44 In the marketplace, one of the 
city’s most diverse spaces, the equal exchange of the two forms of social currency—
deferential respect and paternalistic largesse—was deemed especially critical to public 
order (though often lacking).  
 Consequently, no class of the community encountered the politics of deference 
and paternalism as routinely or intrinsically as hucksters, who proved adept at navigating 
the terrain. While hucksters sometimes responded to challenges to their trade with verbal 
and physical combat, at other times they played on city elites’ feelings of social 
obligation. Hucksters did so by strategically invoking gendered tropes in their 
interactions with authorities, though gender shaped the types of claims male and female 
hucksters could make. Huckster men were in a more delicate position, because many 
viewed huckstering as a woman’s occupation—able-bodied men were thought “well able 
to procure a livelihood in a more reputable way.”45 Thus men had to fully demonstrate 
why they had to huckster for a living. Appealing to Baltimore’s mayor and city council, 
male fruit venders John Shearan and Thomas Moor noted that one was “advanced in age 
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and therefore incapacitated from earning a livelihood by labor, and the other is a 
cripple.”46 More often, men emphasized their responsibility to large families. In 1843, 
James Brown, a wood huckster, asked relief from unpaid fines so he could continue “to 
sustain his family, consisting of his wife and five children, the oldest of whom not more 
than fourteen years.” His wife was in poor health and thus unable to take up a huckster 
basket herself.47 
 Women also had to justify their employment as hucksters, but they had more 
latitude to address other issues in their petitions than male counterparts. They validated 
their occupation most often by claiming vulnerability and lack of husband support. In an 
1805 petition to Philadelphia’s city council, nineteen huckster women began by 
describing themselves as “oppressed by the cares of Widowhood” as well as “rendered 
helpless by the infirmities of age” and “enfeebled by sickness.” They then launched, 
Candice Harrison shows, into a more strident critique of the lack of respect accorded to 
them in society and the law.48 Widow Brown and other market women from Fells Point 
conveyed a similar message to Baltimore lawmakers in 1816: “We are poor women, and 
most of us are Widows, and have families to Support.” The signatures on the petition 
further underscored the gendered nature of the appeal. Men’s names predominated, while 
a single person signed all the market women’s names (possibly because they were semi-
literate or illiterate) and appended “Widow” next to most of them.49 
 A second petition from 1816 highlighted the skillful joining of deference and 
critique in hucksters’ appeals to authorities, who had just passed an ordinance outlawing 
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all forms of huckstering.50 Mary Waddle and four other huckster women recounted being 
forcefully evacuated first from the marketplace and then from the footway at the corner 
of Market Space and Second Street, before being prosecuted and fined $1.58 each. 
Establishing they were “poor necessitous and indigent women chiefly burdened with 
young and helpless Children,” they stepped back to consider the popular prejudice 
against them: “Some perhaps taking human wants woes and difficulties into only a very 
slight consideration, will say, ‘why may not these women apply themselves to other ways 
of getting a living?’” They answered in the third person, citing the social and economic 
inequities produced by the boom-and-bust cycles of early-nineteenth-century capitalism: 
“These women have no mechanical trade, no manufacturing faculty, no stock, can obtain 
no employment (for the present impeded state of business has caused large factories to 
cease their operations) whereby they could obtain a scanty subsistence for themselves and 
families.”51  
 They concluded the third-person exchange with a warning to city leaders as well 
as a subtle but significant argument for free trade: “An Alms house then, if they 
[hucksters] must be fettered from possible industry, must be their final resource.” In a 
final appeal to paternalist authority, they decried the effects of the ordinance not only on 
themselves but also on their customers, who suffered “privation and inconvenience” 
without access to “such necessaries as your Petitioners were wont to have on readiness 
for them.”52 The two petitions were remarkable for a number of reasons, not least of 
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which was that they marked the first sustained petitioning campaign by poor women in 
Baltimore that elucidated an economic worldview. Their homespun political economy 
was predicated on the belief that an open marketplace was also a democratic one, as long 
as hucksters were accorded the respect they deserved as legitimate traders. 
 Eventually, the pleas of Mary Waddle, widow Brown, and other Baltimore market 
women led to the repeal of the 1816 ordinance. A revised market ordinance in 1819 
eliminated the huckster provisions, but they were reinstituted the following year “as if the 
said repealing ordinance had never been passed.”53 Still, the law had become a dead letter 
by the early 1820s. The Panic of 1819, which forced many poor households into new 
informal labor arrangements to make ends meet, was a primary factor in its demise. Even 
when market clerks and police detained men and women for huckstering, magistrates 
proved unwilling to prosecute for petty infractions. In light of this, city shopkeepers 
frequently expressed their displeasure to city leaders in the 1820s. When Edward Johnson 
was again appointed mayor in 1819, grocers were hopeful that Johnson (who had left 
office shortly after the 1816 law was passed) would revive the moribund ordinance. 
Despite Johnson’s “declar[ation] that all he could he would do in the Business,” by 1823 
petitioners decried “the alarming length to which the Business of forestalling had arrived 
in the Center Market.”54 Another 1823 petition asked for a stronger ordinance to combat 
the hucksters “who infest our markets.” In a sign of a shift in attitudes, however, the 
petitioners called for a tax or fee on huckstering, “since it does appear impossible to drive 
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them from the markets as salesmen & women altogether.”55 That same year, the city 
repealed the huckster ordinance once and for all, and over the course of 1824 and 1825 
lawmakers increasingly authorized huckstering—first by licensing it, then by removing 
the prohibition on purchasing food within five or ten miles of the city with the intent to 
resell it.56 
 Elite paternalism may have undermined the 1816 ordinance, but it was not the 
only cause of its repeal. For it proved unfeasible to isolate huckstering from other market 
activities. As an 1821 report put it, “it is almost impossible for the City Council to pass 
any ordinance which can effectually put a stop to the evil complained of (and which is a 
serious grievance) without infringing the rights which are common to all persons.”57 
Forestalling laws could restrict the very farmers and consumers the laws were meant to 
serve. In 1800, a petition signed by 421 Baltimoreans lamented a recent ordinance aimed 
at forestallers, but which ultimately “deprived [them] of the Liberty of Purchasing 
Provisions from the Country people in the streets as usual.”58 In 1804, Mayor Calhoun 
conceded that forestalling laws were “daily violated without the possibility of detection 
by persons disposed to evade it,” punishing those farmers and urban customers who 
followed them. He urged the city council to consider “how far the prohibiting the sale of 
provisions out of Market to the consumer is useful.” Spurred on by the petition and 
Calhoun’s missive, the city council revised its market law to permit farmers to sell 
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outside market hours.59 But this raised a second and more intractable problem: legibility. 
Hucksters simply could pass themselves off as farmers and receive preferential treatment. 
 In 1831, controversy erupted in Philadelphia over the practice of hucksters 
pretending to be farmers to avoid paying license fees and rent. State laws directed the 
municipal corporation to ensure farmers could vend their produce for free in city 
markets.60 With chronically limited space in High Street Market, the city turned to 
establishing curbstone locations for farmers to sell vegetables and meat from their 
wagons. To the chagrin of butchers and authorities alike, a number of huckster men and 
women outfitted wagons, took up residence along the curbstones, and fashioned 
themselves as farmers. A large portion of these unregulated hucksters came to be known 
derogatively as “shinners” (so called, presumably, because of the hazards their makeshift 
market stalls posed to the legs of passersby). These hucksters retailed meat they 
purchased from surrounding areas, in turn cutting and selling it in smaller pieces than 
regulated butchers were allowed to from their market stalls. As a result, shinners attracted 
poorer customers who could not afford to buy meat by the quarter (at least 200 pounds)—
though shinners argued that “there is scarce any family, especially in the warm season, 
who would wish to buy a whole quarter of meat.”61  
 Butchers protested at what they viewed as illegitimate competition from 
“victuallers and others, not inaptly termed ‘shinners,’ under the assumed garb of farmers.” 
In July 1831, several butchers presented a petition at a meeting of the common council, 
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stating: “Laws, whose salutatory intentions can be thus easily evaded, or perverted to 
purposes manifestly repugnant to their spirit or design, must in themselves be radically 
defective.”62 They called on the common council to repeal the law giving shelter to 
shinners and restore to butchers their economic rights. Until the council considered their 
petition, the butchers promised, they would desert their stalls. When Philadelphians 
arrived at High Street Market on the morning of July 16, they found the butchers had 
followed through on their threat. The council at last debated the issue on the 21st and 
concluded that abolishing the law would effectively create a butchers’ monopoly, thereby 
“enablin[g] the victuallers [butchers] to exact most exorbitant prices or at their pleasure 
totally deprive the community of the most indispensable articles of provisions.” Defeated, 
the butchers returned to their stalls. The episode, Sean Adams suggests, revealed the 
growing political power of the “consumer” as well as the emerging opinion that public 
markets hindered competition and potentially kept prices artificially high.63  
 More vitally, the incursion of shinners into Philadelphia’s public markets in the 
summer of 1831 further attenuated the already weakened boundaries of the regulated 
marketplace. By the late 1850s, Philadelphians complained that shinners had virtually 
pushed all other legitimate market venders out of High Street Market, which critics used 
as evidence that the public market houses no longer served any public utility. Hucksters 
may have emerged in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century as solutions to certain 
inefficiencies in the public market system by facilitating the circulation of food and other 
basic necessities. Yet over the course of the antebellum period they pried open the 
marketplace to include a much wider variety of participants and activities. In several 
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respects, hucksters played a role in democratizing consumption in the early republic. 
Their critics, however, argued just the opposite. 
 
III. Disordering the market: social, spatial, economic 
 Owing largely to their skill in skirting municipal authority, hucksters encountered 
popular attitudes that wavered between condescension and contempt. It was common in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to critique huckstering through humor. 
Satire, as Carla Hesse has shown in the case of Parisian fishwives, served as an 
instrument for elites to undercut poorer entrepreneurs’ claims to economic and social 
autonomy.64 In early republic Baltimore and Philadelphia, mockery of hucksters ranged 
from gentle to acerbic. On the one side were books like Amusements for Good Children, 
published in Baltimore in 1808. It described a family who, moved to distraction by “the 
monotony of the Old Woman’s crying Golden Pippins from morning to night” outside 
their home, requested the huckster “move her basket to some other situation.” When she 
pertly rebuffed the entreaty—“like all those kind of people”—a young schoolboy stole 
and hid her apples.65 English pamphleteer William Cobbett, who resided in Philadelphia 
in the 1790s and published the Porcupine’s Gazette, was more vitriolic. In a mock will 
from the 1830s, he wrote: “To the Mayor, Aldermen, and Councils of the City of 
Philadelphia, I bequeath all the sturdy young hucksters, who infest the market, and who, 
to maintain their bastards, tax the honest inhabitants many thousand pounds annually.”66  
 Identifying hucksters as sexually promiscuous, Cobbett’s last point reflected the 
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shifting frame of debate surrounding hucksters—especially with the rise of a new urban 
discourse of disorder after 1820. In this context, hucksters’ subversion of the market 
represented a social and moral danger. Two groups in particular led the way in attacking 
hucksters as conducting an immoral economy: an increasingly self-defined, urban middle 
class and retailers who competed with hucksters for space and customers. For different 
though largely compatible reasons, both cast hucksters as disordering the city and the 
marketplace—morally, economically, and spatially.  
Through the emerging medium of the penny press, middle-class observers portrayed 
hucksters as promiscuous on several levels: mobile, hypersexual, blatantly disregarding 
gendered proprieties, and blurring race and class boundaries. In short, hucksters 
resembled another class of urban residents who circulated through the streets selling 
goods and services, prostitutes. This was the subtext of an 1829 exposé of nocturnal 
Philadelphia, where “Hucksters, Factory girls, and the deluded daughters of honest 
industrious mechanics” frequented dance halls with “Sailors, Raftsmen, Coalmen, and cut 
down Dandies … a promiscuous class of females, all huddled together in a mass.”67 
When York, Pennsylvania, authorities passed a law “forbid[ing] the use of the market 
house, and of the open space thereabout, to hucksters and others,” a Baltimore newspaper 
opined that “this reformation was necessary, as that part was rapidly becoming a 
repository for filth and a rendezvous for vice—a public nuisance and a reproach to the 
town.”68 An 1838 grand jury charge painted a sinister picture of promiscuous circulation 
that identified various targets for better policing in Philadelphia, including “hordes of 
beggars—of unlicensed pedlars and hawkers—of prostitutes who nocturnally swarm in 
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some of our frequented streets and public walks.”69  
 Race figured centrally in the assault on hucksters’ reputation, reflecting the fact 
that Baltimore and Philadelphia were home to antebellum America’s two largest free 
black populations. Interracial sociability was at all times deemed a threat to the social 
order and in need of strict policing. An 1806 petition decried the “Disreaputable 
Inhabatants” in the western section of Baltimore’s Hanover Market, which included 
“from 6 to 8 Lewd women and Black & White and some yellow & as many men of 
Different Caulers—also fighting & Drunkiness Disturbing the Neighbourhood in the 
Dead Hour of the Night &c. &c. &c. &c. &c. &c.”70 A year earlier, a Philadelphia 
newspaper opined that High Street Market ought to be cleared of the crowds of “rude and 
unmannerly” black and white hucksters who subjected respectable pedestrians to “low 
and vulgar abuse.”71 It was not simply an issue of racial intermixing, however, for the 
assembling of groups of African Americans in public was seen as even more dangerous 
to the social order. According to Joseph Townsend and other Baltimoreans writing to the 
mayor in 1824, African American hucksters attracted other bad figures to the 
neighborhood. “[B]y the general introduction of a class of hucksters who occupy the west 
side of Harrison Street in the sale of old cloathing &c.,” they claimed, “it has become a 
mere harbour for drunken disorderly persons & crowds of people of color.”72 Particularly 
in slaveholding states like Maryland, the sight of African Americans engaging in a highly 
visible and almost defiantly independent occupation was, to many observers, absurd and 
dangerous.  
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 Fears of social amalgamation blended into frustrations with hucksters’ more 
material amalgamations. Some likened hucksters to alchemists, manipulating not just the 
price of food but its very quality. Butter, the Baltimore Sun wrote in 1839, lent itself to 
easy adulteration by “woman-pelicans” who “work up ransid butter with their begrimed 
hands, stamp it, rent the use of a countryman’s cart, and vend it for a fresh article.”73 The 
produce and prepared foods that hucksters sold, including pepper-pot soup, peaches, and 
watermelons, acquired reputations as prone to “vile deception,” captured vividly in the 
sobriquet for watermelons, “cholera bombs.” As a soup “composed of all sorts of shreds 
and patches,” with heavy spices serving to mask the potentially off admixtures of 
vegetables, meat, and seafood, pepperpot’s popularity derived in part from its 
promiscuity. Indeed, Krimmel’s 1811 interracial scenes of the pepperpot and oyster 
dealers were meant to capture this point.74 Middle-class commentators were anxious 
about the increasingly mediated nature of the urban food supply and the hucksters who in 
their view made it so. 
 Competing retailers were especially forthright in casting aspersions on the various 
articles hucksters trafficked in. In 1823, Baltimore grocers called the city council’s 
attention to “the practice prevalent in this city, of hawking about the streets candles on 
poles or otherwise and imported fruits, such as oranges, lemons, limes &c.” Not only did 
the trade facilitate “most of the petty thefts committed within the limits of the city, by 
entering houses under the pretext of offering such articles for sale,” but also the goods 
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(like the hucksters) were not as they seemed. “The candles sold in this manner,” they 
contended, “are generally greatly deficient in weight and more so in quality, so that, 
although they are nominally cheaper, the poor, who are the principal purchasers of them, 
are very much injured and defrauded, without remedy, as the sellers are unsettled and 
unknown.”75 A writer in the Public Ledger in 1845 averred: “It is far worse to poison a 
neighborhood by tempting them by low prices to purchase bad provisions, than to commit 
a petit larceny,” for “to take advantage of the necessities of the poor, or the infirmity of 
the weak and feeble, by carrying improper food to their doors, at low prices, in turpitude 
far exceeds the stealing a loaf of bread.” Both the petition and article arrived at the same 
conclusion: “If the public do not encourage regular dealers who have permanent places of 
business,” they would be overrun with hucksters and shinners.76 
 Antebellum fluctuations in food prices and availability magnified the significance 
of claims that hucksters were social outsiders who, like the vulture capitalists of the era, 
preyed on the economic and personal distress of the industrious but downtrodden. As 
individuals directly associated with the manipulation of food, price, and availability—
“monopolizers [who] endeavor to circumvent the market, and thus speculate upon the 
poor”—hucksters were human analogues for the speculative spirit of nineteenth-century 
capitalism, which Americans were forced to wrestle with during the Panic of 1837.77 If 
the Panic of 1819 had temporarily eased restrictions on huckstering in Baltimore and 
Philadelphia, the deep and drawn-out depression of the late 1830s and early 1840s 
produced the opposite effect. As Jessica Lepler has recently shown, the Panic of 1837 
served as a crucible for American ideas about capitalism. Observers attributed any 
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number of causes—such as individual moral failings, political brinkmanship, and 
structural flaws in the global financial system—to the depression, as they searched in 
vain for someone or something to blame for the “Hard Times” that grounded the nation’s 
progress to a halt.78 Dramatic inflation in food prices, coupled with periodic shortages 
(despite apparently productive crops), provided the lens through which many urban 
Americans interpreted the economic catastrophe. Indeed, a spike in flour prices at the 
beginning of 1837 had instigated the financial collapse in May and, before that, popular 
unrest that broke out in “flour riots” in New York and set Philadelphia and other cities on 
edge (Fig. 4.2).79 
 Age-old concerns about forestalling, which had fallen off as a subject of popular 
debate by the mid-1830s, roared back to life—and indeed assumed new meanings and 
scale in the late 1830s and early 1840s. “If the growing cupidity of the times is not 
restrained and checked,” the Sun wrote in August 1837, “proper enactments must be 
looked to as means of protection to the people.” While “Providence fills our stores with 
plenty,” it continued, “speculation and forestalling are made to counteract the benevolent 
purposes of him that sent it.”80 Another article implied the parallel between hucksters 
operating in local marketplaces and “a large number of persons prowling about the 
country, forestalling and purchasing up large quantities of the staff of life, for the purpose 
of monopolizing the market.”81 With spiraling rates of unemployment exacerbating rising 
costs, forestalling was deemed especially egregious for its effects on the poor. In late 
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1838, a Philadelphia newspaper declared: “All speculation in the necessaries of life ought 
to be forbidden, because it enables the evil to fatten upon the necessities of the poor.” It 
called on “housekeepers to buy nothing of forestallers, if they can be supplied 
elsewhere.”82 As the depression eased in the mid 1840s, and the Jacksonian politics that 
had fueled the attacks on monopolies and speculation waned, Americans increasingly 
came to accept middlemen as an integral part of nineteenth-century capitalism. Yet 
hucksters remained figuratively and literally out of place in the urban economy, as 
debates over their use of sidewalks and market stalls show. 
 The sidewalk became a central site of contest over hucksters and their relationship 
to the regulated marketplace. Shopkeepers long had laid claim to the sidewalk as an 
extension of their storefront, pointing to their payment of license fees, property taxes, and 
rent as justification. In numerous entreaties to the corporation, they sought permission “to 
offer to the eye of passengers, articles of merchandize intended for sale” on sidewalks, 
which they claimed was “a custom from time immemorial.”83 In Philadelphia, merchants 
celebrated the 1824 repeal of the odious “six inch law,” which had prevented them from 
extending their displays farther than six inches from the building. With the repeal, they 
could now use the sidewalks “to as great an extent as any of them can desire.” Before the 
ink had dried on the revised ordinance, however, they were calling for a new ordinance 
that would “prevent hucksters from occupying the pavements, to the injury of regular 
traders.”84 Indeed, both hucksters and shopkeepers viewed the sidewalk as an arena of 
commercial activity, whether for advertising wares, loading and unloading shipments of 
goods, or negotiating transactions—to the chagrin of many pedestrians and authorities, 
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who wished to keep streets and sidewalks spaces of mobility and openness.85 
 Shopkeepers took pains to differentiate their claims to the sidewalk from those of 
the hucksters. Like hucksters, shopkeepers benefited greatly from their proximity to 
public markets. Many of the retailers “who reside in the vicinity of the market houses,” 
one petition noted in 1824, “depend principally on the custom of attenders of the market 
for their support.”86 Others relied even more directly on public markets, buying produce 
from market stalls and then reselling it in their stores for profit.  The practice was 
extensive enough for a market clerk to pronounce these shopkeepers “another species of 
huxters that infest our Markets.” Such perceptions further fueled shopkeepers’ desire to 
distinguish their “regular” businesses from the “irregular” hucksters by characterizing the 
latter as a class of rootless and dishonest vagrants. In contrast to the grocers, they wrote, 
peddlers and hucksters had “little, if any interest in the welfare of the city.”87  
 Class shaped the contours of contests over the sidewalks. Representative of a 
growing number of middling urban retailers, renters of a dry goods store across from 
Centre Market objected to “a number of Orange sellers, who fix their stands almost at the 
entrance of our doors … much to the inconvenience of our customers and disadvantage to 
ourselves, by the crowds of boys and other persons who attend them.” They requested an 
ordinance curtailing “the liberty [the orange venders] take in occupying so public a part 
of the Street.”88 Fruit venders typically were among the poorest hucksters. In a gesture of 
paternal benevolence, wealthier retailers often gave them written permission to set up 
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stands in front of their stores, which the venders took in person to the mayor.89 In 1839, 
Julian Brown, “a poor but Industrious worthy woman that has a large family to support,” 
and Mary McCall had letters written on their behalf, the latter’s signed by seven different 
male storeowners. Dry goods merchant Richard Leeke wrote to the mayor giving 
permission to Patrick McCaffrey to sell fruit in front of his store, because he had “no 
other way of making a living but by selling oranges &c. and has a large family.”90  
 Smaller retailers were far less likely to grant permission to fruit hucksters, whom 
they saw as “undersell[ing] the fair dealer whose family depends solely upon an 
honorable industry and his close observation of the laws of the country, for a 
subsistence.”91 Shopkeepers viewed hucksters’ use of the streets as undermining 
competition and restricting consumers’ access to the market. “The blockading [of] the 
sidewalks at the entrances to the different markets,” claimed 91 petitioners in 1846, 
represented a great “inconvenience to the citizens generally.”92 Mary Lebranthwaite, who 
had opened a millinery shop after her husband’s death, joined 29 property and business 
owners in criticizing an 1847 ordinance that empowered Baltimore’s mayor to allow poor 
women to sell homespun wares in the city’s markets without a license, provided their 
stock in trade did not exceed $100. To Lebranthwaite and others, the ordinance “greatly 
injured” those “persons carrying on business in the neighbourhood of the Lexington 
Market and other markets of this City.” Their property had “been almost rendered 
worthless for business purposes because persons will not rent” a stall “and pay a fair 
                                                
89 This was established by ordinance in 1797 and reaffirmed in subsequent ordinances. No. 32 (1797), No. 
94 (1798), No. 12 (1801), No. 15 (1826), No. 24 (1831), No. 2 (1841), No. 31 (1850), Ordinances of 
Baltimore.  
90 Mayor’s Correspondence, 1839:361-365, 1830:997, 999-1001, 1006, 1008-1010, 1032, 1832:437, BCA. 
91 City Council Records, 1831:615, BCA.  
92 City Council Records, 1846:397, BCA.  
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value for it, when they can obtain places for conducting their business in the public 
markets without any such expense.”93  
 A second petition was more calculating in its criticism of the ordinance, invoking 
the language of public and private property and a contractual interpretation of licenses. It 
argued that the unlicensed female hucksters obstructed brick footways, “only about 12 
feet wide.” Between the hucksters (taking up “2 feet”), the stalls they set up (“3 or 4 feet 
wide”), and the “8 or 10 customers” who gather around them (another “2 or 3 feet & 
more”), only a “narrow passage of 2 or 3 feet” remained for pedestrians and their market 
baskets. On top of this, the “stockings, handkerchiefs, suspenders &c.” that hucksters 
hung up on awnings “greatly obstruct[ed] the view of the stores on both sides of them,” 
whose owners “pay high rent for stores near the market for the privelege of selling more 
during market hours.” These women, by “throwing difficulties in the way of the public,” 
were “disturbing the peace.” The petitioner did not ask for the repeal of the ordinance, 
however; instead, he suggested another ordinance be passed requiring the women leave at 
least three feet between their business and the storefronts.94  
 The city’s response to the two petitions reveals the continuing influence of 
paternalism in the regulation of street vending, denying the petitioners’ claims on the 
basis that the ordinance was “a wholesome and humane law, and ought not to be 
repealed.” Rescinding the law, it reasoned, would compel venders, including “multitudes 
of females,” to lease “neighbouring stores and bazaars at an expense which they could 
not endure and which would soon absorb their whole means, or else to abandon their 
                                                
93 No. 26 (1847), Ordinances of Baltimore; City Council Records, 1848:531, BCA.  
94 City Council Records, 1848:532, BCA. Echoing 1820s contests over street vending, the petitioner 




business altogether.” The city council not did wish “to cut off the privileges which the 
charity of a former City Council has extended to” huckster women and thus “drive them 
to utter destitution and the alms house.” Moreover, municipal ordinances were designed 
with a degree of flexibility in mind: “A friendless woman, with a family of starving 
children,” should not have to “pay six dollars a year for leave to retail some eight or ten 
dollars worth of small articles; and any one who should construe those laws differently 
would be unfit to share in the administration of justice.” The city also dismissed the 
competition argument, declaring that the ordinance did not cause “serious injury … to the 
neighbouring storekeepers by the sale in the markets of the trifles in which these persons 
usually deal,” as “the customer can choose whether to purchase at the stall or the store.”95  
 
IV. Huckster capitalism and the rise of green groceries 
 It is tempting to view the 1848 exchange as a rehearsal of earlier debates over 
how to regulate huckstering while promoting it as an alternative to the almshouse. But the 
episode illustrated not continuity but rather dislocation, as urban residents reconsidered 
the place of the public market in the urban economy. By the 1840s, rapid residential 
growth in Baltimore’s outlying neighborhoods outpaced the expansion of the municipal 
market system. Even ardent supporters of the public markets acknowledged they 
struggled to accommodate the demand from shoppers and venders. Demand, however, 
was not evenly distributed across the system. Newer market houses failed to attract 
customers and suppliers, while long-established marketplaces, like Belair and Lexington 
markets, swelled beyond capacity, leading petitioners to complain frequently of the 
“great inconvenience result[ing] from the limited space.” In 1852, one hundred residents 
                                                
95 City Council Records, 1848:724, BCA. 
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west of Poppleton Street bemoaned the fact that the city invested in the enlargement of 
Belair, Cross Street, and Richmond markets, while they still faced the “great 
inconvenience of travelling more than a mile to the Lexington Market.” Nearby Hollins 
Street Market, they intimated, was but a fifty-foot-long shell of a market.96 Despite their 
expansion, Cross Street and Richmond markets remained unpopular and were targeted by 
Mayor Samuel Hinks in 1855 as examples of city property that should be sold. “The 
citizens living adjacent to them will suffer no detriment if they are closed, as the country 
people do not attend them,” Hinks informed the council. “They are used mostly as 
lounging places for idlers, and playgrounds for boys.”97 
 More than consumers, producers and venders felt the strain of the system—some 
because they were unable to secure space in the public markets, others because 
competing hucksters obstructed their doorways and market stalls. William Young and 
seventy-one petitioners in 1845 were hardly alone in asking the city council to show “due 
caution and respect for the convenience” of county farmers, for whom “there [was] not 
room at present” in Belair Market. Other county residents wrote of “great inconviences 
… on account of the hucksters occupying all the chief stands on both sides of the market 
house.” As a result, another petition argued, “we are hurled from pillar to post, scattered 
here and there, and thereby requiring twice the time, it would otherwise occupy, were we 
all centred in a body to make our sales, and for the purchasers to select their supplies, and 
speedily return to their particular avocations.” Hucksters and other itinerant venders 
                                                
96 City Council Records, 1848:537, 1852:456, BCA. 
97 Appendix (Mayor’s Communication), Ordinances of Baltimore, 1855, 8. The city did not sell the two 
markets. The committee to whom Hinks’ report was referred took issue with his suggestion, noting that 
“the city has been to considerable expense in constructing those edifices, and which was for the 
convenience of the neighborhood, and not looking to a source of revenue in a direct manner.” City Council 
Records, 1855:427, BCA. 
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occupying market stalls, it alleged, constituted a “growing evil, which threatens in time to 
exclude us entirely, and place us on the bounds of the market.”98 The city council deemed 
it inexpedient to act, citing an 1838 ordinance that had sufficient provisions to police 
hucksters, if enforced. Despite the council’s directive that police officers and bailiffs 
“give special attention to all hucksters and pedlars,” itinerant traders continued to occupy 
stalls in the public markets, a highly visible indication of the market system’s structural 
limitations.99 
 Butchers unable to secure stalls in the high-traffic market houses took their 
business to the benches outside the markets, selling bacon and other smoked and cooked 
meats. In response, the market’s renters invoked the argument that, as “regular” traders, 
their interests should prevail. Claiming they were “solely influenced by motives of public 
good,” Centre Market butchers remonstrated in 1844 against the “converting the original 
intention of the Market House, in[to] that of so many Cook Shops.” Agreeing it was a 
“great nuisance,” the city prohibited the sale of cooked meats within the marketplace.100 
In 1846, a petition signed by 155 citizens and venders of cooked meats renewed the 
debate. Noting they had “regularly served an apprenticeship to the business of victuallers 
of butchers,” the petitioners contended they were “poor and unable to purchase stalls at 
the exorbitant prices demanded for them.” Moreover, they wrote, “if any among them 
were able and willing to make such a purchase they could not do so at least in some of 
the Markets, for the very obvious reason that the stalls are all occupied by those who 
commenced business years ago.” In response, the city deemed the repeal of the 1844 
                                                
98 City Council Records, 1845:183, 1844:407, 417, 408, 409, BCA. 
99 Resolution No. 90 (1843), Ordinance No. 30 (1838), Ordinances of Baltimore; City Council Records, 
1844:696, BCA.  
100 City Council Records, 1844:414, 410, 693, BCA; No. 26 (1844), Ordinances of Baltimore. 
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ordinance a “manifest injustice to the regular licenced Butchers” and declined to act.101  
 With the possibility of renting a market stall or vending from the pavement 
foreclosed, many meat and vegetable hucksters opened up small shops throughout the 
city, termed green groceries.102 The first sign of an impending sea change in Baltimore’s 
market system came in 1851, when butcher Marcus Wolf and others complained of 
traders who sold fresh meat in private shops. Sympathetic to Wolf, the city council 
agreed “that the practice is calculated to injure Market House property, and the probable 
injury of private property in some situations.” Nevertheless, it had no “remedy for the 
supposed evil, being informed that no restriction can be imposed by the City on persons 
selling under a traders Licence, from selling Fresh Meats in shops or stores, except within 
the limits of the several Markets bounds.”103 Matters had grown dire by 1854, when the 
spread of huckster meat shops undermined attempts to expand Lexington Market. 
Reporting adverse to the extension, the committee on markets pointed to “the declining 
condition of the market accounts” as a result of “the numerous provision stores that have 
been established in almost every square.” It warned that “unless some action be had or 
restriction be placed on said establishments, the markets of our city will be destroyed and 
the revenue thereof lost.” As it was, “butchers are not able to sell enough to pay their 
expenses, and their meat spoils on their hands.”104 To resolve the problem, delegate 
Stirling Thomas, a butcher by trade, proposed a state law granting the city council power 
                                                
101 City Council Records, 1846: 399, 609, 400, BCA. Some licensed butchers supported the itinerant meat 
venders and asked the city council to judge in their favor, but to no avail. 
102 “Green grocery” was an English term for private stores selling fresh meat or vegetables. Few 
descriptions exist, but they were generally small, ephemeral, and located in working-class neighborhoods. 
Junius Henri Browne, The Great Metropolis: A Mirror of New York (Hartford, CT, 1869), 140; North 
American, May 17, 1843. 
103 City Council Records, 1851:645, BCA.  




to restrict the sale of fresh meats to public markets, which was passed in 1856.105 
 The law immediately touched off a debate about free trade, public convenience, 
and the need for economic regulations. Coming out against the law as “an invasion of 
individual rights not guaranteed by the constitution,” the American viewed its passage by 
the city council as unlikely, if for no other reason than the controversy it immediately 
raised.106 The act, the Sun noted, “caused quite a commotion in various sections of the 
city,” pitting green grocers and butchers against one another. Consumers were split. The 
Sun wrote that “a large number of citizens” had called on the city councils not to bar the 
“‘private market houses’ … which are represented to be of great convenience to the 
public who reside at a great distance from the city markets.”107 Thousands of others lent 
their signatures to petitions decrying green grocers. The majority, however, likely shared 
the ambivalence and frustration articulated by a letter published in the American at the 
outset of the controversy. “Both [green grocers and butchers] talk solely for the public 
good,” the author observed, “and the public beginning to believe most that each says 
against the other, begs leave to submit most humbly that it has more at stake in the 
settlement of the question than both these classes put together.” Ultimately, the author 
concluded, “the public hopes that the City Council, unbiased by favor, undeterred by fear, 
will see clearly through the cloud raised to obscure the vision.”108  
 The contest over the green grocery question demonstrated the continuing power 
of petitions in the civic economy but also pointed to the importance of newspapers and 
                                                
105 Ch. 333 (1856), Session Laws of Maryland; Journal of Proceedings of the House of Delegates, 1854: 
556, 561, 1856: 667. 
106 American and Commercial Advertiser, April 14, April 9, 1856. “Justicia” took issue with the 
American’s “invasion” claim, calling it “an unwarrantable attempt to prejudice the question in the minds of 
the members of the Council.” American and Commercial Advertiser, April 15, 1856. 
107 Sun, March 13, 1856. 
108 American and Commercial Advertiser, March 19, 1856. 
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other public forums of debate. Between 1856 and 1860, dozens of petitions circulated for 
and against the green groceries, sent to the city council and state legislature. A March 
1856 memorial signed by at least 1,433 men and women deplored the “selfishness of 
such a movement on the parts of the butchers of Baltimore” and asked that the “honest 
and enterprising” green grocers’ “great public conveniences may be continued, because 
of the accommodations they afford to the neighborhood in which they are established.” 
Organized by ward, the signatures represented a cross-section of society, from John Work 
Garrett (soon-to-be president of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad) and Baltimore Street 
merchants to laborers and German immigrants in outlying neighborhoods.109 Another 
petition, taken up in response to the above memorial, contained 1,250 signatures and 
urged the city council to protect public markets from “disadvantageous competition with 
… a class of hucksters.”110 Printed rather than handwritten, the petitions intended to sway 
the city council less with arguments, which were terse and boilerplate, than with sheer 
amplitude of signatures. Debates of the issues themselves spilled into other arenas. On 
April 16, 1854, for instance, the Murray Institute invited the public to attend an evening 
discussion of the question, “Should the City Council impose the proposed restrictions on 
the Green Grocery Traffick?” Proponents of the butchers and green grocers likewise 
convened large public meetings to discuss the issues and gave speeches to the city 
council.111 
 The most vigorous debates transpired in the columns of the Sun and American and 
                                                
109 City Council Records, 1856:377-382, BCA. The Sun also observed that “the remonstrances and 
opposition to the act appear to be general among all classes of the community.” Sun, March 29, 1856.  
110 City Council Records, 1856:388, 383-387, 389-396, BCA. Because the city council referred back to 
these and other petitions many times in the late 1850s, the petitions moved around a lot and many of them 
likely were misplaced. Thus the number of signatures described above represents only a portion of the total.  
111 Sun, April 16, 1856. 
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cast into sharp relief the shifting contours of civic economy in the late-antebellum city. 
Green grocers built their case on two points, freedom of trade and public convenience. 
Seeing how swiftly lawmakers had dismantled the product inspection system in the late 
1840s and 1850s, green grocers and their supporters recognized that the free trade 
argument carried significant power in the city council and state legislature. “A great bill 
has been passed by the legislature,” “One Who Knows” quipped, “to take from the people 
of Baltimore the right to buy their meat where they please. I hope the next legislature will 
not compel them to buy all their dry goods from a few big dealers on German or 
Baltimore streets.” According to “One Who Knows,” the municipal market system was 
an “odious” form of monopoly that benefited butchers alone and that would not be 
permitted in any other trade.112 In May 1859, “Equal Rights” offered a more staid plea for 
the city council to “not adopt a measure of oppression upon one class for the benefit of 
another.” The next evening, green grocers met to draft resolutions defining the “effort to 
close our establishments” as “a violation of personal rights, prompted by a wealthy class 
of butchers, who, when they get the whole trade into their hands, will show to the people 
that all their demands must be satisfied, however exorbitant.”113  
 While they had support among elite merchants, provision dealers fashioned 
themselves as working-class upstarts seeking to unseat the aristocracy of “gentlemen 
butchers.”114 Indeed, they did little to deny the butchers’ claims that they were hucksters. 
Green grocers like “One Who Knows” readily acknowledged they bought meat from the 
same butchers who criticized them in order to sell it for a profit: “He purchases the best 
                                                
112 Sun, March 22, 1856. The pseudonym also carried the implication that green grocers, as former butchers 
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113 Sun, May 20, May 21, 1859. 
114 Sun, March 19, 1856. In the spirit of competition, the dealers invited butchers to follow through on 
threats to open stores of their own: “We say we welcome all.” 
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Meats only, and from the best butchers—and sells at prices with which the public are 
satisfied.” As for vegetables, they “purchased [them] very early in the public markets 
before they have been exposed for hours to the hot sun.” In denouncing the monopoly of 
butchers, they commiserated with working-class consumers: “How many poor families 
have found on Sunday morning that meats bought on Saturday night in the public markets 
for good were positively stinking?” What distinguished them from itinerant hucksters 
was the fact that they operated from storefronts and paid rent and taxes, thus eluding the 
charge that they were “irregular” dealers not enmeshed in the community.115   
 Like all hucksters, green grocers argued they promoted the convenience of 
laboring households. “Equal Rights” wrote that green grocers purchased “only the best 
parts” of meat in recognition of the fact that to do otherwise “would at once destroy their 
business and drive the people, contrary to their own convenience, to the markets, 
however remotely located.”116 Claiming the mantle of the public good, the 1859 meeting 
of provision dealers argued that “the necessities of the city required the establishment of 
places other than the public markets for the sale of fresh meats and vegetables, for the 
convenience of a large class of the people, especially those residing in the suburban 
wards.” An Annapolis critic of the “green grocery bill” described it as an act “to compel 
poor people to go to the markets, no matter how far the distance, or bad the weather.”117 
Given the importance of gender in the debates over market hours a few years earlier, it is 
noteworthy that none of the green grocers (nor their opponents) explicitly defended the 
convenience of female shoppers. Undoubtedly, many women charged with the labor of 
                                                
115 Sun, March 22, 1856. “Equal Rights” noted that provision stores paid twice the amount for their state-
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117 Sun, May 21, 1859, Feb. 18, 1860. 
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buying for the household found provision shops to be a more efficient use of their time, 
and they may even have patronized one of several women green grocers, such as Sarah 
Binyon and Letitia Naylor in Fells Point, Mary Camper in Old Town, Eliza Duncan near 
Exchange Place, Rosella Evans in Mt. Vernon, and Antonia Young in the western 
neighborhood of Poppleton.118  
 In addition to being located in primarily working-class neighborhoods, such as 
those sprouting up in the southwestern part of the city around Mt. Clare and Camden 
stations, green grocers enabled poorer customers to buy their provisions “piece by piece.” 
This, after all, had been one of the principal benefits of hucksters. Mindful of the 
inadequacy of food storage facilities in working-class homes, “One Who Knows” 
championed the provision dealers’ use of iceboxes to store their meats—“instead of 
hanging in a dusty, hot, public market house, with thousands of flies on it.”119 City 
councilmen in favor of the green groceries argued that the proposed ordinance “was 
detrimental to the masses, and oppressive upon the working man. Let this bill pass [and] 
the day of retribution will come, and it will be a fearful one.” The ominous statement 
reflected city leaders’ growing anxieties about a class divide that, from their point of 
view, was sharpening in the midst of heightened food prices, unemployment, and labor 
unrest in the late 1850s.120 
 In contrast to green grocers, who relied principally on petitioning and public 
meetings, butchers and their supporters heavily used the newspapers to advance their 
                                                
118 There was also at least one African-American green grocer, Jones Burley, whose store was at 158 North 
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119 Sun, March 22, March 25, 1856. 
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 226 
cause. Writing under pseudonyms like “Public Good,” “Public Health,” “The People,” 
and “Justice,” their criticisms of green grocers borrowed directly from the arguments 
long used against hucksters. The most common allegation leveled against the hucksters-
cum-grocers was that they defrauded their customers. Former butchers who had opened 
provision shops like “One Who Knows,” one author claimed, likely “was of an inferior 
sort, or if skillful, either improvident or unreliable in his dealings, else he would not have 
abandoned his regular avocation for another, invariably regarded as an innovation 
unworthy of the craft.” Provision shops were “better adapted to their imperfections and 
their style of ‘serving the public’”—selling the meat of “cattle which would not be 
admitted to the slaughter-yards of respectable butchers” at a premium.121 Others also 
intimated that the green grocers were fallen butchers, unable to compete in the open 
marketplace, pointing to the “great many stalls” that remained unoccupied as proof that it 
was not for lack of space that they had quit the trade.122  
 Far from monopolies that impeded the freedom of trade, “The People” argued, 
public markets were “admirably adapted to the wants of a large class of small traders 
[and] effectually distribut[ing] the advantages of the fresh provision traffick to so large a 
number of individuals.” Green grocers, instead of being the friends of the laboring classes, 
would expand and displace “the hundreds of poor persons who now follow the markets 
with small stocks of market house commodities.”123 Public markets facilitated 
competition and consumer choice. Viewing the market house system as “the best and 
most proper ever devised by man,” an old resident of the city asked: “By those 
commodities being concentrated at one point, does it not follow that the consumer has a 
                                                
121 Sun, March 24, March 26, 1856.  
122 American and Commercial Advertiser, April 30, 1856. 
123 Sun, April 5, 1856.  
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choice for selection as to quality and price not so to be had when scattered over a large 
city?”124 In private provision shops, meanwhile, “ancient meats and withered vegetables 
become, from lack of contrast, quite respectable in quality, and saleable because the 
purchaser has no alternative.”125 By contrast, market houses abounded in alternatives. 
Elevating selection above access, supporters of public markets conceived of consumer 
choice in a fundamentally different way from those of provision shops.  
 A decentralized marketplace affected the ability of not just consumers but also 
health officials to inspect commodities and the spaces in which they were stored and sold. 
Public market supporters boasted that Baltimore had been “a less abundant harvest field 
for death than in any of her sister cities,” attributing the fact to the city’s markets—
“neither too many in number, nor too extensive in space.”126 Another writer took his nom 
de plume, “Yellow Fever,” from the epidemic that had ravaged Norfolk a few months 
earlier, which many attributed to “exhalations and poisonous gasses arising from 
vegetable and animal decomposition.” He averred that “the market house system is 
perhaps the least objectionable on the score of public health of any that could be adopted,” 
because they were airy structures and underwent daily ablutions. Most importantly, the 
market houses were “occupied but a small portion of the time for actual trade, and never 
as places for storing from day to day, meats and vegetables in every stage of decay.”127 
“A Summer Resident” reminded Baltimore’s laboring families that “the wealthy citizen 
[could] remove himself from danger” should the “experiment” with green grocers lead to 
an epidemic of yellow fever or cholera, but most could not. The “thick settled, squallid 
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portions of the town ‘green grocers’ flourish” would suffer most.128 Public market 
supporters played on consumers’ fears of fraud and disease and the sense among many 
late-antebellum urban residents that the retailing of food was fraught with danger. 
 In their newspaper appeals, butchers and their advocates described a grim and 
begrimed landscape that would result from the displacement of public markets from 
urban political economy and the rise of an unregulated huckster capitalism. The spread of 
green grocers would not yield until public markets were entirely vanquished and every 
block “from the lower end of Canton … to Mount Vernon Place, and from thence to 
Franklin Square, and all other rich and poor localities,” contained two or more provision 
shops.129 The “nauseous traffick” would convert the city into “a vast slaughter house,” 
depreciating property values everywhere. No one knew how many provision shops 
operated in the city, but “Justice” offered the dubious estimate of 1,500 to 2,000, more 
than two-thirds of which had opened in the previous six months. City directories 
suggested a number about one-tenth of that, though smaller and ephemeral shops may 
have avoided enumeration. A more official but still imprecise estimate made by city 
police officers put the figure at “several hundred” in May 1859. Like itinerant hucksters, 
green grocers blended into the commercial landscape and proved difficult to 
categorize.130  
 Was all of this—the disease, the fraud, and the assured demise of public markets 
and the revenue they provided to the city and countless businesses—worth the 
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convenience of green grocers, critics asked? Few disagreed that the neighborhood 
provision shops were a convenience, but it was “dearly paid for,” financially and 
otherwise.131 The municipal corporation’s commitment to public health trumped all other 
considerations, particularly those of public convenience, “Yellow Fever” wrote: “There 
are some conveniences, the enjoyment of which every wise citizen should forbear.” “A 
Summer Resident” concluded that “the mere convenience of the citizen should be made 
to yield to the paramount consideration of the health of all and the general enjoyment.”132  
Others wondered whether an emphasis on convenience indicated something about 
consumers themselves. Insisting that there were “market houses sufficient and convenient 
to all parts of the city,” “Justice” recalled a time “when people were not too lazy to walk 
a square or two to the market.” Such reminiscences elided the role that hucksters long had 
performed in the urban economy, one that green grocers were literally building upon.133  
 In the end, city officials, and it appears most Baltimoreans, disagreed with the 
butchers’ separation of the concepts of the public good and convenience. The city council 
returned to the question of green grocers every year between 1856 and 1859, declining 
each time to enact the state act of 1856. Following a final flurry of petitions with several 
thousand more signatures, the second branch of the city council overrode the first branch 
and voted down the proposal law: “We believe said act, if approved, would be very 
oppressive and prejudicial to the interest of a large class of our fellow-citizens.”134 In 
addition to a report from the city counselor that suggested that the courts would overturn 
any such law restricting the sale of meats outside public markets, the board of health 
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questioned the public health arguments leveled against the green groceries: “Such 
establishments are not necessarily injurious to the public health but in the hands of 
careless or dishonest proprietors or salesmen, they become so.”135  
 When the state legislature proposed another bill to prohibit green grocers in early 
1860, the city council acted more resolutely than four years earlier. The first branch voted 
to submit resolutions denouncing the bill to Annapolis: “The public sentiment of the city 
of Baltimore is known to be almost universally opposed to such an arbitrary enactment.” 
Petitions with several thousand more signatures made their way to the state capital. A 
delegation of butchers remained in Annapolis for most of the session, but to no avail. The 
legislature voted overwhelmingly against the bill, and the legitimacy of green grocers 
was confirmed.136 In less than a decade, a few hundred hucksters had transformed 
Baltimore’s commercial landscape. In decentering the public market and confirming the 
power of property to legitimate huckstering, the rise of green groceries further 
marginalized the poorest hucksters who were unable to rent their own stores. Meanwhile, 
the huckster capitalism of green groceries did not retain its radical edge for long; as 
occupants of property, green grocers would join their former antagonists in advancing the 
interests of propertied retailers in the civic economy.  
 
Conclusion: The unbounded marketplace 
 As the city itself evolved into a bazaar, lawmakers endeavored to reassert the 
“limits of the market.” When the city rebuilt Belair Market in 1853, it established a 
temporary market house with a long furrow and granite stones designating its borders. 
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January Session, 1860 (Annapolis, 1860), 113, 170-171, 637, 787 Sun, Feb. 1, March 8, March 10, 1860. 
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The site of the old market house, now empty, became a meeting place for hucksters 
swapping information about prices, commodities, farmers, and clerks. In setting up an 
independent marketplace, hucksters may have viewed themselves as continuing a 
tradition that dated back in America to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, when 
venders, farmers, and buyers convened in “tavern yards” and alongside country roads 
before the arrival of permanent market houses.  
 After one huckster fell into a hole during market hours and injured himself, he 
brought a suit against the city for negligence. The city register contended that, as the lot 
was a construction site, the hucksters had “no business there,” because it “was not an 
authorized market place.” He concluded with an assertion that, while simple at first 
glance, harbored a complex set of meanings: “When the old house was taken down, it 
ceased to be a market place.”137 The claim seemed especially anachronistic in light of the 
transformations occurring in the city’s market geography by the mid-1850s, on display in 
the march of green groceries across the landscape. To believe the register’s statement 
required having a much narrower definition of “a market place” than most late-
antebellum urban residents and, as will be seen in the final chapter, most authorities, as 
well. 
                                                
137 Mayor et. al. v. Brannan (1853), 14 Md. 227. No. 16 and Resolution 246 (1853), Ordinances of 
Baltimore. 
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Fig. 4.1. John Lewis Krimmel, Pepper-Pot: A Scene in the Philadelphia Market, ca. 1811. 
A portrait of the casual intermixing, by race, gender, age, and class, that characterized 
public markets and huckstering, in particular. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Artstor. 
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Fig. 4.2. Edward W. Clay, “The Times,” ca. 1837. A scathing critique of capitalism and 
politics in Jacksonian America, and a vision of the civic economy flipped on its ear: 
peaches and flour are for sale at exorbitant prices, the licensed pawnbroker preys upon 




Chapter Five: A Modern Civic Circulatory System 
 
 On March 3, 1851, an “immense mass” gathered on Baltimore Street to welcome 
Centre Market’s rebirth as the Maryland Institute Hall. Surrounded by Mayor J. Hanson 
T. Jerome, city councilmen, and dozens of dignitaries, the Institute’s founder, John H. B. 
Latrobe, laid the cornerstone for the hulking, arcaded structure that housed market stalls, 
two clock towers, offices, a lending library, and classrooms for the use of “Manufacturers, 
Artizans, and all persons friendly to the Mechanic Arts.” Its fully enclosed design would 
allow buyers and sellers to transact free from inclement weather as well as enable the 
market master to seal off the stalls during non-market hours. It also contained one of the 
largest lecture halls in the East, comfortably accommodating 6,000, and would host the 
Democratic national convention in 1852 and the Whig conventions in 1852 and 1856. 
The new market hall confirmed Baltimore Street’s status as the preeminent commercial 
thoroughfare in addition to promoting the city’s stature in national political culture. A 
local composer marked the occasion by selling sheet music for his new score, “Maryland 
Institute Schottisch” (Fig. 5.1).1 
 The Maryland Institute’s aesthetic and civic influence spread beyond the 
immediate neighborhood. Its Italianate façade inaugurated an architectural movement in 
the city that lasted to the end of the century.2 The building took its ambitious design from 
Boston’s granite-clad Faneuil Hall Market, which had initiated a move towards expensive, 
multi-use market halls when it was finished in 1826. Despite the range of new utilities, its 
                                                
1 Sun, March 3, 1851, May 14, 1851; Charter, Constitution, and By-Laws of the Maryland Institute for the 
Promotion of the Mechanic Arts (Baltimore, 1852), 5.  
2 Mary Ellen Hayward and Frank R. Shivers, Jr., eds., The Architecture of Baltimore: An Illustrated History 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 135-137. 
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designers intended it to remain the city’s premier marketplace. In addition to paying the 
costs of construction, the Institute promised the city that the enclosed edifice would “not 
diminish the market room or interfere in any way with the shambles, will beautify that 
section of the city, render the market house more comfortable to those who occupy the 
stalls, as well as those who visit the same at inclement seasons.” Baltimoreans of various 
quarters immediately hailed the “Institute Market,” as it came to be known, as “an 
indispensable agent of the public convenience.”3 
 With a dual emphasis on intellectual uplift and commodious spaces, the Institute 
Market represented an effort to bring the public market in line with emerging liberal 
visions of the city. There had been similar attempts in Philadelphia, most notably the 
failed William Penn Market in the late 1830s, which was to be equipped with a reading 
library and a museum for fossils found by farmers. The enclosed design of both market 
houses, along with their ornate façades, had a sanitary as well as moral objective. 
Separating the market from the street aimed to improve both spaces: animal and 
vegetable matter would not leach out of the market, while unruliness and commotion 
would not seep in from the streets. The Institute Market would “beautify that section of 
the city,” while the William Penn Market sought to redeem its neighborhood by 
“remov[ing] and scattering” a block of “miserable buildings … inhabited by a wretched 
population.”4 Organized around a series of quads rather than long rows of stalls, the new 
market houses would also facilitate policing by creating vantages where authorities could 
                                                
3 City Council Records, 1850:422, BCA; Sun, July 14, 1852; No. 43 (1850), Ordinances of Baltimore; 
Tangires, Public Markets, 40-42. The city considered a similar proposal in 1853 for the Baltimore 
Institution for Mental, Moral and Social Improvement to construct a “spacious hall” on the second floor of 
Hanover Market, but the bill was tabled. City Council Records, 1853:880, BCA. 




survey the entire scene at once. Finally, by incorporating new amenities, widening 
walkways, and offering a cleaner shopping experience, the enclosed market halls catered 
to consumers who had more exacting definitions of convenience than previous 
generations of marketers.   
 As shown in the previous chapter, the opening of the Institute Market coincided 
with the inception of green groceries and private food retailing in Baltimore. While the 
two developments appear to run contrary to one another, they in fact represented two 
sides of the same coin: the anchoring of liberalism in the urban built environment. It has 
been seen already how regulation, particularly in the case of licensing, reinforced the 
notion of contract at the heart of nineteenth-century liberalism. Returning to the public 
market and the streets surrounding it, this chapter examines another element of 
antebellum liberal discourse, freedom of movement. An 1844 editorial, “The Sanctity of 
Private Right,” captured this element. It began with the cumbersome observation that 
Americans suffered “not in too much government, but in too much in the wrong way, and 
too little in the right way.” Cities especially “suffered.” Drawing attention to inspection 
laws and public markets, the editorialist argued that attempts to regulate the market did 
more harm than good; they were “remnants of barbarous ages, when a primary object of 
governors was revenue, and their principal means extortion.” Let anyone “open a market 
house any where,” and “provisions will be abundant and as good, and cheaper.”5 
 Yet there was an exception in the editorialist’s argument for hands-off 
governance: the public highway. It was the responsibility of government to prevent 
merchants from leaving bales of cotton on the sidewalk, householders from dumping out 
                                                
5 Public Ledger, May 9, 1844. On inspection laws, the author wrote: “If flour is bought by the buyer’s 
judgment, and not the inspector’s brand, millers will be quite as cautious in grinding, and buyers more 
careful in selecting.” 
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their washing water into the street, and any other individuals from hindering the free 
passage of pedestrians.6 In the 1840s and 1850s, city leaders increasingly agreed that 
circulation was the principal aim of urban governance. They set in motion the dramatic 
but irregular expansion of infrastructure and services, taking “risky stances against 
tradition, inertia, and the municipal budget.”7 The liberal city was borne of an extension 
of what one scholar has termed “infrastructural power,” or “the capacity of the state 
actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions 
throughout the realm.” Similarly, Patrick Joyce writes that the liberal city involved the 
“material embedding of power.”8 Missing from the expansion of municipal services and 
infrastructure, however, was the public market. Over the same two decades, the future of 
the public market—as an economic hub if not a symbolic one—became more and more 
uncertain in Baltimore and Philadelphia. There were many reasons for this, but this 
chapter investigates one in particular. While the people long had treated the public market 
as an extension of the street, liberalism entailed a separation of these two spaces. In the 
liberal city, the public market was antithetical, even adversarial, to the project of making 
streets a space of free circulation.    
 
I. Governing scale: people, information, and services 
                                                
6 Public Ledger, May 9, 1844. 
7 Eric Monkkonen, America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities & Towns, 1780-1980 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 93. 
8 Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” in States in 
History, ed. John A. Hall (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 113; Patrick Joyce, The Rule of Freedom: Liberalism 
and the Modern City (London: Verso, 2003), 184. By focusing on the liberal construction of urban space, it 
is possible to view the rise of liberalism as something other than a foreordained conclusion. As James 
Vernon has noted, British political history has tended not only to follow the development of the liberal state, 
but made its ascension seem so inevitable that it became the only narrative, a critique that could be leveled 
against many studies of American liberal development, as well. James Vernon, Politics and the People: A 
Study in English Political Culture, c. 1815-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Vernon, 
ed., Re-Reading the Constitution: New Narratives in the Political History of England’s Long Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
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 In his annual mayor’s address to Philadelphia’s city council in 1858, Democrat 
Richard Vaux characterized “the government of a large City” as a complex machine 
composed of many parts that did not always operate “in harmonious action.” His 105-
page address—itself a testament to the intricacy of the municipal mechanism—aimed to 
parry criticism from Whigs who decried the mayor’s lack of financial austerity during the 
Panic of 1857. Vaux argued that the complexity of urban governance justified the 
corporation’s rapidly accumulating expenses. His address pointed repeatedly to the 
challenges attending the 1854 act of consolidation, which added over 300,000 residents 
and 127 square miles from outlying districts to the two-square-mile corporation of 
Philadelphia. Centralizing administration was one of the biggest complications, 
epitomized (in Vaux’s mind) by the irregularity of reports from the numerous 
departments: “These reports are now difficult to find—made at different periods, not 
collected in a volume, and thus rendered of comparatively little use.” Officials 
complained regularly of the “utterly obsolete” and “dissimilar” ordinances that had been 
carried over from the numerous districts, despite the efforts of the Municipal Department 
to regularize the law.9  
 More than a matter of bureaucratic modernization, however, consolidation forced 
                                                
9 Appendix No. 79 (Mayor’s Message), Journal of the Common Council of Philadelphia, 1857-1858 
(Philadelphia, 1858), 475, 479, 573 (hereafter JCCP). Historians have debated the forces behind 
consolidation, emphasizing alternately the upsurge in popular violence and need for police reform, 
commercial and civic rivalry with New York, contests over fiscal authority between state and local 
government, and the rise of machine politics. See Sam Bass Warner, The Private City: Philadelphia in 
Three Periods of Its Growth (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968); Andrew D. Heath, 
“‘The Manifest Destiny of Philadelphia’: Imperialism, Republicanism, and the Remaking of a City and Its 
People, 1837-1877” (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2008); Michael P. McCarthy, “The 
Philadelphia Consolidation of 1854: A Reappraisal,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 110, 
no. 4 (Oct. 1986): 531-548; Howard Gillette, “The Emergence of the Modern Metropolis: Philadelphia in 
the Age of Its Consolidation,” in The Divided Metropolis: Social and Spatial Dimensions of Philadelphia, 
1800-1975, eds. William W. Cutler, III, and Gillette (Wesport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 3-25; Russel 
F. Weigley, “‘A Peaceful City’: Public Order in Philadelphia from Consolidation through the Civil War,” 
in The Peoples of Philadelphia: A History of Ethnic Groups and Lower-Class Life, 1740-1940, eds. Allen F. 
Davis and Mark H. Haller (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973), 155-173. 
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Philadelphia’s leaders to confront—or rather identify—a problem of scale. As scholars 
have demonstrated, urban authorities throughout the country pointed to the challenges of 
urban growth in justifying the reform and expansion of municipal government by the 
1840s and 1850s. In addition to Philadelphia, which witnessed its population triple from 
1800 to 1853 (41,220 to roughly 125,000), Baltimore’s population increased nine times 
over in the same period (26,514 to about 190,000) as the city expanded to twelve and a 
half square miles. Urban growth was also qualitative, with the population and built 
environment both increasingly diverse.10 In the eyes of authorities, managing the 
movement of people and goods through the metropolis mandated new technologies of 
regulation. Concerns about scale focused on three questions: how to facilitate the orderly 
circulation of people through the streets, how to ensure the universal and uniform 
application of the law, and how to promote access to a widening range (and geographic 
scope) of municipal services.  
 To antebellum observers, the streetscape served as a barometer of the city’s 
vitality as well as the capability of its authorities to create order from that vitality. 
Nowhere was this truer than in Philadelphia, where the geometric arrangement (a 
rectangular grid) and aesthetic features of the streets were a source of civic identification 
and William Penn’s legacy. The street grid, Dell Upton argues, served as the primary 
instrument of an “intellectual program” that sought “to subdue the environment, creating 
a landscape that would embody republican values and that would promote republican 
modes of citizenship and selfhood.” In this “republican spatial imagination,” the well-
choreographed movement of pedestrians, commodities, and vehicles attested to the city’s 
                                                
10 Joseph L. Arnold, “Suburban Growth and Municipal Annexation in Baltimore, 1745-1918,” Maryland 
Historical Magazine 73, no. 2 (June 1978): 110-117; Carole Shammas, “The Space Problem in Early 
United States Cities,” William & Mary Quarterly 3rd ser., vol. 57, no. 3 (Jul. 2000): 505-542. 
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commercial and social progress. Yet this spatial-social order was tenuous and in need of 
constant supervision and maintenance: the formation of obstructions, bottlenecks, dead-
end streets, and darkened alleys facilitated the miasmic spread of vice and immorality.11 
More pressing was the fact that disordered streets halted the traffic of commerce and 
threatened to choke off the city’s economic development. Indeed, as seen in the case of 
inspection, the increased swiftness of intercity, interregional, and international trade only 
highlighted the lack of speed and ease with which people and goods circulated through 
the antebellum city.12 
 Particularly troublesome were the increasing numbers of vehicles and animals that 
clogged city streets. Authorities attempted with mixed success to regulate parked private 
vehicles through the license system, but it was the issue of animals—and in particular 
cattle—that was most problematic.13 Urban residents long had inveighed against cattle 
markets “before their Doors.” Petitioners in 1817 decried “the filth occasioned by [cows] 
standing nearly all day,” the noise, and especially the obstructions. In 1832, occupants of 
Concord and Hawk streets requested the city council to alleviate “a very great nuisance” 
that resulted from the belief among cattle drivers that “this place is set apart for a cow 
market by the City Authorities.” Twice a week, when “large droves of cattle” were driven 
into the streets and “exposed for sale,” women and children were forced to “pass in those 
streets unprotected, to and from the markets.” Because it was not a sanctioned cattle 
market, there was no clerk to whom residents could complain. An 1845 petition reiterated 
                                                
11 Dell Upton, Another City: Urban Life and Urban Spaces in the New American Republic (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2008), 137. 
12 Allan Pred, Urban Growth and City-Systems in the United States, 1840-1860 (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1980). 
13 For an extensive opinion of the city counselor in relation to the municipal corporation’s power to regulate 
parked vehicles as nuisances (in which he declares they can be classified as such in certain circumstances, 
citing a recent English case), see City Council Records, 1839:847, BCA. 
 
 241 
many of these objections, noting that between eight o’clock and noon “the streets and 
side walks are almost entirely obstructed,” with women “having to take refuge in some of 
the adjoining houses, and on several occasions … individuals [were] knocked down and 
gored.” The 75 signatories claimed it was not only a “great inconvenience” but also a 
“direct violation of their rights as citizens and property holders.” Fayette Street residents 
were exasperated in 1852 of the “great public nuisance” that had led to some of their 
carriages being “broken before their own premises.” The city council expressed sympathy 
in virtually all cases, but it deferred action “in view of the commons of the city and the 
rights of other citizens” to the use of the streets.14 
 Urban growth also exacerbated the municipal corporation’s ongoing struggle to 
circulate timely, complete, and accurate information to the public and between 
government agencies. One historian has characterized intracity communication as 
“chaotic” in the early nineteenth-century: “Even sending a simple message across New 
York City could take longer than communicating with another city.”15 The consequences 
of this for regulation were myriad and predictable. Few residents had immediate access to 
the annually printed compendium of ordinances, which was published in small runs of no 
more than a few hundred.16 The time and concentration required in combing through the 
swelling tomes—multivolume by the 1850s—likewise acted as a barrier to general access 
to the law, as did uneven rates of literacy. Digests were specialized publications for the 
use of city and state lawmakers, for lawyers and judges to reference, and for mayors to 
                                                
14 City Council Records, 1817:242, 1832:389, 1845:224, 1852:363, 1850:791, BCA. 
15 Monkkonen, America Becomes Urban, 109. See also Seymour J. Mandelbaum, Boss Tweed’s New York 
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965), 7-26. 
16 Public Ledger, May 13, 1840. Philadelphia’s common council authorized the sale of 300 copies (at $3 
per copy) in 1841, presenting nearby districts and towns, major out-of-state cities, and local societies and 
libraries with free copies. North American, Nov. 26, 1841. 
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exchange with one another as tokens of respect and instruction. It seems that most agents 
of the law, such as market clerks, inspectors, and watchmen, did not receive copies of the 
digest, shared one, or acquired abridged versions.17 Frequent complaints of city councils 
about insufficient enforcement may be attributed in part to inadequate means of 
communicating the regulatory minutiae. While certain ordinances were printed separately 
and posted throughout the city, as was the case with market ordinances, they competed 
with a flood of printed bills and advertisements for space and readers’ attention.18 
Elisions in public knowledge of the law only hastened the proliferation of competing and 
situational interpretations of city ordinances.19 
 Newspapers provided a readymade solution to the problem of disseminating 
knowledge of the law. Printers had the technology, audience, and motivation to assist city 
lawmakers. From the late eighteenth century onwards, Baltimore and Philadelphia’s 
major newspapers negotiated contracts with the cities to print ordinances. Reporters and 
editors viewed themselves as quasi-appendages of the state. In 1848, four reporters from 
the Sun, American, and Clipper asked to have the city council’s clerks place copies of all 
memoranda on their desks, so they could provide “a correct report of the proceedings of 
the Council (a result important both to the public and the members individually).”20 
During legislative sessions, newspapers printed a steady stream of newly enacted 
                                                
17 “The object of these rules,” an 1855 policeman’s manual began, “is to explain the officers their powers, 
obligations and duties, and to remove the wretched excuse of ignorance as an extenuation for official 
misconduct.” Police Manual: Being Rules and Regulations for the Organization and Government of the 
Consolidated Police of the City of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1855), 5.  
18 David M. Henkin, City Reading: Written Words and Public Spaces in Antebellum New York (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998), 69-100. 
19 For a classic study of the malleability of popular and official constructions of the law in the antebellum 
city, see Hendrik Hartog, “Pigs and Positivism,” Wisconsin Law Review (July/August 1985): 899-935. 
20 City Council Records, 1848:540, BCA. See also Patricia Cline Cohen, The Murder of Helen Jewett (New 
York: Vintage, 1998), 24-28; Isabelle Lehuu, Carnival on the Page: Popular Print Media in Antebellum 
America (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Charles G. Steffen, “Newspapers for 
Free: The Economies of Newspaper Circulation in the Early Republic,” Journal of the Early Republic 23, 
no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 381-419. 
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ordinances alongside minutes of the proceedings, committee and mayor’s reports, and 
other memoranda. Judging from petitions, many urban residents first learned about legal 
developments in the newspapers. The fact that residents could read about petitions within 
a day or two of their being submitted certainly facilitated the signing of counterpetitions 
before the legislative session ended. Officials also placed notices in newspapers to draw 
citizens’ attention to market stall sales, sheriffs’ auctions, meetings, and nominations.21 
 The importance of newspapers for vernacular knowledge of the law was evident 
for Baltimore’s burgeoning German-American population. In 1839, a group petitioned 
the city council to publish a German-language digest of ordinances, arguing that “the 
Germans very often transgress the laws solely because they do not know them,” with 
“unacquaintedness … the cause of four fifths of all transgressions.” More vitally, their 
inability to read and know the law “prevented [them] from fulfilling a duty so sacred to 
Freemen … the duty to see that the Fellow citizens observe the laws.” The city did not act 
on the petitioners’ request.22 In 1850, residents again decried the fact that the roughly 
25,000 German-Americans in the city were “tax payers of considerable amount” but “a 
great part of which number remain in total ignorance of the city laws, because they do not 
read the English language, or can only afford to keep a German newspaper.” The city 
agreed to permit the Daily German Correspondent to print ordinances and notices, 
dubiously boasting that “at last popular prejudice has been overcome & liberality taken 
                                                
21 City Council Records, 1827:487, 1835:685, 1843:317, 1848:500, 1850:355, BCA. By contrast, when city 
officials cited specific proceedings or ordinances, they referred to the published digest. Mayor’s 
Correspondence, 1826:372, BCA. 
22 City Council Records, 1839:649, BCA. The petitioners concluded with a series of provocative questions: 
“Is it not strange that the Germans are bound to obey laws which they do not know and which they cannot 
understand? Is it not equally strange that the Germans, having to pay the same taxes as others, should have 
no sight of the accounts rendered by our officers only to their English speaking constituents? Are we not in 
a country of equal rights? Your slaves are even made acquainted with your laws, for that they per chance 




the lead.”23  
 Nevertheless, the frequency with which ordinances were revised may have inured 
rather than sensitized urban readers to regulatory changes. Such was the belief of a 
growing number of critics fond of claiming that the world was “governed too much.” As 
an 1846 letter to the Baltimore American put it, the annual meeting of state legislatures 
produced “useless legislation” at heavy cost and subjected “the public mind [to] agitation 
and turmoil.” The author proposed biennial sessions to reduce “over-legislation,” a 
suggestion the state legislature adopted a year later.24 The regulatory landscape was even 
more cluttered at the local level. There, the Sun noted in 1847, “it is a difficult matter to 
find out sometimes what is and what is not a law,” even for councilmen and 
magistrates.25 Consolidation further complicated matters in Philadelphia, where 
lawmakers were forced to wade through the ordinances of each of the consolidated 
districts’ pre-1854 ordinances and generate a uniform set of laws. They had yet to 
complete this task in 1858, when the city’s market house commissioner complained that 
“the market houses are all governed by the ordinances of the old districts previous to 
consolidation” such that “no two are alike.” With an increased emphasis on uniformity in 
late-antebellum legal culture, over-legislation and nonoperational laws were not just 
inconvenient but spoke to deeper problems of authority.26  
 The decentralized nature of legal administration and communication also 
                                                
23 City Council Records, 1850:355, 1849:891, BCA. 
24 American, Oct. 3, 1846. 
25 Sun, March 17, 1847. 
26 Appendix No. 79, JCCP, 1857-58: 534. As Laura Edwards shows, legal reformers in the 1840s and 
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highlighted the equally ad hoc qualities of the antebellum municipal police system. It has 
been established already that, prior to professionalization in the late 1850s, the police 
forces of Philadelphia and Baltimore were diminutive, spread thin, and (according to 
many observers) lacked training and oversight. The problem of geography was 
particularly pronounced, as the experiences of Joseph Watson, mayor of Philadelphia 
from 1824 to 1828, indicate. As head of the police and criminal court, Watson 
aggressively cultivated networks of informants to stem the flow of counterfeit currency, 
stolen goods, and kidnapped African Americans through and beyond the city. Officials in 
towns across the country wrote to him, asking him to examine his “Black list” and pass 
along any information that would “be of assistance in detecting rogues.”27 His reputation 
for having an “invincible hatred of crime” led many citizens and officials to bring 
evidence to him rather than to local sheriffs or judges.28 Yet his efforts to cobble together 
a piecemeal system of surveillance faced a number of challenges, not least of which was 
the fact that his information was time-sensitive, verging on obsolete by the time it 
reached the right set of hands. The most poignant examples of this came when Watson 
endeavored to locate several African American children who had been kidnapped from 
Philadelphia and sold into slavery in Alabama.29  
 In spite of Watson’s efforts, municipal police struggled to keep pace with the 
                                                
27 Nathaniel Lightner to Watson, July 2, 1825, Joseph Watson Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania 
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increasingly expansive networks of illicit commerce that crisscrossed the mid-Atlantic. 
More sparsely settled districts like Penn Township and Germantown, northwest of the 
city, harbored much of this activity. In the late 1820s, residents met to petition Watson 
for better policing. They directed Watson’s attention to the activities of felons recently 
released from prison who would “sally out into the surrounding country in search of 
plunder . . . [succeeding] with very little risk of detection in consequence of the lonely 
and scattered situations of the inhabitants, cut off as they are by the intervening districts 
from the active interference of the police of the City.” Limited transportation options and 
poor roads contributed to their isolation, but the residents viewed the problem as systemic. 
Decrying the “present loose system of police regulation, and want of concentrated 
information, to carry their good intentions into effect,” they looked to the day when “a 
permanent prompt energetick system of police should be established in the different 
incorporated districts around the City, taking the city as a nucleus, or centre.” This would 
eventually become a potent argument for consolidation in the 1840s and 1850s.30 
Vigilantism (such as anti-horse theft associations) filled the vacuum of law enforcement 
in Philadelphia’s hinterlands, serving only to attenuate the networks of surveillance and 
information that Watson attempted to establish.31 
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relationship between vigilantism and the formation of organized police in nineteenth-century America, see 
Philip J. Ethington, “Vigilantes and the Police: The Creation of a Professional Police Bureaucracy in San 
Francisco, 1847-1900,” Journal of Social History 21, no. 2 (Winter 1987): 197-227. 
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 Policing was one of many municipal services that relied on voluntary, semi-
private, and piecemeal efforts to combat the enlarged scale of the urban built environment. 
Others included firefighting, street paving and cleaning, and water and gasworks. These 
services stood in contrast to Philadelphia’s centripetal market system, which was 
designed and regulated to encourage the best, and most, food products to enter into the 
consumer economy through a centrally located marketplace, High Street Market. As a 
means of orchestrating the streams of food that coursed through the antebellum city, the 
market system was as much about managing competition and ensuring revenue as it was 
about protecting consumers. So long as most residential growth hugged the waterfront, 
consumers had the option of attending High Street Market for the freshest and cheapest 
food. Particularly in Baltimore, which evolved into a city with two central markets 
(Centre and Lexington), lawmakers took great care to ensure public markets throughout 
the city did not directly compete for customers and suppliers. Laws carefully stipulated 
the days and times during which individual markets would be open, and officials were 
averse to any changes in the market schedule for fear of unintended consequences. 
Similarly, city leaders were circumspect in identifying and authorizing new locations for 
markets. As a result, public markets typically emerged well after a neighborhood had 
become populous.  
 The centripetal market system proved difficult to scale up, however, in the face of 
dramatic urbanization and commercialization. Despite the erection of six new public 
markets in Philadelphia and surrounding districts between 1833 and 1851, residential 
development was rapidly outpacing the system’s reach (Fig. 5.2).32 After 1840, especially, 
                                                
32 The markets were built in Spring Garden Street in 1833, Eleventh Street and Shippen Street in 1835, 
Girard Avenue in 1847, Franklin Avenue in 1848, and York Street and Lehigh Avenue in 1851. 
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geographic and demographic growth put increasing pressure on the system as well as the 
structures themselves, which began to require more frequent and expensive renovation. 
Not just the pace but also the character of this growth unbalanced the antebellum market 
order. Capitalist development fueled the city’s sorting into increasingly discrete 
residential, commercial, and manufacturing districts.33 By the 1850s, the immediate 
neighborhood of High Street Market had become the hub of a capital-intensive wholesale 
trade that distributed foodstuffs across thousands of miles rather than a few city blocks.  
 As the residential landscape became decentralized, many Philadelphians 
demanded the municipal market system evolve to reflect this spatial reorientation. While 
expanding suburbs required better access to fresh provisions, they argued, the older, 
increasingly mercantile and industrial areas of the city had little use for retail 
marketplaces like High Street Market. “Business yearly drives hundreds of our citizens 
further away from High street, to seek a quiet place of residence nearer the suburbs,” one 
observer noted in 1853. “In proportion, of course, the means of attending this market 
become yearly more difficult and inconvenient.”34 Another writer concluded that High 
Street Market served only a minority of the community, was “no longer conveniently 
accessible to the mass of housekeepers” in the city, and was especially “of no use 
whatever to the citizens who reside at the remote points of our widely extended 
                                                
33 Proponents of a system of smaller local market houses saw Philadelphia’s sorting into commercial and 
residential districts as an organic process, driven by capitalism and the inexorable logic of improvement. As 
historian Diane Shaw has observed, however, “space does not sort itself out; people do the sorting.” Diane 
Shaw, City Building on the Eastern Frontier: Sorting the New Nineteenth-Century City (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 9. An older but still important analaysis of urban sorting is Sam Bass 
Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1962), esp. 15-21, in which Warner introduces the concept of “the walking city.” 
34 North American, Oct. 13, 1853.  
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metropolis.”35 With citizens receiving, and in turn expecting, a wider range of municipal 
services, inconvenient access to public markets became more objectionable. 
 Amidst debates over the future of High Street Market in 1853, “An Old 
Subscriber” wondered why southern districts like Moyamensing forced “their citizens to 
ride down to Market street to obtain their supplies” instead of building their own. At one 
hundred feet wide, Eleventh Street could (and indeed was designed to) accommodate a 
line of market sheds just as easily as High Street. But only one market house had been 
built, between Shippen and Fitzwater, eighteen years earlier. The lack of market houses 
dampened not only demand for market stalls but also the growth of the district as a whole. 
If the district commissioners extended the line of market houses the full length of the 
widened portion of Eleventh Street, “Old Subscriber” opined, “the market would build up 
the neighborhood, and the neighborhood sustain the market.”36 In 1841, another writer 
acknowledged similar limitations to the city’s westward development, calling for a 
market house near the Schuylkill River at Pine Street. Not only would it prove a boon 
“for the convenience of the present, as well as all future generations,” he wrote, but it 
also would induce “owners of vacant lots in the vicinity to further improve [them] by 
erecting commodious buildings, which would readily find occupants.” Over a decade 
would pass, however, before a market house was erected in southwestern Philadelphia.37 
 Moyamensing was among several largely working-class neighborhoods that felt 
the pinch of a centripetal market system. At a distance of a mile or more from High Street 
                                                
35 North American, Jan. 11, 1853. “It must be obvious to every one,” it continued, “that the present location 
of the market houses is not centre to the population.” 
36 North American, Jan. 8, 1853. 
37 North American, July 20, 1841. The city passed an ordinance in 1848 to erect a market house near the 
location proposed in 1841, but resistance from property owners in the area and budget constraints curtailed 
the project in 1849. Appendix No. 56, JCCP, 1847-48: 223-224; JCCP, 1848-49: 69, 71. 
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Market, many laboring households faced the deleterious choice of devoting a critical 
resource, time, to walk to market on a workday (since markets were closed on Sunday) or 
relying on hucksters and small provision stores closer to home. While social and political 
elites long had been flummoxed by the continued patronage of hucksters, blaming it on 
the ruinous spending habits of the poor, the city council acknowledged that responsibility 
ultimately fell to the municipal market system, which forced working-class consumers to 
rely on small-scale provision outlets “at an additional cost.” Leaving the business of 
provisions in the hands of a few shopkeepers or dealers, the Public Ledger asserted, 
would only “encourage the system of forestalling, which already operates severely upon 
the public by greatly enhancing prices.”38 As the working-class districts spread out, the 
option of attending High Street Market became increasingly unworkable. Omnibuses and 
street railways were slow to draw working-class passengers before 1850, a result in part 
of intense resistance to the laying of rail lines in working-class streets.39 Nevertheless, the 
appeal of homeownership among laborers and aggressive real estate speculation by land 
companies in the 1850s further drew working-class Philadelphians into suburban areas 
beyond the reach of older, more central market houses.40 
                                                
38 Appendix No. 114, JCCP, 1852-53: 285; Public Ledger, May 20, 1852. Left unstated in these and other 
calls for neighborhood markets was the belief that ensuring ample and cheap food for working-class 
consumers was essential for diffusing class tensions and urban disorder, or as one 1853 article about food 
prices argued: “The longer the period of commercial prostration, the more active are the elements of evil. 
Day by day, the criminal class is augmented, and day after day stereotypes in bolder relief every phase and 
characteristic of the moral evil which is at work.” “On Variations in the Price of Food as They Affect the 
Ratio of Crime at Given Periods,” Pennsylvania Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy (Jan. 
1853): 33. 
39 Joel Schwartz, “‘To Every Mans Door’: Railroads and the Use of the Streets in Jacksonian Philadelphia,” 
Pennsylvania Magazine of the History and Biography 128, no. 1 (Jan. 2004): 35-61; Michael Feldberg, 
“Urbanization as a Cause of Violence: Philadelphia as a Test Case,” in Davis and Haller, Peoples of 
Philadelphia, 58-61. For Jacksonian-era resistance to street tracks in Baltimore, see David Schley, “Tracks 
in the Streets: Railroads, Infrastructure, and Urban Space in Baltimore, 1828-1840,” Journal of Urban 
History 39, no. 6 (2013): 1062-1084. 
40 Andrew David Heath, “‘Every Man His Own Landlord’: Working-Class Suburban Speculation and the 
Antebellum Republican City,” Journal of Urban History 38, no. 6 (Nov. 2012): 1003-1020; “New Market 
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 For city leaders, the apparent failure of the centripetal market system to circulate 
food through the “widely extended metropolis” was manifested in the diminishing returns 
on their expensive investments. As municipal governments increased their public services 
in the 1840s and 1850s, financial considerations loomed larger in the minds of those who 
administered the city’s market systems.41 In Philadelphia, an insufficient number of 
market stalls forced hundreds of farmers, butchers, and other venders to sell from wagons 
in city streets, yielding the city only license fees. Rental income from the city’s market 
system was stagnant. In 1840, market stall rents contributed $32,819 to the city treasury, 
excluding the costs of maintenance and salaries. In 1853, the final year before 
consolidation, annual rental income had risen only to $36,470; by contrast, the committee 
on city property that year disbursed over $111,000 on its facilities.42 Those numbers 
conveyed only part of the story. Compared to Boston’s Quincy Market and New York’s 
Washington and Fulton markets, an 1853 city council committee reported, High Street 
Market was a woefully uneconomical structure. Despite its reputation for “the great 
variety and superiority of the different commodities exposed for sale,” Philadelphia 
netted only 53 cents per square foot, a dollar less than Boston and 30 cents less than New 
                                                                                                                                            
Houses,” North American, Dec. 1, 1858. Inconvenient market accommodations bore most heavily on 
working-class Philadelphians, due to unequal access to public transportation as well as the fact that 
household refrigeration was limited to urban residents with money and room to spare. On the geographic 
spread of working-class neighborhoods in Baltimore, see Mary Ellen Hayward, Baltimore’s Alley Houses: 
Homes for Working People Since the 1780s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008), 63-144. 
41 J. H. Hollander, The Financial History of Baltimore (Baltimore, 1899), 171-172, 296-297; Edward P. 
Allinson and Bois Penrose, Philadelphia, 1681-1887: A History of Municipal Development (Philadelphia, 
1887), 231-254; Leonard P. Curry, The Corporate City: The American City as a Political Entity, 1800-1850 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997), 33-85.  
42 Appendix No. 19, JCCP, 1840-41: 76-77; Appendix No. 30, JCCP, 1853-54: 153-165, 120. The city 
council’s growing restlessness about the lack of market revenue can also be seen in the greater specificity 
with which market clerks were made to report rents. In 1840, rent was reported in the annual digest 
(referenced by city officials) as a single sum; by 1845, it was broken down by different types of stalls 
(butchers’ stalls, fish stalls, etc.). By 1848, each renter was listed along with his or her rent. Consolidation 
added several more market houses to the municipal roster, but it did not provide a panacea for market 
revenue, which lingered below $70,000 in 1855.  
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York. “It is apparent,” the committee concluded, “that our Corporation does not receive a 
fair equivalent for the accommodations granted.”43  
 By identifying and calling attention to certain problematics of scale, city leaders 
justified the reformation of urban governance in the 1840s and 1850s. Victorian London 
provided the clearest articulation of this principle. For urban reformers, Lynda Nead 
demonstrates, “London could no longer be treated as a series of disconnected, separate 
parts; it had to be governed as a whole.” London’s geographic and demographic 
expansion in the first half of the nineteenth century was “not robustly corpulent but 
unhealthily swollen; its main arteries [were] coated and becoming choked and it risks an 
urban cardiac arrest.”44 Although London stood at the forefront of mid-nineteenth-
century efforts to reshape metropolitan space, the language of “improvement” (and its 
corollary, “modernity”) pervaded urban discourse on both sides of the Atlantic. A strain 
of anti-urbanism ran through many late-antebellum experiments to refashion urban space, 
most notably in parks and residential enclaves. Yet rus in urbe was not the only response 
to clogged urban arteries.45 Rather, attempts to reform of urban space and municipal 
government coalesced around a singular concern with the circulation of people, goods, 
                                                
43 Appendix No. 114, JCCP, 1852-53: 286-289. 
44 Lynda Nead, Victorian Babylon: People, Streets and Images in Nineteenth-Century London (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 17, 16. As Miles Ogborn’s work shows, the mid-nineteenth-century 
urban “crisis” of circulation (and its resolution) was but another in an urban genealogy that dated to the 
late-seventeenth century and London’s Great Fire of 1666. That William Penn’s plan for Philadelphia took 
its cues from successes and failures of London’s post-1666 reformation is a reminder that ideas about 
metropolitan improvements were subject to constant circulation and reassessment throughout the wider 
Atlantic world. Miles Ogborn, Spaces of Modernity: London’s Geographies 1680-1780 (New York: 
Guilford, 1998), 75-115. See also Laurel Flinn, “Social and Spatial Politics in the Construction of Regent 
Street,” Journal of Social History 46, no. 2 (Winter 2012): 364-390. 
45 For works that consider anti-urbanism within the context of mid- to late-nineteenth-century century urban 
reforms, see especially David Schuyler, The New Urban Landscape: The Redefinition of City Form in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Daniel Bluestone, 
Constructing Chicago (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991); Mona Domash, Invented Cities: The 






II. Transforming the civic circulatory system 
 May 1844 heralded a new era of circulation in Baltimore. On May 24th, Samuel F. 
B. Morse unveiled his electromagnetic telegraph to national leaders in Washington. 
Morse’s first missive, “What hath God wrought,” was conveyed over forty miles through 
a series of overhead wires to his associate in Baltimore. Telegraphy stirred the 
imagination of contemporaries and historians alike, ushering in a new era of mass 
communication that collapsed geographic and temporal barriers.46 As host to the dramatic 
event, Baltimore and its leaders had particular reasons to dream on the telegraph’s 
potential for revolutionizing the transmission of information of all forms—commercial, 
social, and governmental. The same month (May 1st, the day Morse first tested his 
telegraph) also witnessed the introduction of omnibuses to Baltimore’s streets. 
Newspapers praised the horse-drawn cars as “indispensable to the convenience of our 
citizens.” Tracing paths already cut by freight railroads through the urban landscape, 
mass transit enabled the more rapid settling of neighborhoods at a distance from 
Baltimore’s waterfront, where most settlement had clung for more than a century. “Free 
to all white persons for the trifling stipend of six cents,” recalled one resident decades 
later, the omnibus “mitigated, if not obviated … the inconvenience of this wide extent of 
territory.” Within three years, dozens of omnibuses ran along three routes in the city, with 
                                                
46 On Morse and the range of public responses to the telegraph, see Richard R. John, Network Nation: 
Inventing American Telecommunications (New York: Belknap, 2010), 24-64. A copy of the first telegraph 
tape was provided to the city council; Mayor’s Correspondence, 1844:309, BCA. For a recent example of 
the continuing symbolic force of the telegraph’s introduction in America, see Daniel Walker Howe, What 




more on the way.47 
 Telegraphy and mass transit were part of a larger civic project to remake urban 
space in the image of liberal society, emphasizing individualism and freedom of 
movement—ideas that were encapsulated in the term, “convenience.” After outlining the 
problematics of scale and circulation described above, commercial and political leaders 
sought to transform urban infrastructure in the 1840s and 1850s. As a pair of scholars has 
put it recently, at issue was how to make capitalism, predicated on the rapid circulation of 
people and goods, “the foundation of public order and stable government.”48 The 
insertion of new technologies like telegraphy and mass transit into the existing landscape, 
along with a renewed emphasis on more prosaic elements of governance like the grading, 
paving, renaming, and clearance of streets, served to make capitalist growth a source or 
order rather than disorder. Materializing the liberal order—anchoring urban governance 
in the built environment—mandated the expansion of a range of municipal services that 
promoted more orderly and rapid circulation, including street lighting, waterworks, police 
and health departments, and market houses. The process of “making liberalism durable” 
entailed the expansion of municipal government in other ways, as well, such as the 
regulation of privately established services like telegraphy and mass transit and the 
widening scope of nuisance laws.49   
 Perhaps the most basic requirement of the modern civic circulatory system was 
                                                
47 Sun, May 1, 1844; Henry Stockbridge, Sr., “Baltimore in 1846,” Maryland Historical Magazine 4 
(1911): 24; City Council Records, 1847:483, BCA. 
48 Michael Zakim and Gary J. Kornblith, “An American Revolutionary Tradition,” in Capitalism Takes 
Command: The Social Transformation of Nineteenth Century America, eds. Zakim and Kornblith (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012), 1. 
49 Chris Otter, “Making liberalism durable: vision and civility in the late Victorian city,” Social History 27, 
no. 1 (Jan. 2002): 1-15. Otter offers a useful definition of the “self-governing liberal subject” as “master of 
the baser instincts and passions, a creature of thrift, energy, perseverance and, critically, reflexive 
evaluation of its own civility” (2). 
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legibility. A number of scholars have explored the significance of the growth of gas 
lighting in the nineteenth-century city, but it was only one of several aspects of making 
urban space easier to navigate and regulate at all times of day.50 Street naming and 
numbering were another facet. To illuminate the dangers of an unmanageable streetscape, 
an 1836 editorial described a fictional southwestern merchant doing business in 
Philadelphia. Upon arrival, he would encounter “streets of almost interminable length … 
lumbered and obstructed with bales and boxes, and stores and shops filled to overflowing 
with every thing that can be bought and sold.” Yet the merchant would soon become 
disenchanted with the disorderly abundance, “for over all the city, without distinction of 
street or alley, are all things scattered.” He would “not cheerfully consent to run the 
gauntlet among wharves, stores and shops, without guide or direction,” boarding a 
steamboat to New York and instructing his fellow southwestern merchants to do the 
same.51 While the piece addressed the city’s opaque commercial geography, it also 
alluded to more deeply entrenched misunderstandings of the built environment.  
 To the chagrin of authorities, visitors, and many residents, the antebellum city 
was comprised of a tangle of streets that at times verged on indecipherable. Not only 
were new public ways opened at a frenetic pace as the city expanded and filled out, but 
private streets and courts also abounded. More problematically, individual streets could 
acquire several names over time, with the official designation all but ignored in practice. 
While some dual designations—like Philadelphia’s High Street, which was unofficially 
                                                
50 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, Disenchanted Night: The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Peter Baldwin, In the Watches of the Night: Life in the 
Nocturnal City, 1820-1930 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 
51 Public Ledger, April 22, 1836. Bemoaning how Philadelphia merchants “shrink from exposing their 
names in a newspaper,” the editorial exhorted businesses to advertise (in the Ledger) so visiting merchants 
would not have to go on “a voyage of discovery among stores and shops.” 
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known as Market Street—were widely known, many others were not. City leaders 
attempted to clarify the streetscape by having indexes painted at intersections. But this 
endeavor often fell victim to oversights, lack of upkeep, and vandalism, as Baltimore 
lawmakers were informed in 1846: “There are many streets without any Index, as also 
many new streets, lanes and alleys, which are built upon in all directions, which never 
had any names put up, also many of which have had the names changed.” Rather than 
mitigate the confusion, privately undertaken solutions like maps and city guides 
contributed to the babel of place names by virtue of their variety.52  
 To make the metropolis a more dynamic and better-regulated system of pedestrian 
and commercial traffic, local variations needed to be minimized. Indeed, advocates of 
Philadelphia’s consolidation used the issue of street nomenclature to argue for municipal 
reform in the years leading up to the 1854 act. “For want of conformity among the many 
powers into which the imaginary lines of corporate authority have divided this noble and 
flourishing city,” the Public Ledger opined in late 1853, “our main avenues extending 
continuously three or four miles in length [were] called by several distinct and separate 
names, according as they are approached, from the north, south, or in the middle.” It 
celebrated the city council’s plan to change the names of streets west of Broad so that the 
numbers would run consecutively to the Schuylkill—“an arrangement which public 
convenience demands”—but lamented how “every attempted municipal improvement … 
is checked and prostrated” due to a lack of a central authority. A year later, the North 
American exhorted the consolidated city councils to rectify the “defective nomenclature 
                                                
52 City Council Records, 1846:428, BCA. David Henkin has identified a broader trend of antipathy or 
indifference towards “official” signage in antebellum New York. Henkin, City Reading, 39-68. 
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of our city highways.”53 Another four years passed before lawmakers addressed the issue 
of duplicate street names, enacting an ordinance that retitled some 900 streets and 
directed the commissioner of highways to replace the obsolete street signs.54  
 More widespread and incommodious was the incoherent system of numbering 
houses. From street to street and block to block, there was no uniformity in how house 
numbers were assigned or displayed in Baltimore and Philadelphia prior to the late 1850s. 
Annual city directories included rough (and frequently revised) guidelines for how each 
street was numbered, but they were only schematic; the same number could be found on 
the front of two or three houses in the same block. This posed problems for commercial 
traffic as well as regulation. Not only did it hinder the delivery of letters, calling cards, 
telegraphs, periodicals, bills, and consumer purchases, but it also contravened the “new 
postal cartography” that sought to integrate the entire nation into “a single postal zone.”55 
In 1840, Baltimore’s city council deemed it unwise to burden residents with new taxes to 
fix the “irregular manner in which houses are numbered.”56 It was “very annoying,” a 
Philadelphian sighed in 1856, “to find your letters going to the residence of a neighbor, 
whose house is similarly numbered as your own, and to find his bills for groceries, shoes 
and dry goods presented at your door.” Confusion did not facilitate consumption.57  
 Other observers deemed haphazard house numbering to be an indication of the 
erosion of municipal authority. Admitting the prevailing belief among property owners 
was “that a man may place upon his house any number he sees fit,” one editorialist 
                                                
53 Public Ledger, Nov. 30, 1853; North American, Nov. 21, 1854. 
54 Ch. 173 (Sept. 1, 1858), Ordinances of Philadelphia. 
55 David M. Henkin, The Postal Age: The Emergence of Modern Communications in Nineteenth-Century 
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 38-39; Richard R. Johns, Spreading the News: The 
American Postal System from Franklin to Morse (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
56 In 1844, a petitioner complained that “the same numbers are upon different houses and stores … in 
several of our principle Streets of Business.” City Council Records, 1840:611, 1844:354, BCA. 
57 Public Ledger, June 16, 1856. 
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argued “it is no more his property than the name of the street, or the curbstone in front of 
his dwelling, or the sidewalk, which he is obliged to pave at his own expense.” Although 
“the number [had] a public relation, and none other,” however, the city council had 
heretofore failed to exert authority over the system. Worse, the “bungling and most 
vexatious arrangement, or rather derangement of numbers” threatened public order and 
safety by thwarting the swift deployment of policemen and firefighters.58 As with street 
naming, consolidation hastened reform. When Philadelphia lawmakers passed an 1856 
ordinance “to effect uniformity in numbering houses,” the police department enforced 
compliance. The commissioner of highways provided every resident their house’s 
number and gave them 60 days to have it “painted, carved or cast … in a conspicuous 
place [and] in a permanent and durable manner.” The “Philadelphia plan”—each block 
assigned 100 numbers, one side even-numbered and the other odd-numbered—quickly 
spread to other cities, including Baltimore in 1859. There contractors offered property 
owners to have their numbers “done in bold white lettering to make them stand out” for 
the cost of twelve cents.59 
 While private enterprise was instrumental in forging new systems of circulation in 
the antebellum city, it did so within preexisting limits of public authority—though it also 
served to stretch and reshape those limits. As one scholar has shown, Baltimore officials 
sought to weave the railroad into the urban fabric in a way that “did not violate 
established patterns of movement within the city,” requiring railcars travel no faster than 
“a walking pace” of three miles per hour in 1831.60 The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad was 
                                                
58 North American, Dec. 26, 1853; Public Ledger, June 16, 1856. 
59 Ch. 141 (Sept. 16, 1856), Ordinances of Philadelphia; City Council Records, 1859:217, BCA. 
60 Schley, “Tracks in the Streets,” 1068. Schley goes on elsewhere to demonstrate the loosening of 
restrictions on the railroad as it morphed (in perception and reality) from a public utility to a more 
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not the first corporation that forced municipal authorities to confront the challenge of 
integrating public and private systems of circulation. As early as the 1790s, 
Philadelphians debated the relative merits of public and private construction and 
ownership of an urban waterworks, a contest over the meaning of the public good that 
would evolve over the nineteenth century. While its effects on the urban landscape would 
not fully register until later in the nineteenth century, the introduction of the nation’s first 
gasworks in Baltimore in 1816 also prompted a redefinition of the civic circulatory 
system—first by enabling more widespread street lighting, then through the laying of 
pipes.61 By the time telegraphy and omnibuses emerged in the mid-1840s, urban residents 
were accustomed to assimilating new patterns of movement within their everyday lives. 
 While they were hailed as paramount public conveniences, neither the omnibus 
nor the telegraph seamlessly incorporated into the regulated built environment. Indeed, 
the telegraph may have exploded the physical barriers of communication, but it did not 
transcend the physical limits of the streetscape. When Morse received permission to erect 
poles to suspend telegraph wires, he was directed not to “obstruct the street or pavement 
more than a common lamp post.” Telegraph companies frequently replaced poles that had 
been knocked down or rotted, sometimes leaving the stumps. Property owners may have 
appreciated the general benefits of telegraphy but, like those who lived in West Lombard 
Street, viewed them as a “great injury” to their property when placed in their street. An 
1849 resolution allowing the North American Telegraph Company to erect poles required 
                                                                                                                                            
fundamentally private enterprise between the 1820s and 1870s. David H. Schley, “Making the Capitalist 
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them to do so in a “substantial” and “neatly painted” manner in streets no less than forty 
feet wide.62 Authorities and property owners viewed telegraph lines in the same light as 
awnings, steps, cellars, and other private intrusions into the sidewalk—nuisances unless 
strictly regulated by municipal authority.63 
 Limitations on telegraph lines loosened by the 1850s—not because of their 
commercial benefits but rather their potential for policing. As noted earlier, information 
circulated slowly and unevenly through the city, hindering efforts to police the illicit 
movement of people and goods. Leaders quickly recognized that telegraphy could effect 
the integration of systems of official communication. In return for allowing private 
companies erect telegraph lines through public ways, the municipal corporation 
demanded free use of the system. After a decade of haphazard use, Philadelphia 
established a dedicated office for a police and fire alarm telegraph in March 1856. Mayor 
Vaux exalted in 1858: “At the Central Station, night and day, are qualified operators to 
communicate at a moment’s notice any information or orders to the sixteen police 
stations, that comprise the jurisdiction.” In 1857, over 34,000 messages were sent through 
the system to report missing children, fires, riots, and other events. Telegraphy, as much 
as any reform, transformed urban policing in late-antebellum America. It facilitated the 
centralization of administration, which was vital to the management of municipal police 
and fire forces that grew dramatically with professionalization in the late 1850s.64  
 The integration of mass transit into the civic circulatory system was more 
                                                
62 City Council Records, 1845:755, 1853:866, 1848:528, BCA; Resolution No. 53 (1849), Ordinances of 
Baltimore. 
63 See for instance Mayor Jacob Davies’ explanation for returning a proposed 1846 ordinance to the city 
council, which would have given shopkeepers more power to place awnings at their own discretion: “It 
would do a great injury to the City generally and be the cause of great complaint as a nuisance if in general 
use in our greatest thoroughfares.” City Council Records, 1846:460, BCA. 
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problematic. For many, omnibuses posed a physical and symbolic threat to public order. 
Taking advantage of modest license fees, a dozen or more omnibus companies competed 
for customers in the late 1840s and early 1850s. This encouraged many drivers to make 
frequent “improper and dangerous” maneuvers to pass other drivers and scoop up waiting 
passengers. When a route that would run past Fells Point Market was proposed in 1846, 
petitioners feared the “danger to which both Buyers and Sellers would be Exposed.” 
Satisfied with omnibus proprietors’ promises to start their vehicles “at a reasonable time 
apart which is regulated by time keepers at each end of the route,” the city authorized the 
new line.65 Yet for several years there was no all-embracing law to police omnibus 
drivers (who were classed with all other carriage drivers) or lay out an organized system 
of omnibus lines. As a result, petitioners lamented in 1847, drivers were more careful 
when the city council was in session but resumed their improprieties when the session 
ended. Lack of direction meant that omnibus lines over-served some neighborhoods and 
bypassed others.66 
 Baltimoreans and Philadelphians debated how to resolve the redundancies and 
dangers of the omnibus lines. Pointing to the example of New York, where omnibus rates 
were not fixed and “rivalry” served to reduce “the rate of fare very materially,” the North 
American argued in 1845 that “private enterprise with free competition” was the only 
way to ensure omnibuses and other systems of transit “work neatly and safely.”67 When 
Baltimore’s city council proposed raising the omnibus license, in part to expel the 
dodgiest companies, proprietors protested. The law should be employed, they argued, 
“not to increase their tax, but rather encourage them to remain in our city to which they 
                                                
65 City Council Records, 1847:483, 1846:345, 604, 1847:464, 740, 749, BCA. 
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are both an ornament and a benefit.” Another petition noted that “the distinction has 
always been to tax as lightly upon necessaries and as heavily upon luxuries as the 
revenue standard would permit; hence the tax has always been lighter upon the waggon, 
the cart and the dray, than upon the gig, the carriage or the hack.” Since “a man whose 
time is worth any thing cannot afford to walk (in the pursuit of his business) even one 
half the length of our route,” the omnibus was a “necessary” rather than a “luxury.” 
Agreeing “that such vehicles are now indispensible to the public convenience” and still 
“but an experiment,” the city council kept the license at its low level. Similar omnibus 
license debates would recur often during the 1850s, reflecting the encroachment of 
liberalism in the civic economy, the erosion of licensing, and increased deference to 
private companies.68  
 Still, the concept of public convenience was also used to argue for stricter 
omnibus laws. In 1852, the Public Ledger noted that the “procession” of omnibuses and 
other carts, often eight or ten long, required pedestrians to wait “an unnecessary length of 
time for an opportunity to pass on their business.” It called for police officers to be 
stationed at the busiest corners to direct traffic and prevent omnibuses from turning 
corners too fast and knocking down pedestrians, an “inconvenience [that] is growing 
greater every day.” Without “some regulation … it will soon be impossible for women 
and children to cross the streets at all.” A reader agreed: “The increased amount of travel 
in our streets renders some regulations desirable.”69 While the North American advocated 
for “free competition” in 1845, by 1853, with throngs of omnibuses clogging Chestnut 
Street, it called for the city to restrict the number of licenses granted: “Our streets are, and 
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must of necessity be, under the control of the municipal authorities, who are expected to 
keep them safe, comfortable, and free for the passage to and fro of citizens.”70 With the 
long-term viability of omnibuses more or less assured by the 1850s, support for increased 
regulation grew.  
 Nevertheless, the emergence of a modern civic circulatory system raised new 
questions about street access and the boundaries of the public. Owners of mass transit and 
communications systems defended their use of sidewalks and streets as justified not 
simply because they offered convenience but rather they democratized convenience. The 
North American was not alone in claiming the omnibus “reminds men of their equality,” 
men who were “anxious to play their parts on the theatre of the world in their respective 
spheres, which are very various.”71 Yet for women and African Americans, use of the 
streets remained an inequitable and insecure proposition. Women took advantage of 
omnibuses and street railways to exercise greater independence, but navigating “the 
cartography of gender” that evolved alongside systems of transit was exhausting and 
unpredictable.72 For persons of color, the emergence of mass transit spatially reinscribed 
social and economic inequalities. Excluded from Philadelphia’s street railway cars, black 
Philadelphians, along with a number of eminent white advocates, petitioned for access. 
After a failed newspaper appeal in 1859 and court case in 1861, 360 Philadelphians 
signed an 1862 petition that began by stressing that “the Colored Citizens of Philadelphia 
suffer very serious inconvenience and hardship daily” from their exclusion. Indeed, 
convenience proved a powerful argument for streetcar desegregation, which was secured 
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 Contests over access to burgeoning urban transportation systems pointed to a 
central feature of urban growth in the second half of the nineteenth century. As the built 
landscape grew and residential neighborhoods emerged farther from the urban core, the 
expansion of municipal services produced a highly asymmetrical system of circulation. 
Historian Martin Melosi has illustrated this in his study of urban sanitation, noting that 
the “outward growth of cities … exposed inequalities in the delivery of services through a 
citywide system.”74 The modern civic circulatory system of the liberal city did not just 
expose inequalities; it produced, hardened, and rationalized them. With the shift in 
municipal energies from regulation to service—and from an emphasis on public good to 
public convenience—there arose new opportunities for distinctions of class, race, and 
gender to be reified in the urban landscape. Battles over the shape and regulation of 
public markets in the 1850s provide a powerful illustration of this shift. 
 
III. Another kind of market 
 In late 1853, on the eve of consolidation, Philadelphia’s city council looked to 
combine innovations in market architecture with a sweeping overhaul of the municipal 
market system. Its plan directly addressed the late-antebellum problematics of scale and 
circulation. Following a steady stream of petitions by residents for more convenient 
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market accommodations, the council called for “local or sectional” market houses that 
would anchor the rapid residential development occurring in each of the city’s quadrants. 
The four new markets were to be “built in the most substantial manner, and of a general 
character superior to any thing of the kind in the United States,” influenced by European 
market hall architecture and of similar capacity as Baltimore’s new Institute Market. In 
turn, the city would remove the market shambles from High Street. The butchers, 
Pennsylvania and Jersey farmers, fruit venders, and oyster dealers who rented the 746 
stalls in Market Street would relocate to sectional markets, each containing 300 stalls. 
Not only did this plan improve market services in residential neighborhoods increasingly 
distant from High Street Market, but it also served the general public convenience, 
proponents believed, by eliminating the 170-year-old market sheds that obstructed the 
free traffic of pedestrians, vehicles, and commerce in general. In a separate ordinance a 
few weeks later, the city council decreed that the official designation of High Street was 
no more. Thus the plan to remove the street’s market sheds coincided with its rebranding 
as Market Street.75 
 At the same time it integrated the public market within the emerging liberal city, 
the 1853 plan promoted the view that food remained an appropriate, indeed vital, 
municipal service. Not all urban residents agreed with this view. Free trade critiques of 
economic regulations had already unraveled the municipal inspection system, and there 
was growing support for the total privatization of the food trade. In a city with as 
ambitious a commercial reach as Philadelphia, many urban boosters viewed regulations 
such as the size of baskets in which vegetables were to be sold as niggling and tedious 
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legal exercises at best and, at worst, dangerous infringements on personal liberties.76 
American critics pointed to London and Paris, where municipal market systems were 
crumbling and private market halls and groceries were proliferating in the 1840s and 
1850s, as the future of the urban food economy.77 
 Nevertheless, many antebellum Americans continued to see the public market as 
an essential bulwark against deception and disease. In one of the most vigorous defenses 
of market regulations, an editorialist in the Public Ledger re-posed the question, “Is the 
World Governed Too Much?” Writing in 1852, the author lauded the supposedly 
“barbarous” market regulations that protected consumers from dishonesty, monopoly, 
unsafe food, and the “fraudulent spirit” of free trade. Caveat emptor “supposes that every 
buyer is a chemist, and has a laboratory, and has leisure … to analyze every quart of milk 
or every pound of ready roasted coffee.” Poorer customers especially benefited from 
market regulations to restrain dealers from selling them “poisoned” cows and “measly 
pork” in their “recklessness … in pursuit of dollars.” Indeed, “an article can scarcely be 
found unadultered, where adulteration can be practiced without immediate detection.”78 
Frequent reports of adulterated and poisoned foods and periodic public health crises like 
the 1849 cholera and 1855 yellow fever epidemics further validated market ordinances 
that protected consumers from tainted meat and produce. They also furnished evidence 
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for supporters of public markets, who argued that the food trade was intrinsically 
dangerous and needed to be contained within well-policed spaces set off from residential 
neighborhoods.79 
 Bread, a bellwether of shifting attitudes towards market regulations, remained a 
subject of municipal and popular attention well into the 1850s, despite resistance from 
bakers. Spurred by several petitions complaining that “the size of bread has been reduced 
below any former standard,” Philadelphia’s city council directed market clerks to visit 
and report on city bakeries in July 1847. Upon inspecting the shops of 63 bakers, they 
found that “great irregularity and inequality has prevailed in the sale as well as in the 
weight of bread” due to the 1797 state law having “fallen altogether into disuse.”80 The 
attempt to impose the half-century-old assize faltered, however, and a decade later 
consumers again called for the city council to pass an ordinance for the sale of bread by 
weight. Amidst the Panic of 1857 and a surge in food prices, the North American asked: 
“Shall the bakers rule?” The Press admitted that the very mention of the term “assize” 
would raise “the cry ‘of needless interference with private business,’” but charged that 
“the police can seize bad food, and it is a pity of dear food be outside their limits.” 
Despite widespread support for the measure, the city determined it had “no power to 
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exact any ordinance regulating the sale of bread.”81 
 The 1853 sectional market plan was borne of much firmer municipal self-
confidence. Not pausing to consider the irony in removing the market sheds from Market 
Street, the city immediately moved to purchase lots suggested by property owners in each 
of the quadrants. At the end of January 1854, the city council approved $1 million in debt 
to fund the project, which critics shortly would allege was an unwarranted expenditure by 
the corporation in its last days before consolidation. Eager to act quickly, councilmen 
eyed two financially distressed market houses that real estate speculator John Rice had 
opened at the southeastern corner of Broad and Race Streets in late spring 1853. His 
market houses incorporated the newest features of market architecture, including a 
railroad depot, and would provide the inspiration for the numerous market houses that 
would be constructed in the city later in the decade. On February 2, 1854, hours before 
the Consolidation Act was passed, the municipal corporation announced contracts for 
four new lots and the Broad and Race Street markets at a total of $650,000.82  
 For as swiftly as the sectional market plan was initiated, however, the project 
failed just as spectacularly—the city built none of the four markets, and the Broad Street 
Market struggled mightily to fill its stalls. By 1856, with Broad Street Market losing an 
estimated $8,000 annually, the city considered converting the “noble and capacious 
edifices” into public schools.83 The early-morning contracts of February 2, 1854, came to 
be viewed as embodying the shortsightedness and corruption of the old corporation. The 
“Rice Job,” as the last-minute scheme came to be called, cost several city councilmen in 
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the upcoming election and momentarily tarnished the reputation of the new corporation. 
It did not deter Rice, however, from building several more market halls, hotels, and other 
costly (and dubious) monuments to the spirit of late-antebellum urban speculation. 
Moreover, the affair did not curb Philadelphians’ appetite for new, larger, and elegant 
market houses in “the good example set by Mr. Rice.”84  
 Nevertheless, the “long, low, mean, ill-constructed and open sheds” remained 
entrenched in Market Street, an anomalous sight in a streetscape dominated by new five- 
and six-story buildings (Fig. 5.3).85 Proponents of the sectional market plan and critics of 
High Street Market, two largely (but not completely) overlapping groups, argued that the 
continued presence of the “ancient” marketplace and their obstinate occupants thwarted 
the plan. In addition to the 746 market renters, and the thousand or more men and women 
to whom they sublet their stalls for most of the week (at a profit), officials reckoned that 
5,000 market wagons occupied city streets, vending rent-free. The curbstone stands had 
been appropriated for the use of farmers, but observers estimated only one in ten came 
from the country. The rest stored their wagons in tavern yards and alleys nearby, 
dragging them by hand every morning back to the sidewalks.86 The occupants of these 
stalls and wagons, the North American opined, “might certainly be displaced without any 
inconvenience to the community.”87 High Street Market’s defenders disagreed. In an 
1858 letter to the Public Ledger, “William Penn” estimated that 50,000 to 70,000 
Philadelphians continued to “depend on Market street alone for their daily food,” in 
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addition to thousands of others who earned a living from their access to the marketplace. 
An otherwise sympathetic observer, New York butcher Thomas De Voe, was more 
cynical in his appraisal of the curbstone dealers’ place in the urban consumer economy: 
“These squatters supply a poorer class of people, and sell the poorest and stalest of every 
thing.”88  
 Curbstone clearance had been tried elsewhere in Philadelphia, with successful 
results. In 1845, city leaders were determined to expunge the traces of rural production 
that had seeped out of the market houses in South Second Street. Long one of the main 
conduits of the farm-to-city trade, the street’s rusticity came to be seen as a drag on the 
commercial prospects of the city. Twice a week, farmers, wagons, and livestock 
descended on the marketplace, giving Second Street the impression of a malapropic 
country fair. Contributing to the spatial confusion were the curbstone dealers, whose 
wagons lined the street for several blocks. Curbstone advocates argued that the wagons 
drew crowds to the street and, ultimately, into the shops lining the street. The “anti-
wagon party” viewed “the crowd, confusion, noise and dust” of the street market as “a 
perfect nuisance” that drove “good customers away from the shops.” Compelled by 
property owners and shopkeepers, the council passed an ordinance in 1845 that 
prohibited the selling of any articles other than country produce from street stalls.89 Its 
effects were immediate, the North American wrote: “This portion of our city proper has 
been for some years been almost a sealed book to our citizens … a Herculaneum buried 
beneath the market carts, vegetable stalls, and shinners’ stands.” With the obstructions 
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removed and the street “dug out,” ladies and gentlemen could “lounge through” the street, 
which could “truly be called an Arcade or Bazaar, for fancy cannot desire nor necessity 
require an article, which may not be found there.” The market house remained in South 
Second Street, but the street surrounding it was elevated to a promenade.90 
 Over the course of the 1850s, supporters of High Street Market’s removal 
successfully portrayed the market sheds and curbstone dealers as antediluvian obstacles 
to progress, socially and commercially marginal, and great inconveniences to the public. 
Despite the renovation of the market houses in the 1830s, observers continued to 
emphasize the ancientness of High Street Market. The North American noted that the 
Aztec capital of Tenochtitlan had been arranged around a single, central marketplace 
when Spanish conquistadors arrived in the sixteenth century: “Is it expected that we here 
in Philadelphia, in the last half of the nineteenth century, prefer a similar condition of 
things?” Dismissing public markets as the detritus of early stages of civilization’s 
development, the writer declared that High Street’s market sheds “would be splendid 
institutions for the Sandwich Islands, or Santa Fe, or some such place, where society is 
organized on a different basis.” The implication of these comparisons was that the men 
and women who clung to the old market order also might be better off in such societies.91 
 To their critics, the market sheds and their itinerant occupants literally blocked the 
way of progress, preventing Market Street from achieving its historical destiny. What that 
destiny entailed—an elegant shoppers’ promenade, a modern space of freight or 
passenger rail transit, or a combination of the two—was another question. Nevertheless, 
all opponents of the market sheds agreed that Market Street was to be made a space of 
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free and smooth circulation, human or mechanical. Proponents of removal laid claim to 
William Penn’s vision for Market Street, arguing that the city’s founder had never 
intended for the sheds to be a permanent fixture. In its 1853 report, the city council 
lamented “an erroneous impression which many of our citizens entertain” that Penn 
designed Market Street to be a marketplace.92 Others described High Street Market and 
its curbstone occupants as physically and symbolically out of place in a modern 
metropolis. Market Street was the city’s historical axis, a 100-foot-wide boulevard that 
exuded grace and gravitas, and an emblem of civic identity in a city that took the 
“geometric precision” of its streets very seriously. Yet its symbolic power was thwarted, 
as one critic poeticized: “The wide, capacious street, which might / Of ev’ry man the 
boast be made / Is given up to hucksters’ stalls / The popped corn and the peanut trade.”93 
The clearance of Market Street’s “monstrous obstructions,” the North American declared, 
would be “an improvement which is destined to reflect more lustre on the city than 
anything else in its history during the last decade.”94  
 In Market Street, the idea of progress became inextricably linked to the freedom 
of movement. Critics wondered why the convenience of a few hundred marginal traders 
should take precedence over the needs and desires of the general public: “The argument 
of public convenience or necessity cannot be invoked in their favor where, as in the case 
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of the markets in Market street, the majority of the people, both in numbers and interest, 
are infinitely more incommoded by their presence than they are served and benefited.”95 
Another author mocked those whose “sole business in life seems to be to interfere with 
other people’s progress.” The “anti-reformers” were “incredulous of any improvement” 
and deaf “to the cry of public convenience and the demands of trade.”96 What was 
convenient for previous generations of Philadelphians was no longer so for a modern 
lifestyle predicated on the rapid circulation of people, commodities, and capital.  
 Merchants took pains to align their personal convenience with the modern civic 
circulatory system, describing the difficulties posed by the obstructive sheds and 
curbstone dealers as negatively affecting all Philadelphians. Whether or not all 
Philadelphians frequented the street, they argued, one snarl in the civic circulatory system 
affected the totality. “In passing along Market street at the present time,” an observer 
wrote in 1846, “one cannot but be struck with the great inconvenience to which our 
business men are subject, from the crowded state of their pavements.” The street, the 
author argued, “should be appropriated exclusively to business and for the 
accommodation of those who are attracting it so successfully to our city.”97 Another 
writer pleaded for “a free and commodious channel” for the “movements of business,” 
eased of the incessant crush of “drays, wagons, carriages, merchandize, men and 
animals.”98 The removal of the “cheerless and unsightly” market sheds, a petition signed 
by over 500 merchants argued, would serve “the vital interests of Philadelphia … to place 
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her where she of right ought to be, and what the pride of her citizens desires she should 
be, the great distributing and manufacturing mart of the land.” Another called on the city 
council to perform its responsibility and allow “the public interest … to prevail” over the 
“market nuisance.”99  
 But for almost five years, from early 1854 to late 1858, the market issue paralyzed 
the city council. The hang-up stemmed more from political than legal complications. In 
1854, the state Supreme Court removed all legal obstacles to the city’s plan (while 
condemning its underhandedness), affirming the right of the municipal corporation “to 
shift [a market] from place to place, when the convenience or necessities of the people 
demand it.”100 How and where to shift the marketplace, and whether to shift or simply 
eliminate it, were more intractable questions. Following the Broad Street Market debacle, 
many city lawmakers betrayed ambivalence or condescension towards the municipal 
corporation’s continued control of the market system. During a heated debate over High 
Street Market in 1855, one councilman stated he “could not perceive why the city should 
build market houses for persons to sell their produce in,” since no other trade received the 
same accommodation from the city. The municipal market “was merely a relic of the 
past,” he claimed, “which has become unfit for the present age.” In his inaugural mayor’s 
address in 1858, Alexander Henry articulated similar misgivings. “The policy of 
providing at the public expense,” he wrote, “accommodations, however profitable they 
may be to the common revenue, for carrying on any individual business, must be very 
                                                
99 Appendix No. 206, JCCP, 1855-56: 611; North American, May 12, 1852. 
100 Appendix No. 206, JCCP, 1855-56: 601. While the legal obstacles were removed, the city council found 
itself struggling to wade through the market laws of the pre-consolidation districts, of which “no two [were] 
alike” the city commissioner complained in 1856, to produce a single, unified set of market ordinances. 
“There is,” Mayor Vaux declared in 1856, “no subject that more imperatively demands an enlightened 
revision and consideration by Councils than the sale of that most important object of trade—the food of the 
million.” Appendix No. 92, JCCP, 1855-56: 398. 
 
 275 
questionable.”101 Most lawmakers were more circumspect, mindful of the popularity of 
municipal market houses among a large portion of the electorate, especially the 
politically influential butchers. 
 Critics did not view the council’s reluctance to enact legislation to evacuate 
Market Street as representative of popular will but rather of a minority “market interest.” 
In 1858, the North American compared Philadelphia’s “ladies of the stalls” with “les 
dames des halles,” the Parisian market women whose favor French rulers were forced to 
curry at various historical moments. “See how respectfully they are treated by members 
of the City Councils,” it noted, “while those scurvy counting house fellows receive the 
cold shoulder.” In more contemporary parlance, another writer “fear[ed] that there [was] 
not sufficient independence of mind and freedom from demagogic influences.”102 Further, 
the Market Street contest fueled the sharp political rivalry between Whigs and Democrats. 
After Democrats returned to power in 1856, Whig supporters referred to the council’s 
inability to enact Market Street legislation as indicative of the former party’s ineptitude. 
“The opponents of the democratic party,” one wrote in 1858, “have ever shown 
themselves in Philadelphia the true friends of improvement, progress and home 
interests.”103  
 With the election of Mayor Henry in 1858, the major political obstacles were 
removed, and the city council proceeded with the demolition of High Street Market and 
the abandoning of the municipal market system. The ordinance of December 1, 1858, 
                                                
101 Inquirer, March 13, 1855; First Annual Message of Alexander Henry … (Philadelphia, 1859), 28. As 
Helen Tangires suggests, Henry’s predecessor, Democrat Richard Vaux, had been constrained by the fact 
that a large capital improvement like the new market houses would have proved unpopular in the context of 
the Panic of 1857. Tangires, Public Markets, 105. 
102 North American, August 3, 1858, Sept. 20, 1858; Inquirer, March 13, 1855. 
103 North American, Oct. 18, 1858, July 14, 1862. 
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called for the sheds to be torn down at the beginning of March the following year. A 
delegation of butchers and market supporters traveled to Harrisburg in late February to 
ask the state legislature and Supreme Court to halt the proceedings. In its review of the 
1854 decision, the court reaffirmed the right of the corporation to “shift” the marketplace. 
But it also authorized the corporation to divest itself of market responsibilities altogether. 
Broad Street Market, Justice John Meredith Read wrote, “has as yet produced no revenue,” 
and “the whole [market] scheme has utterly failed, with a most serious pecuniary loss to 
the city and their constituents.” He concluded: “This costly outlay is now entirely 
superceded by private corporate enterprise, which promises to supply the old city proper 
with well arranged and convenient market-houses.”104 In early March, the North 
American announced that buyers and sellers “were rapidly accommodating themselves to 
a new order of things.”105 
 Portraying themselves as “business men” arrayed against the “peculiar interests” 
and “antagonistic” aims of the municipal corporation, private market companies rapidly 
proliferated after the city passed the December 1, 1858, ordinance.106 Rice’s Broad Street 
Market provided the template for many of the new market halls that sprung up across the 
city over the next decade—quite literally, in fact, as the Western Market Company hired 
Rice to build the city’s first fully private market house in November 1858.107 Built on lots 
rather in the middle of streets, all conformed to the spatial logic of the grid. Many 
contained their own railroad depots to facilitate the more rapid distribution of agricultural 
                                                
104 Twitchell v. City of Philadelphia (1859), 33 Pa. 221; Wartman v. Philadelphia, 33 Pa. 210.  
105 North American, March 4, 1859. 
106 Report of the Managers of the Farmers’ Market Company, Presented at the Second Annual Meeting of 
the Stockholders, Held January 11, 1862 … (Philadelphia, 1862), 5; Ch. 300 (Dec. 1, 1858), Ordinances 
and Joint Resolutions of the Select and Common Councils of Philadelphia (Philadelphia, 1858), 459-460; 
De Voe, “Public Markets of Philadelphia,” N-YHS. 
107 Inquirer, Nov. 17, 1858; North American, April 12, 1859; Tangires, Public Markets, 112-114.  
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products to city retailers and consumers. Situated at the corner of Market and Twelfth 
Street, the Farmers’ Market (built in 1860) typified the scale of the new operations. 
Costing its proprietors $260,000, the structure measured 306 feet long, 114 feet wide, and 
80 feet high and was considered to be the largest market house in the United States at the 
time (Fig. 5.4).108 Interior photographs of Franklin Market, designed by John McArthur, 
Jr. (also responsible for Philadelphia’s City Hall) and erected in 1859 on South Eleventh 
Street between Market and Chestnut Street, illustrated the vast difference between the 
commodious new market houses and the humble street sheds (Fig. 5.5). 
 By the end of 1858, state lawmakers had incorporated thirteen such market 
companies, and the next two years saw many more legislative charters for market 
entrepreneurs. Many of these private market houses would fail within a few years, as 
butcher-historian Thomas De Voe wrote upon his visit to the city in 1862, victims of the 
vast costs of construction and the glut of market stalls.109 Their effects were far more 
lasting, however, paving the way for a new wave of private provisions dealers and 
undermining municipal market laws. In contrast to the 1838 charter of the William Penn 
Market Company, which was subject to “the control and supervision of the proper 
municipal authorities of the city of Philadelphia,” Helen Tangires observers, most of the 
new company charters of 1859 “vested authority for the ownership, maintenance, use, 
and management of the market house to a board” of managers. The twenty rules and 
regulations established by the state-charted Farmers’ Market Company of Philadelphia 
took precedence over city market laws. When Mayor Henry expressed doubts about the 
city’s role in furnishing market accommodations in his 1858 address, he effectively 
                                                
108 Barshinger, “Provisions for Trade,” 114. 
109 De Voe, “Public Markets of Philadelphia,” N-YHS. 
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declared the end to municipal markets in Philadelphia. What began as an effort to remove 
High Street Market and replace it with more convenient public market houses ended with 
the devolution of municipal market regulations to private enterprise.110 
 Yet the dismantling of the market sheds did not complete Market Street’s 
transformation. In September 1859, the North American gleefully reported that “Market 
street is at length cleared of its curbstone dealers, wagons, butcher blocks, hucksters’ tubs 
and baskets, and all the disgusting odors peculiar to the reign of the shinners.” It 
continued: “We had not the pleasure of watching the wagons depart, but it must have 
been rich, as most of them never had any horses, having been drawn to and from the curb, 
every market day, by hand.”111 The celebration was short-lived. After being removed 
from Market Street, many of the curbstone dealers settled in South Street, where they 
drew customers away from several new private market houses in the largely working-
class neighborhood. The city council had been able to banish market wagons from 
Market Street, but it could not eliminate their presence entirely. As a result, it passed 
ordinances designating several streets, including South Street, as stands for wagons. Just 
as they had done in Market Street, the curbstone dealers styled themselves farmers and 
parked their wagons adjacent to busy public markets—or, as the North American put it in 
characteristically racial terms, “all the tribe of market people rushed into them pell mell.” 
Nearby market houses suffered under the weight of competition and “were soon deserted” 
or converted into armories or distribution points during the Civil War.112 By the early 
1860s, then, with many of the company market halls out of business and municipal 
market laws stripped of their utility, there emerged new opportunities for a more 
                                                
110 Tangires, Public Markets, 108-110; Report of the Farmers’ Market Company, 17-19.  
111 North American, Sept. 6, 1859. 
112 North American, Nov. 6, 1861, Nov. 8, 1859; Public Ledger, Nov. 18, 1859; Inquirer, Dec. 3, 1860.  
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decentralized and privatized system of marketing to take root. 
 
Conclusion: Two views of capitalism 
 If the public market stood as the symbol of the civic economy in the first decades 
of the nineteenth century, the street replaced it in the 1850s—literally, in High Street 
Market’s case. With late-antebellum developments in lithography and photography, street 
scenes offered a way for Americans to think through the various meanings of 
capitalism.113 Two lithographs, one of Baltimore Street in 1850 and the other of Market 
Street in 1859, each celebrate the commercial prosperity of Baltimore and Philadelphia, 
but they do so in decidedly different ways (Figs. 5.6, 5.7). Employing a deep perspective, 
E. Sachse & Company’s Baltimore Street lithograph depicts a city in perpetual motion. 
Vectors of movement abound, as shoppers, cartmen, carriages, children, hucksters, and 
shopkeepers travel at diverging angles. Framing the scene is the massive Baltimore 
Museum, whose proprietors long had attempted to convince municipal authorities to 
remove their license fees. Just out of sight, to the right of the picture, was the old Centre 
Market. Awnings jut out into the street—placed by businesses with permission from the 
municipal corporation—blurring into a continuous row at the far end of the horizon. It is 
a boisterously heterogeneous portrayal of Baltimore’s commercial thoroughfare: white, 
upper-class promenaders pass by African-American laborers, while upwards of a dozen 
                                                
113 Dell Upton has written extensively on the myriad cultural meanings of the antebellum street and of such 
street images specifically. See for instance, Dell Upton, “‘Another City’: The Urban Cultural Landscape in 
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horses trot along. The potential for this streetscape to collapse into disorder is there—a 
horse threatens to run headlong into two draymen, a child dashes in front of a carriage—
but a shared spirit of market activity unites all participants and keeps the disorder in 
check. This image is an eloquent and vibrant rendering of the civic economy, though its 
omission of the public market is revealing.  
 The 1859 Market Street lithograph tells a different story about capitalism, 
emphasizing orderly circulation, homogeneity, and refinement. Unlike Sachse’s 
lithograph, which was produced for popular consumption, the Market Street lithograph 
was an advertisement for the street’s businesses (though, in this sense, both commodified 
the streetscape). Published from 1857 to 1880, The Baxter Panoramic Directory endorsed 
a gentrified vision of the street that appealed to the sensibilities of businessmen and 
property holders, whose investments Baxter courted. Baxter’s scenes removed all signs of 
the hucksters, carters, and poor Philadelphians who employed the street for commercial 
uses other than genteel shopping. That this particular lithograph carried the date of 1859, 
at the apex of contests over Market Street, makes the absence of conflict and difference 
all the more telling. This image captures the liberal vision of the city. By rendering 
Market Street a promenade, a spectacle of controlled motion that demarcated upper-
middle-class identity, it celebrates the triumph of what Chris Otter has termed the 
“bourgeois visual environment.” Just as important, the lithograph disregards those who 
were out of place in the bourgeois visual environment—people of color, laborers, and the 
poor, who belonged to parts of the city where vision was hindered and “dirt, din and 
stench did not instill a sense of shame.”114 Finally, the image entirely obscures the role of 
                                                
114 Chris Otter, “Making liberalism durable,” 3; David Scobey, “Anatomy of the Promenade: The Politics 
of Bourgeois Sociability in Nineteenth-Century New York,” Social History 17, no. 2 (May 1992): 203-227. 
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the state in creating this space of circulation: there are no policemen, no potential 
obstructions in need of regulation, and infrastructure is utterly absent. The rise of the 
liberal city made the rise of political and economic liberalism appear absolute and 
predestined. 
 The contrast between the two lithographs is not necessarily indicative of different 
self-perceptions between Baltimoreans and Philadelphians; there were pictorial 
directories that promoted a staid interpretation of Baltimore Street, as well. Nor should 
one lithograph be viewed as more authentic or less stylized than the other. Like many 
other images that depicted antebellum streets as riotous and anarchic, they both 
performed cultural work. They are prisms through which to examine the countervailing 
forces of capitalism, its kaleidoscopic features, and, in particular, the guiding tension 
between circulation and disorder in the antebellum city. 
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Fig. 5.1. Maryland Institute Schottisch, 1854. Compare this with the Fielding Lucas 





Fig. 5.2. Philadelphia’s market houses in 1854: 1. High Street (1693), 2. South Second 
Street (1745), 3. North Second Street (1800), 4. Wharton (1813), 5. Kensington (1819), 6. 
Callowhill Street (1826), 7. Spring Garden, 8. South Eleventh Street (1835), 9. 
Washington (1835), 10. Girard Avenue (1847), 11. Franklin Avenue (1848), 12. York 
Street (1851), 13. Lehigh Avenue (1851), 14. Broad and Race Street (1854). Adapted 
from Colton’s Map of Philadelphia (1856). 
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Fig. 5.3. Market Street in early 1859, shortly before its demolition. Library Company of 
Philadelphia. 
Fig. 5.4. Butchers’ and Farmers’ Market, circa 1869. Library Company of Philadelphia.
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Fig. 5.6. E. Sachse & Company print of Baltimore Street in 1850. Cator Print Collection, 






Fig. 5.7. Baxter’s Panoramic Business Directory, for 1860. Market Street is presented as 
disencumbered (in more ways than one) from the former blight of High Street Market. 
Library Company of Philadelphia.
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Epilogue: The Return of the Civic Economy 
 
 In early August 2007, health and housing officials condemned a city-owned horse 
stable nestled off a side street in West Baltimore, citing its deleterious effects on the 
horses as well as the neighborhood. The measure touched off a new round of debates 
about the future of a small but well-known group of African American fruit and vegetable 
hucksters known as arabbers. For many years prior to the closure of the Retreat Street 
stables, arabbers and their horse-drawn, produce-laden wagons had been vanishing from 
Baltimore’s commercial landscape. Numbering around one hundred in the 1980s (down 
from their mid-century peak), there were “perhaps a few dozen” by the early 2000s. Since 
a 1966 ordinance prohibited the construction of new ones within city limits, the closure 
of one of the last three stables in the city appeared to seal arabbers’ fate. In the wake of 
the 2007 closure, however, public opinion rallied around arabbing’s preservation: there 
was renewed interest in the history of the trade (edified by a 2004 film documentary), a 
nonprofit preservation group was established in 2009, and the city renovated and 
expanded remaining stables in the early 2010s. The city’s arabbers garnered media 
attention beyond the city, in part due to cameos in the television show, The Wire.1  
 Nevertheless, despite the support of many Baltimoreans who celebrate arabbing 
as a distinctive and prominent feature of the city’s history and culture, the combination of 
health regulations and competition continue to erode the economic and social foundations 
                                                
1 “City-Owned Building Condemned for Safety Violations,” Sun, Aug. 9, 2007; “A Horse-Drawn Tradition 
Endures, Just Barely,” Los Angeles Times, March 8, 2014. For a timeline of recent events (through 2013), 
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3, 2014). See also Roland L. Freeman, The Arabbers of Baltimore (Centreville, MD: Tidewater Publishers, 
1989). For the history of horses in the nineteenth-century city and related questions of animal cruelty and 
regulation, see Clay McShane and Joel A. Tarr, The Horse in the City: Living Machines in the Nineteenth 
Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); Ann Norton Greene, Horses at Work: 
Harnessing Power in Industrial America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
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of arabbing. License requirements prevent anyone under eighteen years old from 
handling the horses, for instance, which arabbers protest is “stopping them [young 
people] from joining the trade.” In fall 2013, officials began enforcing a ten-year-old 
ordinance that mandated the microchipping of horses to enable GPS tracking, a digital 
wrinkle to the long history of attempts to regulate the mobility of commercial itinerants—
a history that, Chapter Two indicated, linked to broader concerns about the mobility of 
African Americans. Arabbers accepted the new tracking regulations but lamented the 
additional costs, paperwork, and oversight. While the proliferation of community gardens 
and farmers’ markets has increased demand for fresh fruits and vegetables, arabbers are 
often relegated to side (and less visible) streets as a result of the dangers posed by 
automobiles. Despite growing attention to the pervasive problem of “food deserts” in 
Baltimore, the number of arabbers has dwindled to about a dozen according to the most 
recent estimates.2 
 The history of Baltimore’s arabbers is not just a lesson in race, regulation, and 
entrepreneurship but also of the enduring legacies of nineteenth-century liberalism in the 
city more generally. Arabbing emerged in the immediate aftermath of emancipation, 
taking advantage of African Americans’ newly fortified freedom of movement. Arabbing 
addressed two distinctive problems of capitalism in the liberal city: discrimination in the 
labor market and deepening disparities in access to food. By the late-1850s, free persons 
                                                
2 Catherine Finn, “The Wanderers’ Songs: The Last of Baltimore’s Arabbers—Horse-and-Cart Vendors—
Are Fading Away,” National Trust for Historic Preservation, 
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of color faced mounting obstacles to employment in trades they long had occupied. 
Competition from native-born and immigrant white laborers, punctuated by violence and 
intimidation, undermined the place of African Americans in shipbuilding and 
brickmaking trades.3 Racism and economic competition, filtered through the prism of the 
civic economy, also undergirded late-antebellum attempts to restrict free blacks’ use of 
public markets. In 1858, 77 men and women, including hucksters, petitioned Baltimore’s 
city council “to pass an ordinance to Prohibit the coloured population from renting & 
licensing stalls in the different markets in the city.” The city council ruled averse to the 
petition, but it offered no solutions to the larger forces at work.4 In conjunction with labor 
discrimination and increasing residential segregation, the turn away from municipal 
markets fixed food system inequalities in the landscape of the liberal city. Much of the 
contemporary phenomenon of food deserts can be traced to regulatory shifts in the 
1850s.5 
 The case of arabbers points to one of the underlying themes of this dissertation: 
the public good is a capacious concept that has worked, at various moments, to buttress 
social inequities rather than bridge them. The People’s Welfare, William Novak’s 
pioneering study, adapts the categories of Nathan Dane and other antebellum jurists to 
argue that the public good encompassed five primary objectives: public safety, public 
                                                
3 M. Ray Della, Jr., “The Problems of Negro Labor in the 1850’s,” Maryland Historical Magazine 66, no. 1 
(Spring 1971): 14-32; Towers, “Job Busting at Baltimore Shipyards: Racial Violence in the Civil War-Era 
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Food,” in The Oxford Handbook of Food History, ed. Jeffrey M. Pilcher (New York: Oxford University 
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economy, public ways, public morality, and public health. While not critiquing Novak’s 
decision to organize his chapters around these five categories—they are, after all, useful 
heuristic devices—this dissertation demonstrates the need to explore the active 
construction and contestation of these categories. In contrast to Novak’s public economy, 
the civic economy stresses how the public good was a subjective concept that could be 
wielded as an instrument of discrimination as well as democracy, of community as well 
as personal interests, of the powerful as well as the powerless. This tension underpinned 
the civic economy. 
 The more marginalized a group was, the blurrier legal distinctions between streets, 
safety, health, morality, and economy became. On the one hand, the collapsing of legal 
categories into a single, overarching concept—order—opened up space for participants in 
the informal economy, because it encouraged police officers, market clerks, and other 
ground-level authorities to construe municipal regulations more loosely. Whether 
officials did so from a sense of social solidarity with the people they policed, confusion 
about what the law meant, or profit incentives (bribery), they contributed to the many 
legalities of the civic economy. On the other, the slipperiness of classifications like public 
health and morality empowered lawmakers to crack down on particular economic 
activities whenever they sensed political opportunities or shifts in prevailing attitudes. A 
Progressive-era jurist captured this dynamic when he described license laws as 
“fluctuat[ing] with the changes of feeling continually occurring in society” about what 
constituted a “danger to social interests.” As a result, regulation made life more, not less, 
precarious for those who engaged more informally with antebellum capitalism. These 
men, women, and children, comprising a large (and perhaps majority) of the urban 
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population, inhabited the spaces between Novak’s categories. Moreover, they bore the 
unseen costs of regulation—penalties, delays, lawyer’s fees, time spent circulating 
petitions—more heavily than their wealthier counterparts.6 
 If the civic economy contained the seeds of a more democratic vision of 
capitalism in the early republic, by the 1840s and 1850s that vision, like improperly 
stored flour, had begun to decompose. Nevertheless, the civic economy retains hope for 
regenerating these seeds. Debates over how to balance the need for order while 
preserving the livelihood of arabbers—as well as their link to an indispensible piece of 
the city’s history—suggest that certain roots of the civic economy so well captured in the 
1850 Baltimore Street lithograph are as robust as ever. Moving from the local to the 
national and beyond, movements to alleviate restrictions on food trucks and farm stands, 
promote fairer access to the financial system through microloans, and breathe new life 
into urban public spaces demonstrate a renewed interest in bringing capitalism back down 
to the human scale. Just as important, these movements have led at least some local, state, 
and federal authorities to reconsider the relationship of the market to the city, though—as 
always—politics has been as much an obstacle to as an instigator of innovation in the 
civic economy. At the very least, recent events suggest that the tendrils linking 
democracy and capitalism have not fossilized but rather continue to sprout new growths 
for the people to cultivate. 
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